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Radical Change in a School of Education, September I967 - November I969:
A Study of Leader-Dominated Change in a University Subcomponent (May 1973 )
Lyman B. Brainerd, Jr., A.B.
,
Harvard College
MBA, Harvard Graduate School of
Business Administration
Directed by; Kenneth H. Blanchard, Ph.D.
This dissertation contains a description and analysis of the
initial twenty-six months of an attempt at rapid and thoroughgoing
change at the School of Education, University of Massachusetts,
Amherst. Particular emphasis is placed upon the change leewiership
strategies employed by the Dean, the success of which depended both on
viniquely effective aspects of the strategies themselves and on the
Dean's domination of the major sources of power in the organization.
Preliminary chapters include a summary of the literature of
change in higher education and of organizational change and a chapter
in which the scope and magnitude of the changes at the School of Edu-
cation are delineated by means of a comparison of the School at the
beginning and end of the period under review along as many significant
aspects, tangible and intangible, as possible.
The body of the study is comprised of four case analyses which
describe and analyze the actions of the Dean and instructional
staff
members in response to the four principal organizational
challenges of
of the initial change period, which are summarized as
follows;
the building of an institution committed to change
rather
than maintenance of the status quo
Vll
the mobilization of members of that organization, most of
whom were new to it, to develop new progreims and policies in a short
period of time
—the conceptualization, development, and legitimization of
new programs and policies by the organization
—the development and legitimization of appropriate governing
mechanisms to support the change effort and facilitate continued inno-
vation in the School
The final analytical chapter focuses on the change strategies
pursued by the Dean, beginning with a force-field analysis demonstrat-
ing the importance of these strategies to the change effort, continuing
with an analysis of how domination of the major power sources, formal
and informal, in the School was achieved, and concluding with a descrip-
tion of the specific strategies employed.
The final chapter consists of summary and conclusions drawn
from the case analyses and in the perspective of the literature pre-
viously summarized.
Some of the major conclusions of the dissertation are:
—^that the School was able to accomplish substantial reform in
a system which has historically been highly resistant to change
—that the academic reforms accomplished were in the directions
auivocated by the major national commissions on higher education of the
last five years
that the principal factor in the successful change effort was
the uniquely effective change leadership of the Dean which included a
wide array of strategies whose effect was to motivate those within the
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organization toward creative innovation, to protect the organization
from premature restraint from without, and to counteract the conserva-
tive tendencies of collegial decision-making structures
—that at the end of the period under review a number of sig-
nificant problems remained, particularly the potential difficulty of
converting the organizational focus from conceptualization of programs
to implementation and evaluation, the unresolved tension between par-
ticipative and leader-dominated governance, and the potential problems
inherent in the course of growth on which the School was embarked, par-
ticularly in the implications of growth for the maintenance of the
Dean's leadership style and of a shared sense of purpose and community
in the School.
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2CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Significance of the Study
Radical reform occxirs only rarely in large institutions and per-
haps most rarely of all in large educational institutions, particularly
institutions of higher education which have proven themselves to be
uniquely resistant to rapid and thoroTighgoing change. Normally change,
when it does occur in such institutions, takes the form of slow, often
reluctant, evolutionary alterations which become apparent over a period
of years. Such reforms have generally been sufficiently small in scope
and substance as to not significantly affect, except when viewed in the
perspective of decades, the fundamental assumptions, structures, and edu-
cational policies and processes of the institution.
There is clear evidence that this evolutionary process of change
in the large Universities which form the basic strands of the fabric of
the higher education system in the United States has not kept pace with
the revolutionary changes which have taken place in the social and tech-
nological environment in which the University exists and for which its
students must be appropriately prepared—in effect creating, in these
institutions, a serious "debt to time." For Universities to repay this
debt, to close the gap and become current with the present, will require
far more rapid and thoroughgoing change than such institutions have his-
torically been willing or able to achieve.
3But merely closing the gap will not be enovigh. There is every
indication that environmental change will continue and that it will occur
at an increasingly rapid rate. This fact of time and change will make it
incumbent upon Universities to maintain their capacity for rapid and
thoroughgoing change—^will demand that change, often radical change, be-
come the norm rather than the exception in the conduct of the university.
In the face of the pressing need for rewiical change now, and for
the institutionalization of change in the futvire, the collective knowl-
edge of the means by which these goals can be accomplished appears woe-
fully inadequate. We have learned that change cannot successfully be
forced upon a reluctant educational community, but how to involve such
a community in an honest attempt at re-evaluation and reformation remains
more an art, subject to many trials and more errors, than a science claim-
ing reasonably reliable maps for reasonably describable territories.
During the period September 19^7 through November the School
of Education, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, underwent a period
of change marked by explosive growth in numbers and diversity of faculty
and students, rapid expansion in scope and substance of educational pro-
grams, and thorough reformation of academic and organizational policies
possibly unparalleled in the history of American higher education.
This study represents an attempt to contribute to the collective
knowledge of change in higher education and of organizational change in
general by a critical examination and analysis of the significant actions,
events, and processes which contributed to the effort to bring about
radical change at the School of Education.
4Implications of the Study
The data, analysis, and insights of this study are intended to
be specific in that they pertain to a particular change effort in a par-
ticular school under a particular kind of leadership—specifically, to
radical, leader-d.ominated change in a university sub-component. However,
this study has been pursued in the expectation that many of its findings
would also be generalizable to less rsuiical attempts at change, pursued
under other leadership styles, in other kinds of organizations.
Further, it is expected that the content of this study will be
useful both to organizational theorists, since it provides specific in-
sights into the dynamics of this organizational change effort, and to
practicing administrators, since it describes and analyzes a specific
and potentially replicable change effort and delineates a set of change
strategies successfully employed to bring about change.
Description of the Period Under Review
The period under review in this study covers the major change
period of the School of Education, September 19^7 through November 1969 »
d\xring which time the fundamental personnel decisions, operating and
governance structures, and academic policies and programs which were to
characterize the School in future years were conceived and brought to
various stages of consummation.
This period begins with the opening of the 1 967-68 School year
under a new Dean appointed the previous May; encompasses that year in
which the groundwork for the changes to come was laid by the Dean; pro-
ceeds to the 1968-69 "planning year" in which the major academic policies
5and programs of the School were designed and the major governing struc-
t\xres emerged; and culminates in November of the I 969-7O school year when
the final business of the period, the formal adoption of a ''permanent"
governing document for the School, was completed.
Objectives of the Study
As an active participant in the change effort, I believe that the
period under review here was the most challenging and important in my
life and that the events of the change effort were of enormous signifi-
cance to higher education and to the understanding of organizational
change. I have therefore set out in this study to describe the signifi-
cant actions, events, and processes of the period, come to an \xnderstand-
ing of the major factors operating to bring about change, make tentative
judgments about the successes and failures of the change effort, and
finally to attempt to view the implications of the change effort at the
School of Education in the larger context of educational and organiza-
tional change.
It became clear early in the study that of the approximately 200
people involved in this attempt at radical reform, the actions and change
strategies of one man, ]>wight W. Allen, named as Dean in May of 1967i
stood out clearly as the single most important factor in the change ef-
fort. Any attempt at understanding the success of the change effort at
the School would thus have to look closely at his actions and strategies
both separately and in the context of their impact upon the period under
review. Therefore, a major focus of this dissertation will be on the
description and analysis of change strategies employed by the Dean.
6A final goal of this study relates specifically to the School of
Education at this point in time, and is one of considerable importance
to the writer. This goal is to provide a history of the origins of the
School for the hundreds of faculty and doctoral students who have joined
the School since the planning year. In an organization whose operations
are as informal, flexible, and often as chaotic as are those of the School
of Education it is important for all involved to have a shared sense of
what came before, of how policies and decisions which continue to affect
them in the School were made, and of how the School came to be as it is.
The hundreds who have joined the School have not had that sense, and
many seem to want it. I have, for example, been asked many times to ex-
plain "the spirit of Colorado," a spirit which they sense has considerable
meaning for those who were there, but little (except perhaps a sense of
exclusion) for those who were not.
I hope, therefore, that this dissertation will provide for those
not involved in the planning year at least some sense of that exciting
year which can be shared as a common bond with those who were there.
For this reason I have, at times, gone into greater detail and analysis,
and introduced anecdotal material, beyond that needed simply for the case
analyses.
Definition of Terms
Two important terms in the title of this dissertation require
further definition.
Radical Reform ; My use of these words denotes extreme change
from the usual or traditional—change so thoroughgoing as to "affect the
7fundamental character of the thing involved."^ In the case of the School
of Education, changes so thoroughgoing as to make it fundamentally dif-
ferent from the traditional school of education. Radical reform also
implies rapid reform, as indicated hy the use of these terms in the ini-
tial paragraph of this chapter. These terms, however, are not intended
to indicate reform in any particular direction. There is, for instance,
no intent to imply that radical reform bears any relation to the radical
movements in the United States.
Leader Domination ; "Leader domination," as used in this disser-
tation, describes a structure of governance and organizational decision-
making characterized by unilateral decision-making power on the part of
the leader and the absence of an effective countervailing power structure
by which members of the organization can, through institutionalized means,
legitimately overturn a decision of the leader or make a decision for the
organization without the approval, explicit or tacit, of the leader. All
power and legitimacy tend to run to the leader and persons designated by
the leader. The leader has, whether he employs it or not, the power to
make or overturn any decision at any level of the organization. The
leader* s power is derived both from the legitimization of his position
by higher powers and from his control over the most important sources of
power in his organization.
'^
Webster’s Dictionary of Synonyms (Springfield, Mass.; Merriam,
1951), P. 376 *
8Organization of the PiBser-bation
On the basis of the objectives described above, I have organized
this dissertation as follows:
Chapter II—Contains an overview of the relevant literature on
resistance to change in higher education, on the state of contemporary
higher education, on case studies of change in higher education, and on
organizational change theory. This overview is undertaken to provide a
perspective on the significance of the change effort at the School of
Education in the larger context of educational and organizational change.
Chapter III—-Contains a comparison of the School at September
1967 and November I969 along as many significant aspects, both tangible
and intangible, as possible as a meajis of establishing the specific scope
and ma^itude of the changes which took place at the School during the
period under review.
Chapters IV-VII--Contain case analyses of significant actions,
events, and processes organized both chronologically and around the four
major challenges faced by the School in its attempt at radical change.
The purpose of these case analyses is to describe what took place, ex-
plore the import and implications of significant actions and events and
the dynamics at work in those events, and make tentative judgments about
the strong and weak points of the change effort. These case analyses
focus both on the actions and strategies of the Dean and on other fac-
tors significant to the change process.
Chapter VIII—^Focuses on the change strategies employed by the
Dean, first assessing their impact through the medium of force field
9analysis, then describing the means by which the domination over the
organization on which most of these change strategies depend was achieved,
and finally detailing the various specific strategies and their impact
on the success of the change effort by specific reference to material in
the case analyses. This chapter concludes with an attempt to generalize
these strategies for replication by others by deriving some general prin-
ciples on which these strategies are based and delineating points at
which organizations appear to be susceptible to change based on the suc-
cess of these strategies.
Chapter IX—Is devoted to recapitulation and summary of the major
analytical insights and conclusions of the study, to an examination of
the implications of some of the findings for the future of the School,
and to an exaunination of the study in the perspective of change in higher
education and of organizational change.
Methodology of the Study
I have chosen what I term historical case analysis as the basic
methodology for dealing with the events of the period under review. Case
analysis is similar to case study in that it focuses on the description
of significant events, but differs in that it includes an attempt to
trace causes and effects, describe implications, and make judgments based
on the data available. In addition, the data presented in case analysis
is organized more according to major interpretive foci than as an attempt
to chronologically delineate significant events.
Also in this case analysis I see my function more as an historian
than as a researcher in the sense that the events with which I am concerned
10
occurred in the past and were not subject by me or anyone else to any
systematic attempt to collect data during the period. Thus, whatever
data is available exists only in undifferentiated form in the minds of
participants and in recorded and written records of the time.
Since I was, as will be described below, an active participant
in many of the events to be described, this study belongs to a subcate-
gory of history, often referred to as eyewitness history. As such, it
is necessary first to distinguish this history from memoir, and secondly
to attempt to deal with the extent to which my participation in events
has biased my presentation and interpretation of them.
As to the first, Arthiir Schlesinger, Jr. in his essay "The His-
torian as Participant" distinguishes memoir from history as follows:
"Memoirs are part of the raw material of history, but they are written
for their own purposes—to set down one man's experience or to chronicle
notable events or to discharge v^ulities or rancors—rather than to dis-
cern causation in the flow of events over time [which is the function of
the historian]."^
My intent in this study is to be the eyewitness historian—to
trace causes and effects in the flow of events in which I was a partici-
pant. The principal lenses through which I view these events are drawn
from the fields of organizational and leadership theory.
As to the biases inherent in the fact of my own participation in
the events of the period. Let me first point out that 2Uiy "historian,"
in the sense used by Schlesinger, by his very attempt "to discern
^Daedalus
,
Spring 1971* P« 340.
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causation in the flow of events over time" is introducing a bias in his
accounting of events. Since it is a practical impossibility to recount
all events from all viewpoints, a historian necessarily focuses on those
events which relate (either pro or con) to his interpretation of those
events. Thus, for example, an analyst of the French Revolution who, by
his study of the data, concludes that there were five major causes of
that revolution will, in relating his findings, present to the reader
only that data which bears on his interpretation—necessarily phrasing
the data in a way which emphasizes its relation to his findings and ex-
cluding other data which he believes not relevant to his interpretation
and thus, for him, not relevant to the causes of the revolution.
In this process there is a presumption (and an inaccurate one,
I believe) that because of his distance in time from the French Revolu-
tion the historian can be considered an objective viewer.
I have followed, as will be described further in this section, a
process quite similar to that of the historian—with the exception of the
fact that the events I ajn attempting to interpret are considerably closer
in time and I was a participant in many of those events. My "objectivity,"
therefore, is open to greater question.
To help the reader arrive at his own judgment of the extent of my
objectivity and thus of the validity of my recounting, interpretations,
and conclusions, I shall first outline below the nature and extent of my
participation in the events under review and subsequent connection with
the School and then attempt to explore my own biases.^
^Since much of the data on my involvement with the School has only
limited meaning for those unfamiliar with the period under review, I
would
suggest that the reader make a note to reread this section when he
has
finished the study.
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I joined the School in September of I968 as one of the 85 plan-
ning doctoral students, having had no contact with or knowledge of Dean
Allen prior to my interview with him in August, I968 (at the sviggestion
of a friend who had accepted a faculty position for the fall). I was
fresh from a highly disenchanting experience as Dean of a private board-
ing school and Dean Allen's description of the kind of school he was
pleuining to build was enormously exciting to me.
My involvement with the planning year included;
—Present at the initial (Sept. 4) faculty meeting and most fac-
ulty and community meetings thereafter.
—Present at the Retreat, a member of the Sunday night group
which instigated the racial awareness sessions, facilitator at
the racial awareness sessions, present at all community meet-
ings, involved with the structure committee and a number of
interest groups, present at parties described, participant in
late-night bull-sessions.
—Consultant to, ajid informal member of, the Executive Committee
with major concern constitution—writing, school organization,
emd fund raising. Present at most Executive Committee meetings
including the October 23 Northfield meeting.
Co-author (with Robert Woodbury and Richard Coffing) of the
Ten-Year Projection.
Co-author (with Richard Coffing) of "The School of Education
and a New Corporate Design."
—Co-author (with Lloyd Kline and Arthur Eve) of "A Thrust Toward
Relevance," the first attempt, undertaken in late October 19^8 ,
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to describe the School and intended primarily for funding
agencies.
—^Writer of Tabula Basa (Dec. 6
,
I968) lead editorial “Some
Inconclusive Observations on Direction."
—Active member of Administration and Humanistic Education plan-
ning committees (and author or co—author of funding proposals
for both) and closely in touch (through my wife’s membership)
with the Aesthetics Education planning committee.
—^Primarily responsible for initial draft of the Interim
Catalogue .
—A.lso held the following positions and memberships during the
period under review; Member of Finance Committee, School Man-
agement Committee, Editorial Board of UMass Series on Education,
and elected member of the Graduate Faculty Assembly. Also
Coordinator of Fund Raising during a portion of the planning
year.
—Member of Writing Committee for the Interim Catalogue .
—Present at the University Faculty Senate Meeting at which the
Interim Catalogue was approved.
Author of "A Thrust Toward Relevance: The Year in Review," an
attempt to summarize the planning year, published in Trend
magazine. Spring 1969*
—Subsequent activities which may bear on my interpretation of
events include; during the I969-7O academic year coordinator
of planning for an innovative program in educational leader-
ship; in winter I97I the general editorship of Profile , an
14
extensive description of the School and its activities intended
for outsiders; in spring I97I consultant to the "President's
Committee on the Future University of Massachusetts," and in
winter I973 preparation of a draft copy of a report on the
first five years of the School for the Board of Trustees.
—Since September 1970 I have not been actively engaged in the
day-to-day affairs of the School, but have, as implied by the
previous paragraph, taken the role of observer and interpreter.
I would summarize my involvement with the School during the plan-
ning year as follows. I was in a position, often as active participant
and often as witness, to observe closely what I believe were the central
events of the planning year. My participant role was always as member
of groups acting euivisory to the Dean or the School Community, but I do
not consider myself to have been a close insider or confidant of the
Dean—nor was I ever in substantial conflict with the Dean or any other
group in a confrontation-type situation.
In sum, in attempting to explore my own biases, I do not believe
that, as a result of my participation in the planning year, I have either
a personal ax to grind or a desire to protect anyone or any group. It
is clear that many of the issues I was involved in during that year, par-
ticularly the issue of governance and of the adoption of new academic
programs, are issues which I deal with in considerable length in this
study. It is possible that my concern with them during the year has
colored ray view of their relative importance to the development of the
School
15
Clearly my work on the charter during the fall and on the "In-
terim Catalogue" writing committee during the spring gave me a perspec-
tive on the process and importance of those efforts which others might
not share.
And finally, I am aware of a personal philosophical bias which
was present during the planning year and has grown firmer since, and
that is that I am convinced of the necessity of effective participative
governance in higher education. My ideas on this subject are profoundly
influenced by, and well summed up in, Warren Bennis' Changing Organiza-
tions . This conviction has certainly influenced my decision to focus in
on the School's abortive efforts to achieve participation in governance.
However, it should also be noted that as a result of the insights gained
in preparing this st\idy, I have become far more sympathetic to the ap-
proach which I describe as leader domination and which, it now appears
to me, may be appropriate under some circumstances.
It should be emphasized that this study is in no way an "author-
ized" recoxinting of the development of the School. All statements about
School thrusts, purposes, intentions, goals, and priorities are my own
perceptions as are descriptions of the strategies and activities of the
Dean. This study represents my best attempt, based on the data I have
acciunulated and on my observations as participant, to reliably portray
aind interpret the major factors in the development of the School. But
it should be emphasized that these are my own perceptions. Others occu-
pying different positions during the planning year or viewing the plan-
ning year as an outside observer or holding different philosophical biases
would probably see different issues and conceivably arrive at different
conclusions
16
My principal method of organization for the case analysis sec-
tions of this study (Chapters IV through VII) has been to begin the
chapter by describing what I saw as the major organizational challenge
to be met during the specific period being reviewed and then, in the re-
mainder of the chapter, to trace the efforts of the Dean and those in
the organization in meeting those challenges. My choice of each of these
challenges arose out of my experience, my interviews with Dean Allen,
and my review of the documentation of the period.
In Chapter VIII I focus on the change strategies pursued by Dean
Allen as a result of my conclusion, based on the evidence presented in
prior chapters, that these strategies were the most important factor in
the success of the change effort at the School and should therefore be
presented in greater detail both because of their importance to the de-
velopment of the School and as potential models for chajige strategies to
be pursued by others.
Data Sources
Beyond my own contact with the events of the planning year, my
most importajit source of data was a series of twelve discussions, aver-
aging about one and one—half hours each, with Dean Allen held from July
1971 through May 1972. These discussions, which I taped, were devoted
in some part to the recollection of events, but were primarily focused
on discussions of Dean Allen's philosophy of educational leeuiership and
on the strategies which he followed to bring about change at the School.
Much of the material contained in Chapter IV, "Establishing a Foundation
for Change," and Chapter VIII, "On Leader-Dominated Change," was derived
17
from those discussions, but the constructions and interpretations pre-
sented in this dissertation are entirely my ovm. Vfhat I have described
is my ovm interpretation of the philosophy and strategies of Dean Allen
based on my discussions with him together with my observation of his be-
havior during the planning year, and I do not purport to have described
his philosophy and strategies as he would.
Since I was not present during the I967-I968 year, I have relied
on interviews and written and audio records of the period for my data.
My interviews included six hours (taped) of intervievre vfith two
members of the original group who arrived with Dean Allen in January
1968 . Those interviews, held in February and March 1972, focused on the
recruiting effort and on fund raising for the planning year.
I also formally interviewed three members of the existing faculty
(taped, approximately two hours each) focusing on the organization of the
School prior to the arrival of Dean Allen, the personality and leauiership
style of Dean Purvis, the faculty "personality” and morale, the curricu-
Ivun, the student population, and the transition period following Allen's
arrival in January I968. These interviews were held in May and June of
1972.
I interviewed Oswald Tippo, Provost of the University during the
period under review. This one-hour taped interview was held in May 1972
and covered the nature of the School prior to the arrival of Dean Allen,
the selection process which resulted in the hiring of Allen, the kind of
University support given to the Dean during the planning year, Tippo 's
views of the progress of the planning year, and a discussion of the In-
terim Catalogue approval process in University channels.
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A major source of data on the state of the School prior to
Allen's arrival and particularly on the effect of hie behavior and ac-
tions on the existing faculty came from a transcript of the testimony of
the tenured faculty members who had brought an extensive grievance
against Dean Allen in April I968. This transcript also included Allen's
responses—and School files include copies of the grievance itself and
preliminary memoranda exchanged between Dean Allen and the tenured fac-
ulty* I also listened to a tape of the grievance hearing of a faculty
member whose contract had not been renewed. Much of the final section
of Chapter IV and portions of Chapter III were derived from these docu-
ments*
I reviewed the documents in the central School files for data on
the 1967-1968 school year, which appear incomplete but did yield the
Annual Report, faculty meeting minutes, recruiting correspondence, and
docianents pertaining to the planning doctoral program. These files also
contain an evaluation report prepared by the School in November I966 for
the National Coiuicil for Accreditation of Teacher Education and Dean
Purvis' final Annual Report ( 1 966-67) which summarized his thirty-one
year tenure at the School and included his analysis of the state of the
School in late 1967 * The latter two dociunents were extremely helpful in
understanding the School prior to the arrival of Deaji Allen*
Also, while not strictly qualifying as data, I have discussed
the "old" ajid "new" School of Education with a number of University and
School of Education faculty members over the years, their observations
being part of and consistent with the picture I have drawn in the disser-
tation
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Most of the statistical data in this study, particularly in
Chapter III, was drawn from School and University publications including
the School of Education grofile
,
the I970 report of the Faculty Senate
Long Range Planning Committee, the I967 "Blue Book" prepared by the Uni-
versity Office of Institutional Studies and its I972 supplement, and the
Report of the President »s Committee on the Future University of Massachu-
setts *
My sources of data on events subsequent to my arrival includes
—^The previously described interviews with Dean Allen.
—My own recollection of events together with some very sketchy
notes made at the Retreat and at some meetings thereafter.
—What I believe to be a complete set of all written communica-
tions distributed to the faculty and doctoral students during the plan-
ning year—which I kept and filed.
—A complete collection of Tabula Rasa
,
the School newspaper,
published twice weekly during the planning year. (Bound collections in
School central files and the Archives of the University Library.) This
collection provides a fairly complete compilation of the important docu-
ments of the period, including agenda for and minutes of most Executive
Committee and Faculty meetings.
—A copy of the Interim Catalogue prepared for University approval
agencies, (in central School files.)
^Video-tapes of some of the Retreat events including Dean
Allen's Tuesday afternoon discussion of racial issues, his Wednesday
morning "What Makes Dwight Tick" speech, the discussion of the structure-
goals-^iecision^aking issue, the Joseph Rhodes speech to the group, the
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WSSC presentation, the departure from the Colorado Springs airport, and
miscellaneous others. It is reported that other video records of the
year were reused for teaching p\irposes because of a lack of funds for
new tapes.
—I was given free access to the central School files, but did
not find them a particularly illximinating source of data on the period.
Material I did use included Annual Reports for I 969 and I 97O, the com-
pilation of votes for the Executive Committee, reports of votes on each
of the Constitution ballots, and a description of the entire Constitution
balloting process prepared by Allen, and a summary of doctoral students
and stipends. Other data, peripherally useful, in the files includes
communications between Dean Allen and various faculty members, letters
to and from outsiders including recruiting correspondence, and letters
and memoranda to and from the University administration.
—Some data not generally available is in my personal files as
a result of my participation in the activities of the School. Such data
includes data on the planning committees in Ootober 19^9 used in prepar-
ing the "Ten Year Projection," a series of preliminary drafts of the
Executive Committee "charter," some position papers prepared for the
October 23 Executive Committee Retreat, and preliminary drafts of the
Interim Catalogue .
—I submitted a draft copy of this study to six faculty members
who participated in the planning year, most in central roles, with a re-
quest that they comment upon its accuracy. I received a few questions
as to facts, vdiich have led to scxne revisions of this final draft, and a
number of questions as to perceptions and relative emphasis on certain
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aspects of the change process, but received general agreement that ray
factual data was reliably presented. While I certainly do not consider
this procedure as providing a rigorous test of the validity of my data,
it does provide at least some indication as to its general accuracy.
I have, in the text of this study, footnoted all material derived
primarily from outside sources. Unfootnoted material can be assumed to
be derived primarily from my own experience and perceptions.
Limitations of the Study
The major limitations of the study are those described in the
previous section on methodology, particularly the fact that data was not
systematically collected during the period and the potential biases in-
"trinsic to my participation in the events of the period under review.
Two other limitations to be considered are;
First, the limited time period covered in the study—for a nximber
of reasons: (1) the success of many crucial aspects of the change effort
cannot be firmly judged on the basis of the short time period involved,
(2) the success and implications of the Dean's change strategies simi-
larly must be viewed over a longer term, and (3) the quality of the
School's programs and personnel can only be judged over the longer term.
It is my hope that someone will choose to do a subsequent study of the
progress of the School focusing on further examination of the issues and
tentative conclusions contained in this dissertation.
Second, it can be argued, with some justification, that because
of the overwhelmingly large number of faculty and doctoral students added
to the School during the period under review this study is not, in fact.
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a study of organizational change but of the development of a new organi-
zation. I have chosen to view the change as one of organizational change
primarily because the School did exist as a substantial body prior to
Dean Allen's arrival and his dramatic expansion of it can be considered
as only one of many options for change of that organization, and because
the controls over the organization maintained by the University clearly
mark it as an ongoing organization for which change was not merely the
agreement upon new policies, but a change from existing policies which
required the approval of appropriate agencies.
Chronological Summary
A difficulty of the case analysis approach to the description of
events is that chronological sequence is not as clearly delineated as it
would be in a conventional case study. I am therefore including below a
chronological summary of events as a guide to the reader.
Academic Year 1 966-1 967
- Dr. Allen hired as Dean
June - Dr. Parody becomes Acting Dean
Academic Year 1 967-1 968 (Chapter IV)
September 22 - Dr. Allen first appears before School faculty
(Sweetheart Tea Room); annovinces discontinuation
of all courses, programs, degrees, and require-
ments as of September 19^9 declares 1 968-69
a "Planning Year."
Janxiary 2 - Dr. Allen arrives on campus to assume Deanship
January through March - Faculty recruiting period. Thirty new
faculty members hired.
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^
- Planning Doctoral Program approved by Graduate
Faculty, 85 doctoral students subsequently
recruited,
Fgbruary and March - Personnel actions for existing faculty
‘’Q
- Tenured faculty grievance filed
Academic Year 1 968-1 969 (Chapters V, VI, and VII
)
September 4 - Planning Year begins. Approximately 120 new peo-
ple arrive on campus
September 15-21 - Colorado Retreat
October 3 — First Marathon
September through January — Major emphasis on interest group
planning committees
January — Beginning of Interim Catalogue preparation process
March - Allen assumes leadership of preparation process
March 25 - First faculty vote on "Interim Constitution"
April 2 — Straw vote on significant parts of academic aspects
of package
April 8 - Final faculty vote to approve "Interim Constitution"
April 1
1
— Approval of Academic program by School community
May 29 - Approval of Academic program by University Faculty Senate
Academic Year 1969-1970
November 26 - Approval of Constitution by School of Education
faculty
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CHAPTER II
SUMMARY OP THE LITERATURE
Introduction
The purpose of this summary of the literature is to support and
elaborate upon the generalizations with which I began this study, to pro-
vide a context in which the significance of the achievement of the School
of Education during the period under review can be considered, and to
offer some perspectives on the means by which the change was accomplished.
This chapter will contain four major sections, as follows:
First, I shall explore the need for change in higher education,
focusing on the fact that significant reform occurs only rarely in insti-
tutions of higher education and its result, that the activities of con-
temporary institutions of higher learning are inappropriate to student
needs in the face of present realities.
Second, I shall describe in detail the findings of four recent
case studies of attempts at change in higher education to determine the
extent to which change was achieved and the major determining factors
in the change—or lack of change.
Third, I shall review the evidence of change in schools of edu-
cation.
And fourth, I shall explore the literature of organizational
change and describe some change models which may provide some insight
into the change effort at the School of Education.
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The Need for Change in Hifi^her Education
Much of the literature of higher education points to a pressing
need for change in America's colleges and universities. It describes a
system which has historically resisted significant change in its activi-
ties and which, as a result, is at present generally described as fail-
ing to meet the needs of today's students in today's society.
On Resistance to Reform
There are strong indications in the literature that resistance
to reform is a fundamental and chronic problem of American higher educa-
tion—one as evident in earlier years, when environmental change was
relatively slow, as it is at present in the face of an exponential in-
crease in the pace of environmental change.
For example, in his classic survey of the history of higher edu-
cation in America, Frederick Rudolph sums up attempts at reform as
follows:
Resistance to fundamental reform was ingrained in the
American collegiate and university tradition as over three
hundred years of history demonstrated ... the historic
policy of the American college and university [has been]
drift, reluctant accommodation, belated recognition that
while no one was looking, change had in fact taken place.
^
This view of the xmiversity as fundamentally change resistant is
shared by many other analysts of the field. For instance, in his analy-
sis of change in higher education. The Dynamics of Academic Reform
,
Frederick Rudolph, The American College and University: A His-
tory (New York: Alfred Knopf and Random House, 19^2), p. 49
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J. B. Lon Hefferlin quotes the terse conclusions of two students of
higher education, Bernard Stern, who summed up his historical analysis
of academic change by terming the process one of "defensive concessions
and progressive adjustments" to the demand for change2 and Irving Kristol
who observed that "the university has been-with the possible exception
of the post offioe~the least inventive (or even adaptive) of our social
institutions since the end of World War II.
And in the preface to their case study of six attempts at insti-
tutional reform, Joseph Fashing and Steven Deutsch observe that:
regard, to the basic educational process, there has
been little alteration except in the faculty—student ratio,
since the very beginning of American higher education. 4
Perhaps the most succinct statement of the rigidity of univer-
sities of all was quoted from "one frustrated administrator" by Samuel
Baskin; "It is easier to move a cemetery than overhaul a curriculum."^
The Newman Task Force offers a thoroughgoing indictment of higher
education on this score;
The [higher education] system, with its massive inertia,
resists fxindamental change, rarely eliminates outmoded pro-
grams, ignores the differing needs of students, seldom questions
2Bernard J. Stern, "Historical Materials on Innovations in Higher
Education" (unpublished manuscript. May 1953), p« 25, quoted in Dynamics
of Academic Reform (Ssin Francisco; Jossey Bass, 1969), P» ?•
^Irving Kristol, "A Different Way to Restructure the University,"
in The New York Times Magazine
,
Dec. 8, 19^8, p. 5, quoted in Dynamics
of Academic Reform
,
p. 6.
^Academics in Retreat; The Politics of Educational Innovation
(Albuquerque; University of New Mexico Press, 1971), P* ‘•2.
^Samuel Baskin, Higher Education; Some Newer Developments (New
York; McGraw-Hill, 1965), P* 331
•
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its educational goals, and almost
ferent types of institutions.®
never creates new and dif-
This historical resistance to change has continued to the present,
intensified, in fact, by the increasing rapidity of change in the sur-
rounding environment, and in the face of increasing pressures for change
from outside on university decision-making bodies.
Since 1968 three major case studies of university reform have
been published, at least five major commissions on higher education have
been convened, and a vast number of analytical and evaluative works on
higher education have been written by scholars, educators, and educa-
tional writers of all persuasions—and the overwhelming consensus has
been that contemporary institutions of higher education have moved little,
if at all, to adapt their activities to current needs.
The major case studies include Dwight Ladd's Change in Educa-
tional Policy (1970)5 J. B. Lon Hefferlin's Dynamics of Academic Reform
(1969); and Joseph Fashing and Steven E. Deutsch's Academics in Retreat
(1971)» These studies share a similar conclusion—that very little change
of significance has taken place in the institutions surveyed, as will be
described in a later section of this chapter.
The commission reports of recent years generally concur in the
judgment that inability to change in response to changing social and en-
vironmental conditions is one of the major problems facing higher educa-
tion today.
^Newman Task Force, Report on Higher Education
,
Frank Newman,
chmn. (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971 )i P» ^
(hereafter referred to as Newman Report ).
28
The Ha^en Report
,
for example, obeerves that
-[the university
•
b]
sprawling size and organizational structure stand in the way of innova-
tions needed. One of the major findings of the Newman Commission, was
that
-the decade of the sixties produced many changes in higher education,
but their combined impact was to homogenize institutions—the more they
changed, the more they became alike"® and the Newman Report's indictment
of the "massive inertia" of the higher educational system has previously
been cited.
Other scholars, educators, and analysts of higher education have
lamented the lack of movement in higher education despite the ferment
around it in recent years. For example, Harold Taylor, in How to Change
Colleges
, observes:
Seven years after the Berkeley uprising, the American uni-
versity and its system of control and instruction remains sub-
stantially the same. The few changes that have been made do
not get to the heart of the matter, which ... is the question
of the role of the university in contemporary life, including,
first of all, the life of the student.
9
And Alvin Eurich, summing up his work in higher education, pessi-
mistically observes:
While it is true that some colleges and \miversities have
conducted experiments and demonstrations designed to improve
^Committee on the Student in Higher Education, The Student in
Higher Education
,
Joseph P. Kauffman, Chairman (New Haven: Hazen Founda-
tional 1968 ), p. 4 (hereafter referred to as Hazen Report ).
®From Harold L. Hodgkinson, "Reflections on the Newman Commission,"
Change Magazine
,
May, 1972, p. 35*
^Taylor, How to Change Colleges (New York: Holt, 1971 )» P* 6.
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instruction, the cumulative and enduring impact
imperceptible. is practically
and
Clearly, a very large majority of our institutions ofhigher learning and faculty members have no commitment to
change or to improve college and university teaching.
On Present Inadequacies
This failure of the institutions of higher learning in America
to find the means of reforming their activities has resulted in the situa-
tion in which these institutions find themselves today—out of joint with
the times.
This condition has been noted in the reports of the commissions
as well as in an avalanche of boohs and articles authored by ’’critical
lovers and unloving critics” representing what appears to be a total
spectrum of perspectives and persuasions. The data below represents a
sample of the general scope of criticism of contemporary higher educa-
tion beginning with the findings of the commissions and continuing with
a sampling of individual criticisms from a variety of perspectives.
The 1968 Hazen Report was direct and emphatic in its criticisms
of the contemporary system of higher education ’’for not being more con-
cerned about the total personality development of its students,” and
among its conclusions are the following terse and comprehensive indict-
ments:
^^Alvin C. Eurich, Reforming American Education: The Innovative
Approach to Improving our Schools and Colleges (New York: Harper, I968)
,
p. 135 *
^
^Eurich, quoted by Hefferlin in Dynamics of Educational Reform ,
p. 8.
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Despite the huge sums of money poured into higher educationma^ If not most
,
students are poorly housed, poorly fed.
’
an live in a physical and social environment which is hardly
conducive to moral, cultural, or esthetic growth.
•We do little to help students in their search for commitment,despite our knowledge that they are at precisely the age when
commitment is of critical importaince.
The Linowitz and Scranton commissions, while confining themselves
to reporting "major accounts" of the underlying causes of student dis-
satisfaction and not taking an explicit stand on the failures of the
higher education system, do in their recommendations point to specific
areas in which they feel \miversities and colleges have not fulfilled
their responsibilities. Por example their recommendations include:
Prom the Linowitz Commission:
—^Everywhere there is need to reexamine existing disciplines
and to allocate resources for the design of new forms of
intellectual inquiry.
—New curricula and resources are needed to further the self-
development of students in ways traditional curricula have
failed to do.
—^Most collegiate institutions in the past have been heavily
oriented to the purposes of the white majority. More atten-
tion must be given to the needs of ethnic minorities.
and from the Scranton Report:
—The university, and particularly the faculty, must recognize
that the expansion of higher education and the emergence of
the new youth culture have changed the makeup and concerns
of today's student population. The university should adapt
itself to these new conditions.
^^Hazen Report
, pp. 4» 13-H*
^
^Special Committee on Campus Tensions, Caunpus Tensions: Analysis
and Recommendat ions
,
Sol M. Linowitz, Chmn. (D.C. American Council in
Education, 1970)i PP« 49“50*
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Large xiniversities should take steps to decentralize or
reorganize to make possible a more human scale.
—University governance systems should be reformed to increaseparticipation of students and faculty in the formulation of
university policies that affect them.H
And finally, the Nevrman Report
, published in I971, is perhaps
the most comprehensive and thoroughgoing in its indictment of the con-
temporary system of higher education in America.
It begins with a comment on the work of previous commissions, a
comment which emphasizes the radical kinds of changes which members of
the Newman commission feel must come to higher education:
Several commissions have examined the state of higher edu-
cation within the past few years. Their recommendations, rang-
ing from expanding community colleges to spending more for
research in the graduate schools, are intended to strengthen
and extend the existing system.
We have talcen a different approach. We believe that it is
not enough to improve and expand the present system. The needs
of society and the diversity of students now entering college
requires a fresh look at what "going to college" means.
The commission then goes on to summarize conditions in higher education
which they feel call for more radical reforms than those proposed by
previous commissions.
As we have examined the growth of higher education in the post-
war period, we have seen disturbing trends toward uniformity
in our institutions, growing bureaucracy, overemphasis on aca-
demic credentials, isolation of students and faculty from the
world—a growing rigidity and uniformity of structure that makes
higher education reflect less and less the interests of society.
Rather than allow these trends to continue, means must be found
to create a diverse and responsive system.
^^Campus Unrest Panel, Report of the President's Commission on
Campus Unrest
,
Will W. Scranton, Chmn.
,
in The University Crisis Reader ,
Vol. II, ed. by Immanuel Wallerstein and Paul Starr (New York: Random
House, 1971)1 P» 507*
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And the commission concludes its preface with a question which reflects
perhaps their most serious and pervasive criticism of the institutions
which make up the American higher education system.
What will make higher education more likely to reflect the real
i::e^el7l5 - intemal"^^^
A review of the criticisms of scholars, educators and analysts
of higher education reveals a wide panorama of dissatisfaction with the
existing system. For the purposes of this review, I have divided such
criticisms into three general categories: (l) quite general and thorough-
going indictments, ( 2 ) criticisms based on research on the effects of
higher education upon students, and ( 3 ) criticisms based on lack of
morality and/or relevance in institutions of higher learning.
General Indictments
In the annals of scholarly examination of the state of higher
education, the most shocking and dramatic indictment of contemporary
higher education came in Sanford's The American College
,
a massive com-
pilation of articles pertaining to the state of higher education pub-
lished in 1962, soon after the end of the complacent fifties. An
unexpecting reader had only to progress to the fourth paragraph of the
introduction to find the following terse and unequivocable summary of
the review:
One does not need any fixed conception of educational goals
in order to be convinced that American colleges are failing
15pp. vii & X.
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rather badly* They fail to achieve their own stated purposes;
and they fail by other reasonable standards of accomplishment
.
and Harold Taylor, summing up in Students without Teachers
,
angrily notes:
The dilemma of the university is that everything it does is too
late. ... In the 1950's and the first half of the 1960's, it
was almost impossible to convince those responsible for the con-
trol and advancement of higher education that . . . the univer-
sities were becoming educationally bankrupt.
In any case, the facts about the universities are now out in the
open. It is not necessary to repeat again that the big univer-
sities have become huge bureaucracies with an academic mind and
no heart, careless and ignorant about students and their intel-
lectual needs, organized by managers and managerial professors
absorbed in their own pursuits giving service to the existing
social order and dispensing its conventional wisdom, bereft of
a philosophy and the social imagination to create a new and com-
pelling conception of their own future. The literature of educa-
tion and social criticism has dealt with that, events have affirmed
it, the students have found their voice to proclaim it."*8
Prom Arnold Toynbee, in his preface to Eurich's Ceimpus I98O :
There seems today to a worldwide consensus that the tradi-
tional system of higher education does not meet, any longer,
the educational needs of a more and more rapidly changing society. ^
Prom Sheldon Wolin and John Schaar:
The only hope for the university lies in replacing the
narrow and fatal premises which have produced the present im-
passe with others more appropriate to the general social sitiaa-
tion in which the university now stands. That social situation
^^Nevitt Sanford, ed.. The American College: A Psychological and
Social Interpretation of the Higher Learning (New York: Wiier, 1962), 2
^
^Taylor, Students without Teachers: The Crisis in the University
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 19^9)1 P* ^ ^ ^
•
^^Ibid . , p. 10.
^^"Higher Education in a Time of Accelerating Change," in Camp^
1980: The Shape of the Future in American Higher
Education, ed. by
Alvin G. Eurich (New York: Dell, I968), p. xix.
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IS one that can be called revolutionary in the sense that whilethe forces of change gather momentum, the society cannot find
the appropriate response either in thought or acts. ... The
troubles which beset American society are unprecedented and
paradoxical.
. .
.<^0
and Eurich censures what he sees as a pervasive hypocrisy in higher edu-
cation:
The greatest gap in education has always been that between
theory and practice, between what we claim to be doing for young
people and what we actually are doing. This gap, unlike the
missile gap, has not been closed. Educators tend to be bold in
thought but timid in action* All too often educators have built
grand theories while the schools and colleges stayed in their
comfortable ruts.*^^
And finally Dwight Ladd, in his summary of the findings of the self-
studies of eleven different colleges and universities,^^ provides an
excellent list of generally agreed upon failures in higher education
today, as described on page 49 of this chapter.
Research-Based Criticism
In 1957 the first comprehensive review of research on the impact
of the college experience on students was published by Phillip E, Jacob.
This review, entitled Changing Values in College: An Exploratory Study
of the Impact of College Teaching
, sent waves of shock and disbelief
through the academic community since it concluded that college h2ui very
little effect on students.
^^Wolin and Schciar, The Berkeley Rebellion and Beyond (New York:
N.Y. Review, 1970) » P« 64.
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Reforming American Education , pp. xiii-xiv.
^^Dwight R. Lauid, Change in Educational Policy: Self-Studies in
Selected Colleges and Universities , The Carnegie Commission on Higher
Education (New York: McGraw-Hill
,
1970).
^^Jacob (New York: Harper, 1957)*
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William Arrowsmith siunmarized the book as follows:
Certainly it is hard to imagine a more deimningly documented
indictment of the liberal arts college than that of the Jacob
study . . , with its bleak conclusion that, apart from three or
four colleges
,
the effect of college teaching on student values
is simply nil, zero, and that what small change occurs comes
from the student subculture. ^4
And Joseph Axelrod elaborates:
... the studies of college and university students . . .
reveal the crushing fact: the primary effect of college and
university experience on students was simply that they had be-
come more like one another. ^5
The Jacob study, with its bleak conclusions about a process con-
sidered central to life in the United States, the value of which had
previously been considered beyond question, naturally provoked a substan-
tial outpouring of new studies, many of which are summarized in Kenneth
Feldman and Theodore Newcomb's The Impact of College on Students . These
studies are considerably more positive in their findings, although ap-
parently never really resolving the question of the extent to which the
changes observed can be attributed to the college experience.
The authors begin their 1970 s\immary of research with a refer-
ence to Jacob's study.
In some respects this report resembles Philip E. Jacob's
much quoted Changing Values in College , published in 1957»
We have hewi the advantage, however, of an euided decade, char-
acterized by more voluminous output, probably, than all of the
previous years taken together. Our conclusions, moreover,
differ in many ways from his.^°
^^Arrowsmith, "The Future of Teaching," in Ceunpus 1 980 , p. 126.
^^Axelrod, "New Organizational Patterns," in Higher Education in
the Revolutionary Decades , ed. by Lewis B. Mayhew (Berkeley, California:
McCutchen, 1967)i P» 169»
^^Feldman and Newcomb, The Impact of College on Students (San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1969Tr'p^3^
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In summarizing the implications of the research analyzed in this
book, the authors present the following conclusions:
Preshman-to-senior changes in several characteristics haveMen occurring with considerable uniformity in most American
colleges and universities, in recent decades
.
LAuthor's italics.]
And go on to describe the nature and directions of changes found
as follows:
Declining "authoritarianism," dogmatism, and prejudice,
together with decreasingly conservative attitudes toward public
issues and growing sensitivity to aesthetic experiences are
particularly prominent forms of change—as inferred from freshman-
senior differences* These add up to something like increasing
openness to multiple aspects of the contemporary world, parallel-
ing wide ranges of contact and experience. Somewhat less con-
sistently, but nevertheless evident are increasing intellectual
interests and capacities, and declining commitment to religion,
especially in its more orthodox forms. Certain kinds of personal
changes
—
particularly toward greater independence, self-
confidence, and readiness to express impulses—are the rule
rather than the exception.
This study includes, however, a possibly significant caveat, that
those who do not attend college (although eligible and acceptable) "often
change in the same directions, though in lesser degree."^®
Criticisms based on moral
and relevancy issues
A substantial number of critics of contemporary higher education
base their criticism on the institutions* unwillingness to come to grips
with the central moral, political, human, and environmental issues of
the day. A few examples of this type of criticism are as follows.
^^Ibid
. , p. 326,
28Ibid.
,
p. 327.
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Both Gardner and Taylor censure the universities for their neglect
of the problems of the cities—which both see as a crucial national prob-
lem.
Prom Gardner:
. . . our cities today are plagued with every conceivable ill:
apathy, crime, poverty, racial conflict, slum housing, air and
water pollution, inadequate schools and hospitals, and a break-
down in transportation. Coping with these problems is going to
be very near the top of the national agenda for the next decade.
There are no institutions better equipped to serve as a base for
that struggle than the colleges and universities, but they have
played a negligible role thus far. ^9
and Taylor accuses the universities not merely of neglect, but of com-
plicity in the problems of the city:
While the problems of the cities were multiplying and their
situation was mounting to the level of catastrophe, the uni-
versities were busy with the construction of buildings which
disrupted the lives of citizens and whole commvinities.30
Fashing and Deutsch point to the universities' neglect of moral
issues:
... a refusal of the academic community to come to grips, or
at least make an attempt to come to grips, with moral issues
such as war, racism, and poverty.
And the "radical left" has made university morality a central
issue in its attack on it—a sampling of such criticism includes:
The University functions as a production line, of servant-
technicians to operate our inhuman, economic oriented system.
... It treats people (students, faculty, employees, and
neighbors alike) as objects serving this system of inhuman
values.^^
^9*»Agenda for the Colleges and Universities," in Campus I 98Q 1 P* 5*
^^Stxidents without Teachers, p. 113» ^ Academics in Retreat , p. 13.
^^University Crisis Reader, Vol. I, p. 120.
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It IS not a violation of the purpose of a university that some
activity serve society; but . . . The university is
at this moment an ideological institution, a mask for systematicdominance and privilege.
The collegiate wing of privilege could not shield us from the
decay and violence in our society. The University was not, as
we first believed, a sanctuary from the world; it was, in fact,
a proponent of the most violent system the centuries have
created—the system of capital. It was that system that led
to fascism in Greece, starvation in India, ruin in Vietnam, and
racism in America.
And Harris Wofford has observed:
The federal government knows, the State Department knows, the
Pentagon knows, the CIA knows, [^andj our adversaries around the
world know——that American universities are and have been agents
for research and recruitment in support of America's world
policies and military efforts. 35
And finally two others, older critics, make criticisms very simi-
lar in tone and substance:
Prom Harold Taylor:
[Universities] have been organized for efficiency, not for true
public service. At the time they should have been creative cen-
ters for the development of strategies for peace, disarmament,
and world xmity, they were expanding their work with Defense
Department contracts. When the educational problems of the
black community were getting worse by the day, they were busy
making admission requirements more and more favorable to white
students with high scholastic aptitudes.3^
And from Alvin Eurich, succinctly:
We cannot tolerate another generation that knows so much about
preserving and destroying life, but so little about enhancing it. 37
^^Ibid.
,
p. 119.
^^Ibid .
.
p. 24.
^^Quoted in Academics in Retreat , p. 285*
^^Students without Teachers , p. 113.
^^Reforming American Education , p. 122.
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Most writers and scholars who deal with issues of the ecology
and global survival join in indicting the universities for neglecting,
and indeed by their technological output often contributing to, the
threats to human survival and quality of life facing contemporary civili-
zation. For example:
Prom Paul Ehrlich, Stanford ecologist, population biologist, and
author;
In the United States and around the world there clearly has been
an almost total failure to prepare people to understand and make
decisions relating to the population—environment crisis. The
universities, which should be leading the way in education, have
been too conservative and compartmentalized.
from Alvin Toffler in Future Shock ;
What passes for education today, even in our ’’best" schools
and colleges, is a hopeless anachronism. . . . our schools
face backward toward a dying system, rather than forward to
the emerging new society. Their vast energies are applied
to cranking out Industrial Men
—
people tooled for survival in
a system that will be dead before they are. 39
and finally, from Garrett De Bell, editor of The Environmental
Handbook:
Education, particularly higher education, is critically impor-
tant to solving our ecological crisis. At present, universi-
ties do much of the specialized research which develops the
technology that is raping the earth and threatening our survi-
val. They do this job devastatingly well. Yet the knowledge
and wisdom to apply technology wisely is neglected. . . . Very
little research is aimed at developing alternatives to our
present disastrous pattern of existence with excessive produc-
tion-waste; conspicuous consumption; manipulative advertising;
growth for its own sake; poverty in the midst of plenty; and
^®Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich, Population/Resources/Envi-
ronment (San Francisco; W. H. Freeman, 1970) » P* 264*
^^Toffler, Future Shock (New York; Random House, 1970 ), pp. 353-54*
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the destruction of the air, water, soil,
the basis of the life-support system. 4-0
and organisms that are
C^ase Studies of Change in Higher Education
My attempt to discover case studies of change in higher educa-
tion has led me to a conclusion similar to that of Joseph Fashing and
Steven Deutsch:
Considering the magnitude of the problems facing higher educa-
tion, there has been relatively little systematic study of the
change process and its response to these problems. In the past
decade, for instance, there has been very little study of the
process of educational innovation in colleges and universities,
and almost none with reference to some of the most important
developments, (p. 5)
There is nevertheless a small, and hopefully growing, body of
literature which recounts and analyzes recent attempts at change in
American institutions of higher education. Chief among these are J. B.
Lon Hefferlin's The Dynamics of Academic Reform (1969)» Dwight R. Ladd's
Change in Educational Policy (1970), Fashing and Deutsch' s Academics in
Retreat (1971)| and two chapters in Warren Bennis' The Leaning Ivory
Tower (1973)« In total these studies provide a distressing panorama of
limited aspirations and failed attempts to bring about change at the
institutions studied—and offer some surprisingly similar conclusions
as to reasons for those failures.
40tiEducation and Ecology," in The Environmental Handbook , ed. by
Garrett De Bell (New York: Ballentine, 1970), pp. 129-30.
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The Dynamics of Academic Reform^ l
In the first of these J. B. Lon Hefferlin studied curriculum
change and its sources from ^^62 to I967 in 110 selected institutions
to try to determine what factors (which he called indicators of insti-
tutional vitality) tended to distinguish those who changed more from
those who changed less.
A major finding of his study is that a relatively small amount
of change in fact took place at the 110 institutions during the five
years of the survey—as evidenced by the low rate of change in courses:
By 1967 1 the 110 institutions that we siirveyed had reor-
ganized or substituted, on the average, one out of every five
courses that they had offered in I962. Their rate of course
reform, according to our measure, was slightly over 4»4 per
cent a year . . . theoretically, at least, this means that the
content of the undergraduate curriculxun is being reconstituted
completely at least every twenty-two years, (p, 54)
In the face of the need for reform described in previous sections
of this chapter, this indicated rate of change appears clearly insuffi-
cient.
Hefferlin begins his attempt to trace the causes of this low rate
of change with a survey of the literature of change and ofeducational
change—and from this study derives a list of resistances to change that
appear to be operating in institutions of higher education. He sees
these resistances as arising both out of the general resistances to
change common to most institutions and out of a set of resistances unique
to educational organizations—as follows:
B. Lon Hefferlin, The Dynamics of Aceuiemic Reform (San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1969T^
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RESISTANCES AS AN INSTITUTION/ORGANIZATION
Organizations are inherently passive—they exist for
routinization of behavior
Voliintary organizations attract members who agree withtheir activities
Organizations tend toward institutionalization
and ritualism
Organizations that are livelihoods for people tend to
come to exist only as livelihoods for those people
The maintenance of institutional effectiveness or
achievement (such as students' learning) is only one
problem that organizations must face in order to survive.
Other problems must take precedence over it. The squeaky
institutional imperative, in short, gets the oil.
RESISTANCES AS AN ACADEMIC ORGANIZATION
Their purposes and support are basically conservative
The educational system is vertically fragmented
Within higher education institutional reputation is not
based on innovation
Faculty members have obsez^ed their vocation for years
as students before joining it
The ideology of the academic profession treats professors
as independent professionals
Academics are skeptical about the idea of efficiency in
acctdemic life
Academic institutions are deliberately structured to
resist precipitant change, (pp. 10-16)
Hefferlin then, in his study of the literature, moves from that
on "the problems of reform" to that concerned with the "processes of
reform" to determine how change, when it has been successful, seems to
have been brought about. He concludes from this study that the three
dominant sources of change in higher education have been "(t) the re-
sources available for it, (2) the advocates interested in it, and
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( 3 ) the openness of the system to them." He goes on to summarise, "In
every case of academic change, these factors together appear to determine
its outcome." (p. 49)
In elaborating upon these findings, he points out that new re-
sources appear essential for change because of the unwillingness of in-
stitutions to divert resources from existing programs to new ones:
. . .the first key to academic reform is that of resources:
an existing program will continue to exist as long as it canfind support. A new program will be tolerated if it costs no
money or brings its own support. It will be resisted if the
new funds it requires could be used for the expansion of exist-ing programs. And it will be actively opposed and accepted
only under duress if existing resources must be divided to in-
clude it. (pp. 39-40)
He further points out that this requirement of new resources for
new programs tends to create a situation in which control of change in
universities is held by aigencies outside the university since "the re-
sources that support the system overwhelmingly come from outside the
schools themselves." (p. 4I)
In his discussion of "advocates" for change, he finds that some
have come from inside the institution being changed, but more often are
new to that organization, observing that
New members of an institution will naturally tend to alter the
organization unless they deliberately avoid or are constrained
from doing so, simply because newcomers disrupt tradition by
being unaware of it. (Thus the members of any group who wish
to preserve their status quo generally resist the recruitment
of new leaders or members from outside. . .
.) (p. 45)
and pointing out that
Unlike some other organizations, colleges and universities are
almost completely dependent on turnover of personnel to accom-
plish major reforms. Thus the process of acawiemic reform
occurs of necessity through change of persons—the replacement
and rotation of individuals—rather than change ^ persons, such
as changes in their attitudes or skills, (pp. 145-46)
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For this reason he finds that the ’’openness" of an institution
to change depends primarily on the introduction of new people into that
institution which, in turn, depends primarily on the growth of the in-
stitution.
The recruitment of such individuals as catalysts of change
accounts for much of the process of reform. One result of
this fact is a generally higher level of academic innovation
at institutions that are expanding in contrast to those stay-ing the same size. Expansion permits new programs and the
hiring of new faculty at a rate faster than replacement, (p. 48)
Hefferlin then moves from his study of the literature to an suialy-
sis of the data derived from hie survey of curricular change at 110 in-
stitutions in an attempt to further define those factors which tend to
contribute to academic innovation. He first looks at the general insti-
tutional characteristics which seem to separate those that changed more
from those that changed less, and finds that the more innovative insti-
tutions tend to be characterized by small size, financial instability,
dependence on student tuition, high faculty turnover and urban loca-
tion. (p. 127)
He also summarizes the results of a questionnaire sent to se-
lected faculty and administrators at the institutions eliciting their
perceptions of the source of changes at their institutions, and in his
concluding chapter combines the data from his review of the literature,
the study of general institutional characteristics, and the questionnaire
to delineate ten factors which he sees as "likely contributors to con-
tinuous academic change" (p. 154) summarized as follows:
(1) A market is essential . "Above all, a market for new ideas
—
a demand for improvement—is necessary . . . resources and rewards must
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be available for academic reform!' (pp, 154-155)
aS« "-oaelB are needed for
’•Academic refom con-
sists far more in the diffusion of educational ideas from one institu-
tion to another than in the creation of new ideas." (p. 156)
need circulation. "Educational refo™ has traditionally
depended on the circulation of individuals from job to job . . . but other
mechanisms can be used.
. , ,»* (pp, I57-I58)
(4) A niimber of "marginal" members are helpful
. A marginal
member is someone "associated with it whose livelihood is not dependent
on it. Such people "can affect [the institution's] operations by mediat-
ing between the institution and its environment.
. . . Typical marginal
members
. . . are trustees, alumni, visiting lecturers, patrons, and
consultants.
. . ." (p. 159)
( 5 ) For major reorganization, new members seem necessary—
—for
the reasons described above, (p. 161 )
Hefferlin sums up these first five factors as follows: "...
these ... all have in common an element of openness to the environ-
ment: openness to outside influence, openness of competition, and to a
variety of ideas, individuals, and new members." (pp. 162-164)
He then goes on to five conclusions about the effect of insti-
tutional decision-making processes on the achievement of academic reform.
( 6 ) The right people must be retained . The institution must not
systematically reject or exclude from its decision-making processes those
who do not subscribe to the maintenance of the status quo. (p. I64)
(7) Initiative is decentralized . Faculty and students have the
opportunity to take initiative for curriculum changes. Hefferlin observes:
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e suspect that the major restriction to continuous reformon many campuses is the debilitating effect of a sense ofpowerlessness, whereby initiative seems impossible, (p. 166)
off.; IT.
inetiiutions appear'by and Lrgl to
ior
students greater latitude of behav-l . They select faculty whom they consider competent andstudents whom they deem able, and then they trust them. (p. 168)
Pgi^ri^rchy is avoided. Hefferlin defines a patriarchal in-
stitution as one in which "power is not merely concentrated in one per-
son or group, but it is assigned on the basis of seniority and is thus
held interminably or indefinitely by senior members." In this structure
initiative tends to be restricted to senior members of the faculty,
those least likely to desire any change in the institution, (p. I69)
(9) Collegial consensus is also avoided
. Hefferlin sees col-
legiality as the opposite of patriarchy because "(1) Initiative is dis-
persed throughout the organization rather than being concentrated in one
person . ,
, (2) High status is achieved through renown rather than
ascribed through seniority
. . . and (3) Positions of high status rotate
among members of the organization." (pp. I74-I75)
Hefferlin believes that collegiality has become the "ideal model"
of academic decision-making for many professors and he expects that in
the future more institutions will move toward it. He is, however, very
skeptical of the appropriateness of the collegial model to the achieve-
ment of academic change, pointing out that in many institutions the
collegium permits no initiative on the part of individual faculty mem-
bers without the approval of the faculty at large, a situation which he
refers to as "the tyranny of the collegium." He is also highly suspicious
of collegiality because, vinder such a system, "academic reform . . .
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hinges almost entirely on the quality of the new professors that the
faculty allows or attracts into the School." (pp. I75-I77)
institution is avuncular. According to Hefferlin,
who employs this anthropological term to describe the decision-making
processes which he sees as most conducive to academic change, the
avuncular institution has three general characteristics:
( 1 ) Initiative is neither permanently centralized nor dispersed.All members of the institution as well as outsiders are con-
sidered to be advocates, and while power is generally diffused,It IS occasionally centralized
... ( 2 ) High status is assigned
on the basis of expertise. Responsibilities are delegated toindividuals because of their special competencies, (3) Positionsof status shift according to different tasks rather than in
strict rotation, (pp. I78-I79)
Hefferlin views the avuncular form of institutional decision-
making as the most effective compromise between patriarchy and collegi-
ality
,
observing that in this system "expertise tempers the authority
of patriarchy and the equality of the collegium." (p. 181 )
Change in Educational Policy
Dwight Ladd’s Change in Educational Policy: Self-Studies in
Selected Colleges and Universities^^ is based on the analysis of case
studies of eleven^^ institutions which attempted to reform themselves
by self-examination, usually by a select committee, described by Ladd
as "the study and report method." The book "describes and evaluates
^^Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1970).
^^Univ. of California at Berkeley, Univ. of New Hampshire, Univ.
of Toronto, Swarthmore College, Wesleyan University, Michigan State Univ.,
Duke Univ., Brown Univ., Stanford Univ., Columbia College, and UCLA.
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both the educational policy changes proposed in [these] institutions
between I965 and I969 and the processes by which these proposed changes
were developed and disposed of by the institutions involved.- (p. 2)
Ladd's conclusions are most succinctly summed up by Fred M.
Hechinger in a Time magazine review of the book:
After more than five years of labor, the university reform
movement has brought forth mountains of committee reports but
only little actual change. This is the essence of a report by
the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education [Ladd's book] made
public here last week. 44
And Ladd himself, after observing that "In the context of the
extreme changes in the environment of higher education, the policy pro-
posals, on the whole, strike me as being neither very imaginative nor
very radical," reaches the following general conclusions:
There is little indication in any of the experiences to sup-
port the idea that the study—and—report technique is an effec-
tive way of gaining acceptance of the need for change or of
creating enthusiasm for involvement in developing new policies.
Where the study—and—report processes were intended primarily
to challenge the status quo, they largely failed to do so.
(pp. 197-198)
The situations reviewed here suggest that these studies
have rarely succeeded in bringing about any fundamental change
in educational policies on the campuses involved except where
a significant portion of the faculty had accepted the desirability
of some change before the study began or where pressures for
change from outside the faculties were much in evidence, (p. 200)
and
Except to the extent that consideration of these studies has
made several of the institutions more ready to change in the
futxire, the changes which have thus far resulted from the pro-
posals seem, with some exceptions, to be only modest disturb-
ances of the status quo, (pp. 211-212)
August 9 1 1970*
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The lack of success of these reform efforts is particularly sur
prising in the light of the fact, noted by Clark Kerr in his foreword,
that most reports seemed to agree on the areas in which changes were
needed and on the direction of those changes. Specifically:
Teaching —**0n the whole, the several reports can-
didly pointed to the often routine and
sometimes deplorable quality of the
teaching done by many college and uni-
versity professors. •• (p. 162)
Advising —". . , the advising system tends to fail
both as a channel of information and as a
basis for significant contact between stu-
dents and faculty members." (p. I 65 )
Curriculiim —". . . structured general education require-
ments have virtually no support and distribu-
tion requirements only reluctant support
[from the various study committees]." (p. I 78 )
Grading —Was seen as "threatening" and did not give
students an adequate "sense of their standing,
strengths, and shortcomings." (p. v)
Academic structure—"It seems high time for some university to
challenge the concept that the department
is the sole context within which scholarship
can flourish. "45
Yet despite this apparent agreement on the important areas of
concern, which might be construed to indicate strong consensus among
academic leaders on such issues, the actual change achieved, as Ladd has
observed, was quite small.
Ladd ascribes this resistance to change primarily to the colle-
gial structures by which these institutions were governed. In his last
chapter, titled "The Limits of Collegiality ," he suggests three ways in
which the collegial structures hampered the reform efforts.
^^Quoted by Ladd from Wesleyan Report, p. 193.
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First The faculty decision-making bodies tended to adopt only
those recommendations "which would have little effect on the behavior
patterns and value systems of most individual faculty members," in the
face of the more thoroughgoing reforms recommended by the study commit-
tees. (p. 212)
Second—Most reports called for a reassessment of the basic goals
and objectives of the institution and, as Ladd observes, "The record of
the cases makes quite clear that
,
for the most part
,
faculty never con-
fronted these basic questions about goals and objectives at all." (p. 214)
Ladd ascribes this failure to the departmentalization of the faculty
which had focused their interests, concern and allegiance on their de-
partment and professional field rather than on the institution as a whole.
Thus the faculty had neither the interest in, nor perspective for, deal-
ing with the institution-wide issues of goals and objectives, (p. 214)
And third—The departmentalization of the faculty also made it
nearly impossible, for similar reasons, for the faculty as a whole to
deal with the institution-wide issue of new approaches to undergraduate
education, (pp. 212-213)
Ladd therefore concludes, much as did Hefferlin, "The evidence
from the studies . . . does suggest that we have passed the limits of
collegiality as an effective system of decision-making." (p. 212) He
elaborates "The ability of our colleges and universities to respond to
a need for change except when faced with severe pressure or the threat
of such press\ire—is frighteningly limited," (p. 9)*'* • • real change
in educational policy will require significant reallocation of resources,
and, at present, resource allocation is controlled for the most part by
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those who most benefit from the status quo" (p. 211), and "Given these
conditions, a primary task of academic leadership is to try to counter
the pressures favoring the statue quo by creating or maintaining an at-
mosphere of receptivity to change." (p. 206)
And finally, in concert with Hefferlin, Laxid concludes,
. ,
the essential issue raised by this study is the apparent need, in the
foreseeable future, for a new basis for decision-making in relatively
large and diverse iiniversities." (p. 215)
Academics in Retreat
Joseph Fashing and Steven Deutsch^^ provide case studies of at-
tempts at reform in six colleges and universities on the West Coast.
These studies do not purport to be objective, as appears to have been
the intent of Ladd and Hefferlin, but rather to focus on changes made in
what the authors see as the "right" direction—toward increased human-
ness, student participation, and institutional responsiveness to the
needs of both students and society.
The author's bias is clear in the following critical account of
the kinds of change which has taken place in American higher education
to date.
While there has been an apparent organizational rigidity
within the university in this country, it has not been totally
unresponsive to demands for change. The nature of such change
has rarely, however, been oriented toward the actiial or per-
ceived needs of stxidents, but to the more general demands of
the outside conununity, especially government and industry. ...
Thus while the xmiversity cannot be characterized as having
^^Academics in Retreat; The Politics of Educational Innovation
(Albuquerque : Univ. of New Mexico Press,
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been totally unresponsive to the demands for change, it is
exactly in those areas where it has been responsive that theproblem lies. (pp. 12-13)
In many senses this study is marred by a pervasive pessimism.
One senses that the authors do not want to find evidence of successful
innovation. Thus, while they find encouraging trends at Western Washing-
ton State (primarily in the apparent success of its experimental satellite
colleges and their positive influence on changing other parts of the uni-
t iu the institution's extensive student participation poli-
cies) and Stanford (in its curriculum innovations and Black Studies
Program), they also take pains to point out the fact that these insti-
tutions are not typical of most institutions of higher education in
America.
Thus, in introducing the Western Washington case, they begin,
"Of all the institutions discussed. Western Washington departs farthest
from the group norm [primarily in size, location, and student composi-
tion]." (pp. I56-I57) And their analysis of change at Stanford contains
the observation: "Attempting to compare Stanford with other institutions
presents a problem . . . because in many respects Stanford is in a dif-
ferent world. It is private. It is wealthy. Its resources are magnifi-
cent, and its students overwhelmingly upper middle and upper class."
(p. 214)
For the other four university change efforts studied. Fashing
and Deutsch record a highly distressing panorama of the failure of ini-
tially promising attempts at reform and innovation—which no doubt should
be read somewhat skeptically in the light of their previously described
pessimism, but which nevertheless appears to have considerable validity.
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Their conclusions read as follows:
At San Francisco State
cannot escape the conclusion
. . . that San FranciscoState College, if it is deserving of a postmortem, has beenlaid to rest, a victim of successful educational innovation,
autocratic administration, and reactionary politics, (p. II 3 )
At the University of Oregon
After an impressive beginning, the University has joined
the retreat in the face of intensified community pressure, (p. I 55 )
At Berkeley
The history of educational reform at Berkeley has been one
of expressed commitment without action, of study without fol-
Icw—through, and of a facade of innovation in what may be one
of the most thoroughly conservative institutions in the nation.
Increasingly demoralized, cynical, and embittered as a con-
sequence of their experiences with one another and the outside
community, students, faculty, and administration at Berkeley
may have finally abandoned the last vestiges of constructive
effort at educational reform. It is not inconceivable that the
University has passed beyond the point of salvation—at least
if it is to retain any semblance of honor. Whether this mat-
ters any more appears doubtful, (p. 244 )
At UCLA
Despite its record [of being "at the front of educational
innovation and change among the established major institutions
in California"] . . . UCLA like each of the other institutions
has been faced with virtually insurmountable barriers to progress.
Even with a committed administration and a more constructive
approach to vital educational problems than most, the battle to
move forward has been a losing one. At best perhaps UCLA has
managed to creep forward on some fronts and has not regressed
as far on others as have some campuses we have examined.
(pp. 182-183)
In their analysis of the causes of these failures in reform.
Fashing and Deutsch join Ladd and Hefferlin in ascribing primary respon-
sibility to the limitations of collegial decision-making and to the de-
partmentalization of the faculty.
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Of the faculty, the authors state that »ln each of the institu-
tions visited, the faculty was at best a neutral force in educational
innovation. More often, though, they constituted the center of resist-
ance to change," and also that "Faculty resistance to innovation appears
to have grown in each case almost in direct proportion to the success
of the innovative prograun." (p. 26o)
On departmentalization, they observe in their opening chapter
that:
To the extent that the focus of the faculty of the various
disciplines is so constricted by narrow disciplinary inter-
ests and to the extent that they are unwilling or unable to
address the problems of the larger university community, there
is likely to be a situation in which nothing is altered even
under intense pressvire. This is often so because: 1) nobody
is interested in the larger problems; 2) the faculty member's
energies are so taxed with the problems revolving around dis-
cipline and department that there is nothing left for more
general problems; or 3) factional disputes severely limit, or
make altogether impossible, a resolution of general community
problems, (pp. 16-17
)
On collegial decision-making, they point out that:
... a major dilemma in the structural organization of most
colleges and universities is caused in part at least . . .
by the quasidemocrat ic procedures which have become increas-
ingly characteristic of college and university government . . .
(pp. 239-240)
The authors' analysis of the limitations of collegiality is
similar to those proposed by Hefferlin and Ladd, but generally takes a
more political view, implying that these processes are used by "conserva'
tive interests" to impede cheinge and by university administrations to
mask inaction:
There is a genuine dilemma in any democratic or quasi-democrat ic
system with multiple interests. Competing constituencies, with
fundamental, and perhaps irreconcilable, conflicts of interests
may effectively veto any administrative action. To the extent
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that this is true, moving the organization in any direction
that involves altering the status quo may be very nearlyimpossible.
. . . Given that this is the case, the highlydemocratized, and in this case highly inefficient structure,
acts as a barrier fostering the conservative interests of
those hiding behind it. ... The strategy of avoiding de-
cisions through the construction of elaborate deliberative
mechanisms is an integral feature of almost any action taken
at the faculty level. In this respect, it has often been the
case that institutions have given the appearance of taking
action while, in effect, nothing was happening, (pp. 241 -242 )
The Leaning Ivory Tower
The final two chapters of Bennis' book^^ are devoted to personal
reflections on an attempt to bring about radical reform at the State Uni-
versity of New York at Buffalo (SUNYAB). Since the goals of the change
effort at Buffalo were very similar to the goals of the change effort
described in this study and since some of the means employed and prob-
lems which arose were also quite similar, the conclusions which Bennis
arrived at as a result of his experience have considerable significance
for this study and will, therefore, be described in some detail below.
The goals and fate of the attempt to reform Buffalo are con-
cisely summarized in Bennis' two chapter heads, "The Berkeley of the
East" and "What Went Wrong."
Bennis joined Buffalo as Provost of the Social Science Faculty
as part of a dramatic revitalization effort undertaken by its new Presi-
dent, Martin Meyerson. Meyerson had come to Buffalo after compiling a
highly successful record as a leading scholar in urban planning, first
director of the Harvard-MIT Joint Center for Urban Studies, and Acting
^ ^Warren Bennis, The Leaning Ivory Tower (San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass, 1973).
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Chancellor at Berkeley. It was Meyerson who intended to make Buffalo
••the Berkeley of the East," and to do so through academic reform. In
his inaugural address, for example, Meyerson had stated, "If we have the
courage to be different, we shall not long be different because the
model of State University of New York at Buffalo will become a model for
many." (p. 124)
Meyerson •s "Ace in the hole," as Bennis describes it, "was a
truly monumental plan for redesigning Buffalo's conventional depart-
ments—schools—and colleges academic structure." His plan for doing
BO had been ratified by the Buffalo Faculty Senate two months after his
arrival and included:
—The reorganization of the ninety existing departments into
seven new faculties, each with a provost as chief academic and adminis-
trative officer. This structure was intended to encourage the develop-
ment of interdisciplinary programs and each provost was to have ample
resources and administrative leeway to implement new academic programs.
—The building of thirty new colleges on campus, each to act as
living-learning centers for 400 students and 6OO commuters. These col-
leges were intended to "offset the apathy and anomie characteristic of
an enormous campus" and to "counteract the stranglehold that traditional
departments have on the typical university."
—The development of "University-wide action-research centers
or councils on international studies, urban studies, and higher educa-
tion studies [which] would act as magnets for scholars and students drawn
from the entire university (and outside) to work together on such vital
central issues." (pp. 1 17-118)
57
A new $650,000,000 campus was planned and Meyerson had assured
Bennis "that with the new campus sufficient resources would be available
to build quality on top of the university's inevitable deadwood, the less
competent holdovers from previous administrations." (p. II9)
And the following year was indeed a year of change. Seventy-five
per cent of the total faculty were Meyerson recruits, many raided from
Harvard, Yale, Princeton and MIT. Bennis himself recruited forty-five
new faculty members for his unit and replaced nine chairmen and two
deans (changing about 90 per cent of the leadership in his area). As
he reports, "The tiny crowded campus barely seemed able to contain all
the excitement within it." (pp. 125-126)
And Bennis also reports some "rumblings in paradise." The col-
leges, six of which had gotten under way, were getting a reputation for
low academic standards. The Centers were not doing well. The new faculty
structures were being resisted by many faculty members, (p. I27)
In Axigust 1968 Bennis was made university Vice-President for
Academic Affairs, (p. 128 )
Bennis concludes his first chapter with the terse statement,
"Camelot lasted barely a thousand days" and picks up that theme in the
next chapter, "I had gone to Buffalo seeking Camelot. Ceunelot's shining
moment was brief indeed. . . . Three years after ray arrival, Buffalo
was a different university." (p. I30) He goes on to describe the mag-
nitude of the disaster:
—President Meyerson and the university chancellor had resigned
—Two of the three new provosts had resigned (Bennis was the
third).
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•'The BIX colleges were struggling for their existence, the
initial energies and ideas behind them dissipated."
"All directors of the three special centers
, . . had resigned,
and only one center ... was still in operation."
—Construction of the new campus had not gotten under way until
late 1970.
The faculty was beginning to lose its "superstars."
—Most Meyerson appointees had resigned.
A conservative president had been named, and he had appointed
primarily "old" Buffalo people to important posts, (pp. 130—131)
In attempting to assess the reasons for the precipitous failure
of the attempt to reform Buffalo, Bennis observes, ''Nothing is so hard
to change as a university, and Meyerson' s attempt was courageous."
(p. 136) "Whether anyone could have turned UB into a permanent academic
Utopia in three short years is doubtful. But the warning signals of
weaknesses that would ultimately prove fatal were there early in the at-
tempt, and we in the Meyerson administration consistently ignored them."
(p. 133)
Bennis particularly points to some observations made earlier by
Ladd (who had visited the campus as a part of his work on the study of
change in higher education described above) which included:
—The fact that the reoi^anization, although highly dramatic and
visible, did not necessarily affect the behavior of individual faculty
members.
—The fact that many educationally conservative faculty remained
in informal positions of influence.
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The fact that a major outcome of the reorganization had been
merely to add another layer to an "already baroque" bureaucratic struc-
ture. (pp. 133-134)
Bennis, however, lays the majority of the blame on the failures
of the leadership to effectively direct the change effort. He summarizes
his findings in a set of eleven guidelines which he would follow if he
"were asked today to bring about change in a \miversity setting." (p. 136 )
The guidelines, together with a brief summary of their rationale,
is included below.
^ ) Reci^it with scrupulous honesty—Recruiting at UB focused
on thehopes of the future rather than the realities of the present.
We had raised expectations as high as any in modern educational history.
When our program met only a part of these expectations, the disillusion-
ment which followed was predictable and widespread. The disparity be-
tween vision and reality became intolerable." (pp. 136-138)
2) Guard against the Crazies—
Innovation ... attracts interesting people. It also attracts
people who will take your ideas and distort them into something
monstrous. . . . Change-oriented administrators must be able to
distinguish the innovators, however eccentric they may be, from
the crazies, (p. 138) [Bennis is never more specific about the
effect of "crazies" at Buffalo.]
3 ) Build support among like-minded people, whether or not you
recruited them—"We succeeded in infusing new blood into Buffalo, but
we failed to recirculate the old blood." (pp. 138-139)
4 ) Plan for how to change as well as what to change—"Buffalo
had a plan for change, but we lacked a clear concept of how change should
proceed. A statement of goals is not a program." And Bennis also ob-
serves, under this heading, "If change is to be permanent it must be
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gradual." (pp. 139-141)
settle for rhetorical change—"We allowed ourselves to
be swept along by our rhetoric and neglected the much more demanding
business of building new constituencies and maintaining established
ones." (p. 141)
Don’t allow those who are opposed to change to appropriate
such basic issues as academic standards—"We allowed the least change-
oriented faculty members to make the issue of standards their own. They
persuaded a great majority of moderate faculty members that the adminis-
tration was committed to change for change's sake." (pp. I4I-I42)
T) Know the territory—"We never mastered the politics of local
chauvinism. At the same time that the national press was romancing the
university
,
one of the two local dailies was libeling her unmercifully.
We devoted too little energy and imagination to public relations at the
local level." (p. 142)
8) Appreciate environmental factors—"Like any other human
activity, change proceeds more smoothly under optimal environmental con-
ditions." The problem at Buffalo was that, in the absence of its new
campus, facilities were overcrowded, often primitive, and increasingly
scattered, (pp. 142-143)
9) Avoid future shock—
Buffalo aspired to be The University of the Year 2000. The future
limited the campus just as the past limits the neurotic. The
future insinuated itself into every attempt to deal with current
issues and distorted our perception of the present. The unfinished
new campus became an albatross, reminding everyone of the limited
progress that was being made toward limitless goals. We put so
much stock in the vision of future greatness that our disillusion-
ment was inevitable, (pp. 143-144)
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”*0) Allow time to consolidate gains
The average tenure of a university president is now 4-4 yearsand decreasing. It is impossible to transform a universityin so short a time. ... The campus had, in effect, undergone
major surgery and did not have sufficient time to heal.
. . .(p. 144)
^
^member that change is most successful when those who are
affected are involved in the planning
This is a platitude of planning theory.
. . . Buffalo's academic
plan was not popularly generated. Students and faculty did not
contribute to its formulation. People resist change, even of a
kind they basically agree with, if they are not significantly
involved in the planning. A clumsier, slower, but more egali-
tarian approach to changing the university would have resulted
in more permanent reform, (p. I45 )
Change in Schools of Education
Schools of education are subject to all the resistances to re-
form which flow through the university and have, if anything, been more
resistant to change and find themselves more antiquated in their content
and methods than other departments of the university. I have found
little in the literature directly relating to the process of change in
schools of education, but would speculate that there are at least two
resistances to reform beyond those operating in the university as a
whole which are unique to most schools of education. First, the public
school system is a major client of a school of education. Its students
must be prepared for teaching in these schools. If the schools remain
unchanged in their operations and their expectations of the graduates of
the school of education, it is very difficult for the school of educa-
tion to change its own content—and as a generality, the public schools
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remain conservative in their methods and expectations.
Secondly, as previously described, schools of education tend to
be second-class citizens in the university cornmunity, considered, at
worst, as second-rate scholars teaching in a vocational school. The de-
sire to become accepted as first-rate citizens demands an allegiance to
the dominant values of the collegium (witness, for example, some of the
"research" carried on in schools of education) which in most oases leads
to an overdose of the kind of conservatism attributed to university fao-
ulties above.
The two major studies of schools of education came out, perhaps
more than coincidentally, in I963 carrying the complementary titles The
Education of American Teachers and The Miseducation of American Teachers .
The former, written by James B. Conant,^^ ex—President of Harvard, in-
cluded a study of state teacher certification policies (which he found
inconsistent and often inappropriately derived and supervised) and of
teacher training procedures in schools of education (which he finds want-
ing in many respects) and concludes with a series of recommendations for
reform on the part of the states, local school boards, schools of educa-
tion, and the National Association for the Accreditation of Teacher Edu-
cation.
^®This condition could, should the schools change, become a source
of innovation. But to a large extent what happens in schools of educa-
tion determines what happens in schools. In effect, then, the schools
and schools of education exist in a closed circular system which sup-
ports maintenance of the status quo.
^9conant, The Education of American Teachers (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1963).
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There is little evidence that this book, which initially caused
a considerable stir in educational circles, brought about any significant
change in most schools of education. For instance, in June I 964 the
editors of the Phi Delta Kappan had 21 reporters check the effects of
the report on the educational system and schools of education in their
areas—and the consensus was that very little had changed as a result of
the book. Its strongest effect seems to have been to cause some states
to set up study committees. Other responses to reporters included com-
ments along such lines as criticism of Conant, he was not to be taken
seriously since he was not a part of "education*' (all hie experience hav-
ing been at the university level); that "no one was going to dictate
changes to me"
;
that the time since the study had been too short to
achieve any change in response to the report; and that "it was a good
study that needed to be closely studied."
It seems clear that heads of schools of education, who could have
used a book by as highly respected a man as Conant as a lever for reform
in their own university and school, did not choose to do so. In fact,
the Phi Delta Kappan editors wryly conclude with the observation that:
Special evidence of the esteem in which Dr. Conant is held lies
in the fact that a large number of Deans
,
professors of educa-
tion, and others, with a fine balance of pride and indignation,
make this assertion: "Our college . .
.
probably comes closer
than any other to following Mr. Conant *s recommendation. "50
Koerner's book. The Miseducation of American Teachers
,
also ap-
pears to have left schools of education unaffected. This book amounted
50»»is The Education of American Teachers Influencing the Education
of Teachers?" Phi Delta Kappan , June I964t P» 433.
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to an acrosB-the-board denunciation of the activities of most schools
of education and, despite some very perceptive insights, was generally
dismissed, and I believe with justification, as supercilious and intem-
perate>-as evidenced by the following quotations from his summary of
findings:
. the inferior quality of the Education faculty is the
frmdamental limitation of the field,"
[Education] has not yet developed a corpus of knowledge and
techniques of sufficient scope and power to warrant the field's
being given full academic status.
. . . That it has been given
this status in most of our colleges
. . . does not make Educa-
tion a genuine discipline; it only makes possible the building
of more academic empires on sandy foundations, 51
and Koerner alleges that educationists have abandoned the English lan-
guage for "a pernicious patois that can most charitably be called Edu—
canto. ... Educanto masks a lack of thought, supports a specious
scientism, thrives on slogans and incantations, and repels any educated
mind that happens upon it, "5^ and, "in Education, as opposed to other
fields, there are as yet insufficient forces to oppose the policy of
stagnation. "53
I have made an extensive, but by no means comprehensive, search
through the Education Index
,
5^ an index to articles in 200 education-
related journals, for the 1968-1973 period to find evidence of substan-
tial change in schools of education. There are clearly no case studies
of such changes and of almost equal clarity is the fact that the type of
51 james D. Koerner, The Miseducation of American Teachers (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1963), p» 17*
5^Ibid .
,
pp. 20-21. 53j^^, ^ p, I’y,
^^Julie W. Ehrenreich, ed.
,
Education Index (New York: H. W.
Wilson, 1969-72).
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thoroughgoing reforms being attempted in other parte of the university
are not as prevalent in sohoole of eduoation. In sum, it appears that
eohools of eduoation as a whole are not engaged in a period of subetan-
tial reform of their activities.
This observation is confirmed by Harry Resnick in his article
in the Saturday Review. "Are There Better Ways to Teach Teachers?" when
he observes;
Despite years of protest and criticism, unimaginative courses
in the history, philosophy, psychology, and methodology of
education continue to be standard fare in teacher-training
programs throughout the country. Lately some schools have
shovm signs of enlarging their view of teacher training by
offering such options as group dynamics and sensitivity
training, and including specialties such as ethnic studies
or urban affairs, But the basic framework is the same. 55
Resnick then goes on to describe three institutions that have
made basic changes—^Harvard, the University of North Dakota, and Uni-
versity of Massachusetts. My review of the literature indicates that he
probably has chosen the most significant examples of change in schools
of education in the last five years.
According to Resnick, the changes at Harvard have been dramatic
and thorough, and include;
1) A consolidation of academic areas from twenty-two to eight.
2) A curriculum devoted less to teaching conventional school
subjects and more to developmental psychology, social policy, planning,
and "the premise that schools in their present form need full-scale
revision and that teachers and graduate students must join in taking a
more activist role in bringing it about*'
55saturday Review
,
March 4i ^972, p» 46.
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3) The departure of twelve faculty „,en.bere and an increase in
proportion of doctoral students from 20 per cent to 50 per cent
4) Increased involvement in off-campus projects. 56
It appears from Resnick's article that these changes were
brought about, in contradiction to Ladd's conclusions, by self-study
and through the collegial decision-making process. For example, he de-
scribes an 18-month Patrick Moynihan seminar to study the findings of
the Coleman Report as "a crucial factor in [the] drastic reorganization
now taking iJace within the Harvard ed. school
. .
.« and goes on to
state that "the changes at Harvard [were] engineered by a student-
faculty committee set up by Dean Theodore R. Sizer to re-evaluate the
entire school. ..." It also appears, however, that the Dean himself
was a strong motive force behind these changes since. Resnick observes,
"Sizer has decided to step down, after seven years as dean, hoping that
a period of calm and consolidation will ensue. "57
At the University of North Dakota, change in the preparation of
teachers appears to have been brought about by what has been called the
"end—run strategy"—that is by the creation and development of an inno-
vative progTcim outside the pre-existing structures of the organization.
Thus, in I 968 the New School of Behavioral Studies in Education was
established "as an experimental college component of the University. "58
This school, under "the astute political guidance of its Dean, Vito
Perrone," became committed to the open classroom approach to education
^^Ibid .
, pp. 47-48.
^'^Ibid ., p. 47.
^^Insights
,
Newsletter of the New School of Behavioral Studies in
Education, University of North Dakota (Grand Porks), May 1972, p. 1.
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and, according to Resnick, "abandoned
. . . required courses and built
its curriculum around the principle that, in order to teach students how
to be autonomous learners,
. . . teachers first would have to master the
art themselves.”
Resnick states that “There are virtually no course requirements
at the New School, and students plan and organize their curriculums in
close consultation with their advisors. ”59
The end run appears to have been highly successful, so success-
ful in fact that in July I972 the New School and the College of Educa-
tion were merged into a new teacher training entity called the Center
for Teaching and Learning—^with Vito Perrone as Dean.^^
Beyond these two brief summaries, there is little evidence of
significant reform in schools of education available in the literature
surveyed
.
On Organizational Change
A review of the literature of organizational change leads me to
the conclusion that although some theories offer useful insights into
some aspects of organizational process, as a whole organizational change
theory has not provided organizational leaders with the tools they need
to bring about change in their organizations.
Warren Bennis appears to agree with this observation. In his
book Changing Organization
,
written shortly before he accepted the posi-
tion at Buffalo and perhaps foreshadowing some of the difficulties of
6059Resnick, p. 46. Insights , p. 1.
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the leadership in successfully bringing abcut change there, he describes
the lack of useful theories for bringing about organisational change.
If there is one truth most social theorists agree on and onwnich they can arrive at a quick consensus, it is the lack
of a viable theory of social change.
. . .
. . . what
. .
.
[is] so curious about the present state of
theories of social change ... is that they are silent on
matters of directing and implementing change .... they
tend to identify and explain the dynamic interactions of a
system without providing a clue pertaining to the identifica-
tion of strategic leverages for alteration. They are theories
suitable only for observers of social change, not theories for
participants in, or practitioners of, social change. They are
theories of change and not theories of changing
.
Bennis cites the statements of three prominent sociologists to
support his contention that there are no viable theories of social
change, quoting
Wibert E. Moore, who stated "The mention of 'theory of
social change' will make most social scientists appear defen-
sive, furtive, guilt-ridden, or frightened."
K. D. Naegele who, in preface to his "monumental" Theories
of Society
.
Volume II, observed "At the gate of the study of
social change stands a host of half truths."
and D. Martindale who reports an admission made by ". . .
leading sociologists that its theory of social change is the
weakest branch of sociological theory .
Bennis elaborates on his thesis by reference to the work of
Robert Chin, who has delineated seven prerequisites of a viable
theory of changing, and concludes that no existing theories meet
these prerequisites. "Such a theory does not now exist, and this
probably explains why the change agents . . . appear to write like
'theoretical orphans.' More important," says Bennis, "it also explains
why so many change progreuns based on theories of social change have
61
p. 99.
Bennis, Changing Organizations (New York;
62
Ibid.
McGraw-Hill
,
I966)
,
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been inadeqviate,”^^
Louis M. Maguire seems to concur with Bennis' view of the weak-
ness of change theories, beginning his comprehensive summary of change
literature for educators
The past decade has witnessed a profusion of writings addressedto change in education and a substantial increase in the number
of projects designed to effect educational change. There existhowever, few scientifically developed (i.e., theoretically based,
empirically tested and revised) tools for use in the task of
administering change
. , ,
The overarching observation is that the practicing school
administrator can find very little practical help in the litera-t^e fog^planning and managing, and dealing with problems of
In the absence of the consistent, theoretically based model for
change which Bennis, Maguire and no doubt all leaders would like to have,
we do have a substantial number of theoretical and strategic lenses.
These constructs can provide useful insights into parts of the change
process, although not the whole, and are therefore of some use to prac-
titioners. William A. McClelland has summarized the situation as fol-
lows:
It is premature to do more than wish for a general model, let
alone a general theory of change and changing. Accordingly,
researchers have developed a variety of subsystem models,
each of which deals with some aspect of the change process
or with some specific setting. ^5
In the pages which follow I shall describe some of the major
theoretical and practical lenses available to practitioners. My choice
^^Ibid
.
,
pp. 100-101.
^^Louis M. Maguire, Observations and Analysis of the Literature
on Change (Philadelphia: Research for Better Schools, 1970), p. H
^^Ibid.
,
p. 12.
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of lenses to describe is based on my estimate of usefulness in under-
standing organizational change, on my estimate of the general aco.ptanoe
and use of the construct by practitioners and students of change, and on
my estimate of appropriateness for use in educational settings.
I shall divide these constructs into three general categories,
realizing that the boundaries between these categories will often be
fuzzy and ill-defined.
—The first category will consist of "analytical models," con-
structs which offer useful ways of looking at organizations and organi-
zational change processes. The practitioner can devise appropriate
change strategies or attempt to adopt appropriate leader behavior based
on the insights provided him by these models.
—The second category will be made up of "descriptive models,"
descriptions of patterns of change in organizations derived from obser-
vation and analysis of change efforts in a variety of organizations.
Such descriptions can be useful to the practitioner in assessing the
potential for change in his organization and in developing effective
change strategies in his organization.
—The third category consists of "change strategy models," in
effect partial blueprints to guide the practitioner in bringing about
successful organizational change.
Analytical Models
Levels of change
In their Management of Organizational Behavior Paul Hersey and
Kenneth Blanchard look at the process of organizational change in terms
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of four sequential levels, (,) toowledge ohanges. ( 2 ) altitudinal changes
(3) individual behavior ohanges, and ( 4 ) group behavior changes-^s in-
dicated in the following illustration from their book.
GROUP BEHAVIOR
0>
> INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR
0
>
c ATTITUDES
T
0
KNOWLEDGE
(Short) Time involved ^ (Long)
(c)^Paul Mersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard, Management
of Organizational Behavior
. Second edition, Prentice-
Hall, Inc.
They postulate that both the time required for and difficulty
of these changes increases as the organization moves through the vari-
ous levels. They go on to describe two methods of bringing about or-
ganizational change in terms of these levels. The first they call the
"participative change cycle." This cycle, as described in the illustra-
tion below, begins with the introduction of new knowledge, usually by
the "personal power" of the leader. This new knowledge will, if accepted,
tend to change individual attitudes, which will then affect individual
behavior, and ultimately the changes in individual behavior will aggre-
gate themselves into changes in group behavior. According to the model,
the difficulty of and time lapse between changes in level will increase
as the organization moves through the cycle—^which they illustrate as
follows.
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(c) Paul Hersey and Kenneth
Organizational Behavior
,
Hall, Inc.
H. Blanchard, Management
Second edition, Prentice—
The second cycle, which they describe as the
-coerced change
cycle,- begins at the fourth level by a forced change in group behavior,
usually imposed by a leader relying on his position power, (i.e.,
"Henceforth there will be no more talking or horseplay while the pro-
duction line IS in motion. Any employee engaging in such behavior will
be ... ) According to the theory, changed group behavior will require
changes in individual behavior, which in turn will require the assimila-
tion of new knowledge to support that behavior, which finally will result
(c) Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard, Management of Or—
ganizational Behavior
. Second edition, Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Comparing the two change cycles, the authors postulate that
participative change is slower than coerced change, but also tends to
be more permanent since changes are better integrated into participants'
behavior and thus do not depend on continued enforcement by the leader.
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They further postulate that the participative change cycle appears to be
most appropriate for mature groups (to be described below) since they
are more independent and also more likely to assume responsibility for
implementation, and that the coerced change cycle is most appropriate for
immature groups, which tend to be passive and dependent and which, ac-
ocrding to the authors, "might prefer direction and structure. "66
A somewhat similar, although less comprehensive model, is pro-
posed by Art Oallaher, Jr. in his description of the three interrelated
processes which lead to culture change. These processes are described
as
(l) innovation, the process whereby a new element of culture
or combination of events is made available to a group, (2) dis-
semination, the process whereby an innovation comes to be
shared, and (3) integration, the process whereby the innova-
tion becomes mutually adjusted to other elements in the cul-
ture . ° •
Maslow’s need hierarchy
Abraham Maslow's theory of the hierarchy of human needs is often
used by practitioners of change to determine the most effective motiva-
tors of change and to attempt to reduce the personal threats which often
accompany change efforts. Maslow's hierarchy was developed to describe
levels of individual motivation but has also been applied by analysts to
organizations as a whole.
^^Excerpted and summarized from Paul Hersey and Kenneth H.
Blanchard, Management of Organizational Behavior
,
Second Edition (New
Jersey, Prentice-Hall
,
1972) pp. 159-161
.
^
^Maguire, p. 9»
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MasloWB hierarchy, as described in his Motivaticn and
2iit£, proposes that man's needs can be viewed as a hierarchy which be-
gins with physiological needs (food, clothing, shelter), and moves through
security (assurance that physiological needs will continue to be met),
to affiliation, esteem (recognition), and finally to self-actualization.
The theory postulates that a person's primary motivation will arise out
of the lowest unmet need in the hierarchy, and that when a need becomes
relatively satisfied, the satisfaction of the next highest unmet need
will become his major source of motivation.^®
A practitioner might use this theoretical construct, for example,
to ascertain appropriate rewards for new behaviors in his organization.
For instance a man (or a group) operating primarily at the esteem level
will probably respond to added recognition from management, while an-
other, operating at the affiliation level, would probably resent such
recognition, since it would tend to set him off from the rest of the
group from which his major motivating need was being met.
The Hersey-Blanchard synthesis
Kersey and Blanchard have developed a theoretical construct of
orgemizational behavior and change which integrates what they call *' life-
cycle theory” with a number of other theories of change, motivation, and
leadership behavior. The Hersey-Blanchard synthesis is significant in
that it pulls together a variety of theories which previously, primarily
because of differences in nomenclature, were treated as relatively
CO
”°Summarized from Abraham H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality
(New York: Harper, 1954 )*
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discreet and unrelated. The fact that these theories have sufficient
ooo».onallty to be synthesised. ™ay also increase the practitioner's con-
fidence in their validity. I will describe only the life cycle theonr
in detail, for more explanation of the other theories the reader is
recommended to Mersey and Blanchard's Management of Organisational
ioT, Chapter 9 stud references.
or-
Life cycle theory postulates four phases in the growth of an
ganization and describes appropriate behavior on the part of the leader
in each stage. The illustration below delineates the stages and effec-
tive leadership styles.
EFFECTIVE STYLES
if
Highl?elaHonships
and
Low Task
[21
High Task
and
IHigh Relationships
T-owTask
Low^e 1 a t i0 nsh i ps
Hi^^^sk^
an^k
Low Relatiowhips
\
(c) Paul Hersey and
Kenneth H, Blanchard,
Management of Organi-
zational Behavior
.
Second edition,
Prentice-Hall, Inc.
(Low)- TASK BEHAVIOR- (High)
(Mahjr (Immature)
According to life cycle theory an organization moves from imma-
turity (passivity and dependence) to maturity (initiative, responsibility,
and independence) in four phases. In stage one, the theory postulates,
the leauier needs to focus on the task (high task), particularly in pro-
viding structure for the fulfillment of the task, but need not concern
himself with personal relationships between himself and the group or
among group members (low relationships). As the group begins to mature
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(phase 2), the leader „uet concern himself with both task and relation-
ships (high task-high relationship), since personal relationships have
begun to affect the maturation of group members. As it matures further,
the group begins to develop its own structure for task accomplishment, and
any direct interference from the leader would only be dysfunctional to
the task (high relationship, low task). In the final stage the group
has matured to the point where members provide each other with personal
support and the group as a whole structures its own activities, m
this phase interference by the leader in either the task or the group
relationship would be dysfunctional. He is not needed to accomplish the
task nor is he a part of the functioning work group. He thus adopts a
low task, low relationship behavior style.
Life—cycle theory is thus useful to practitioners of change in
that it defines appropriate leader style to bring about change in each
of the four phases.
Hersey and Blanchard use this life—cycle theory as the basis
for their integration of other theories. This integration is useful in
many ways, chief among them that it gives practitioners more lenses
with which to look at organizational growth and change, secondly because
the other theories so synthesized tend to extend and validate the life
cycle theory and each other, and thirdly because life—cycle theory gives
insight into appropriate leadership behavior under various conditions
described by the other theories.
The following is an attempt to summarize Hersey and Blanchard's
synthesis of life cycle and other related concepts. 69
^^Excerpted and smnmarized from Hersey and Blanchard, pp. 134-138,
174-179.
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Life Cycle Theory
Leadership style Task
Relationships
Maslow*s Need Hierarchy
Herzberg's Motivation-
Hygiene Theory '/*^
Argyris Immaturity-
Maturity Continmun^^
McGregor Leadership Theory7 ^
Likert Management Systems^^
Schein's Motivation
ParadigmV4
Lewin’s Change Cycle
^^Ibid
.
, p. 54 *
7 ^ Ibid
. , pp. 50-51*
pp, 46-48.
^^Ibid
.
,
pp. 60-64.
^^Ibid
. ,
p. 176.
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Force field analysis
Force field analysis is used, retrospectively, in this study
of changes at the School of Education and is described in detail in
Chapter VIII. When used prospectively as an analytical tool to guide
the practitioner in his change effort, the following general approach
is normally followed. First the practitioner charts as best he can the
nature and strength of the driving forces toward innovation in the or-
ganization and the restraining forces toward maintenance of the status
quo. He then surveys the forces he has described to determine which
forces can be altered in appropriate directions (increase driving/reduce
restraining) and also attempts to determine what new driving forces can
be added. In effect, he is looking for "strategic levers," as described
by Bennis.
In looking for strategic levers, he focuses first on the possi-
for reduction of restraining forces, since the theory postulates
that change achieved by the reduction of restraining forces will tend to
be easier and more permanent, since change through an increase in driving
forces tends to increase the level of tension in and volatility of the
organizat ion . ^ ^
Force field analysis is a very useful lens for systematically
analyzing the change potential of an organization and developing appro-
priate strategies. Generally specific strategies will be derived from
other ways of looking at organizations such as those described above.
75summarized from David H, Jenkins, "Force Field Analysis Applied
to a School Situation," in Warren Bennis, Kenneth Benne, Robert Chin,
eds.. The Planning of Change (New York: Holt, 1961)1 pp. 238-244.
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Descriptive Models
Dennis* summar;y of planned
change techniques
BenniB in his Changing Organizations has evumarised and categor-
ised techniques used in planned change efforts. The term "planned change'
has come to be associated with an approach to organisational change de-
veloped by Ronald Lippett, Kenneth Benne, and associates of the National
Training Laboratories (NTL). This approach normally implies a consul-
tant "change agent" working with a client system. Chin defines planned
change as follows:
. .
. planned change [is] a deliberate and collaborative processinvolving a change agent and client system that are brought to-
gether to solve a problem or to plan and attain an improved
state of functioning in the client system by utilizing and ap-
plying valid knowledge.^®
^o^pils^ion, then^ is limited to collaborative planned
change techniques, and is not intended to cover the entire range of
change techniques. Thus, for example, coercion does not appear on his
list, although it is probably far and away the most common organizational
change strategy.
I am including Dennis' summary as a descriptive model because it
provides a model of alternative strategies for the achievement of planned
change. He describes seven types of planned change techniques:
1 ) Exposition and propagation—(which Dennis sees as the most
popular type of plajined change technique) assumes that knowledge influ-
ences behavior and therefore that behavior change can be brought about
7%a.guire, p. 11.
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by the exposition and propagation of new knowledge.
2) me Elite Corps-assumes that the "right people" introduced
into appropriate positions in the organization will bring about appro-
priate changes.
Relations Traininff-~assmnftR that the necessary insight,
wisdom, and diagnostic sensitivity for appropriate changes can be facili-
tated in key executives through such training.
4) ^aff Analysis—assumes that if sufficient data in well
analyzed form is made available to the key executive by his staff, he
will be able to appropriately guide change efforts.
5) Scholarly Consultations—in which a change program is devel-
oped on the advice of an "expert" (sociologist, organizational theorist,
psychologist, etc.) on the basis of the outstanding theory and litera-
ture of that expert's field rather than on research into the organiza-
tion to be changed.
Circulation of ideas to the elite—which assumes that change
can be brought about by "converting" the powerful people in the organi-
zation.
7) Action Research—which, once a goal of change has been
agreed upon and initial strategies adopted, closely monitors (gets feed-
back from) the system being changed as a guide to the maintenance of
appropriate strategies throughout the change effort.^^
^^Bennis, Changing Organizations
,
pp. 101-103.
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The pattern of planned change
Ronald Lippett and his associateB, in their book The Dynamioa of
Planned Change
,
desoribe the pattern of Buooeseful planned change through
the use of a "change agent" in seven steps:
1. The development of a need for change
2. The establishment of a change relationship
3. The clarification or diagnosis of the client system's
problems.
4. The examination of alternative routes and goals: establishing
goals and intentions of action
5» The transformation of intentions into actual change efforts
6. The generalization and stabilization of change
7. The achievement of a terminal relationship. 78
The Greiner change sequence
The most comprehensive descriptive model available is that pro-
posed by Larry E. Greiner derived from his analysis of case studies of
eighteen successful and unsuccessful change programs. Based on this
study, he postulates seven sequential components of a successful change
effort—as follows:
1 ) The organization and especially top management is under con-
siderable external and internal pressure for improvement long before an
explicit organizational change is contemplated. Performance and/or
7^onald Lippett, Jeanne Watson, Bruce Westly, The Dynamics of
Planned Change (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1958), pp. 131-143*
morale are low. Top management seems to be
problems.
groping for solutions to
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2) A new man, known for his ability to introduce improvements
enters the organization, either as [its] official head, or as a consul-
tant who deals directly with the head of the organization.
3) An initial act of the new man is to encourage a reexamination
of past practices and current problems within the organization.
4) The head of the organization and his immediate subordinates
assume a direct and highly involved role in conducting the reexamination.
5) The new man, with top management support, engages several
levels of the organization in collaborative fact-finding, problem-
solving discussions to identify and diagnose current organizational
problems.
6) The new man provides others with new ideas and methods for
developing solutions to problems—again at many levels of the organiza-
tion.
7) The solutions and decisions are developed, tested, and fo\ind
creditable for solving problems on a small scale before an attempt is
made to widen the scope of chcuige to larger problems and the entire or-
ganization.
8) The change effort spreads with each success experience, and
as management support grows, it is gradually absorbed permanently into
the organization’s way of life.
Greiner also observes, on the basis of his analysis, that the
less successful efforts at change tended to differ from the more success-
ful primarily because of one or more departures from the "successful"
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pattern described above, specifically:
1) They began at different starting points-i.e., there was
not strong pressure for change both externally and internally.
2) They missed one or more of the above steps.
3) The change effort was either unilateral or delegated by the
leadere^9
Change Strategy Models
Change process model strategies
Kurt Lewin has postulated that successful organizational change
moves thro\igh three stages, which he describes as unfreezing (desire and
readiness for changed behavior), changing (the adoption of changed be-
havior), and refreezing (the full integration of changed behavior). This
cycle of change can be applied to individual, group, and organizational
change
.
Blanchard and Hersey describe some specific strategies used by
managers to move their organizations through these cycles. Their de-
scription is based primarily on studies of change processes by Edgar
Schein and H. C. Kelman.
Unfreezing ; Schein has found some common elements in his survey
of unfreezing strategies including:
(1) The physical removal of the individual[s] being changed
from his accustomed routines, sources of information, and social rela-
tionships
^^Excerpted and summarized from Larry E. Greiner, "Patterns of
Organizational Change," in Harvard Business Review, May-June 196? i PP»
122-126.
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(2) the iinderroining and destruction of all s
(3) demeaning and humiliating experiences to
ocial supports
help” the indi-
vidual being changed to see his old self as unworthy and thus to be
(4) the constant linkage of reward with willingness to change
and of punishment with unwillingness to change
Changing : Once the individual or group has become "unfrozen"
they are ready to adopt new forms of behavior. According to Kelman,
new behaviors tend to come from three sources
id-entification—with a model from whom the individual can
learn new behaviors by identifying with him and patterning his behavior
after him
internalization—of new behaviors in response to changed
social or environmental conditions.
coercion^—
—usually by the continuation of a reward system
which supports changed behavior and punishes unwillingness to change.
Refreezing : Refreezing is accomplished primarily by the mainte-
nance of an environment which reinforces and supports the new behavior.
Such an environment may often evolve relatively spontaneously in a group
that has gone through the unfreezing and changing cycles together pro-
vided management is supportive of the new behaviors, and can often be
institutionalized by management through the development of an appro-
priate organizational reward system.°^
80Excerpted and summarized from Hersey and Blanchard, pp. I 6 I-I 64 .
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Planned change strategies
NTL has delineated six etrategio principles to guide change
agents in their attempt to facilitate change in the client system-as
follows:
1. To change a subsystem or any part of a subsystem, relevant
aspects of the environment must also be changed
2. To change behavior on any level of a hierarchical organiza-
tion, it is necessary to achieve oomplementaty and reinforcing changes
in organization levels above and below that level.
3. The point to begin change is at those points in the system
where some stress and strain exist.
4. If thoroughgoing changes in a hierarchical structure are
desirable or necessary, change should ordinarily start with the policy-
maJcing body
5. Both the formal and informal organization of an institution
must be considered in planning any process of change
6. The effectiveness of planned change is often directly related
to the degree to which members at all levels of an institutional hier-
archy take part in the fact-finding and the diagnosing of needed changes
and in the formulating and reality—testing of goals and programs of
change . ® ^
®%aguire, pp. 19-20.
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In the concluding chapter of this study I shall attempt to pro-
vide perspective on the change effort at the School of Education by
reference to the literature on resistance to reform and change in higher
education presented above and to refer to the organizational change
models as a means of gaining insight into the change process at the
School of Education,
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CHAPTER III
SUMMARY OP CHANGES
SEPTEMBER I967 - NOVEMBER I969
The purpose of this chapter is to delineate the scope and niagni-
tude of the reformation of the School of Education in the period Septem-
ber 1967 through November I969 by comparing the School at each time along
as many significant dimensions, tangible and intangible, as possible.
Physical Facilities
September 196?
The School is a low, flat-topped, many-windowed brick structure,
late 1950's New England rural elementary school in architecture, located
at the out-of-town end of a 1-^-mile university campus. The School of
Education portion of the building is L shaped with three floors of usable
space including the basement, a portion of which is devoted to the Uni-
versity media center. The short section of the L contains 48 faculty
offices on three floors and the long section houses I5 classrooms and a
20,000^ volume library. A number of faculty have offices in a small ad-
jacent building.
Attached to the top of the L in a flattened V shape is the Marks
Meadow Observation School, an elementary school run jointly by the School
of Education and the Town of Amherst. At the intersection of the two
^Albert W. Purvis, Annual Report [I966-67] (June 15i 1987)i P* 1 •
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schools is a 350-seat auditorium used jointly by the two.
Upon entering the building through the main door one finds him-
self in a vast, flagstone-floored foyer, neat, olean and bare. One is
struck by the subdued, orderly, and professional tenor of the place, its
bare walls and straight lines, the lack of movement in the halls, and
its placidity and quietness except during class change periods when the
sound of shuffling feet and young voices temporarily echoes through the
building.
Outside, the parking lot, University Lot #7, is, at 11 a.m.,
comfortably filled by some 50 recent vintage Fords, Chevrolets, Plyraouths,
and Oldsmobiles, most bearing Massachusetts license plates and #7 stick-
ers, neatly parked before signs declaring Faculty and Staff Only, By
Order of the Board of Trustees
.
November I969
Still the vintage 1950's building at the edge of the campus, but
inside all the classrooms save two are gone, converted into offices (some
by their occupants, some by normal university channels) for most of the
faculty, others of whom have spilled out to fill two small buildings
nearby.^ The library remains, scheduled for conversion to offices the
following year. The media center section of the basement has been turned
over to the School of Education media center, equipped with a "micro-
teaching" laboratory and a plethora of photographic, film, and audio and
video tape equipment.
^Derived from Memorandvun from Richard T. Coffing, Subject: "I969-
70 Space Allocations," August 11, I969 (School files).
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Entering the building, one finds the majority of the foyer con-
verted into a busy secretarial pool and is immediately struok with a
sense of movement and activity in the building. Walls, doors, and an
information kiosk are a clutter of posters of all descriptions, meeting
and course notices, general announcements, picture collages, and personal
notices. The halls are filled with people, moot in motion, usually with
hands filled with folders and papers; others talking animatedly in knots;
others sitting in chairs, on tables, or on the floor, talking, waiting
or watching.
The parking lot remains, but behind it is another lot for 250
care where before there had been fields. And cars are littered every-
where, Volkswagen beetles and buses, Opels, Renaults, Volvos, pickup
trucks, brilliant Dodge Chargers, a substantial smattering of battered
hulks, as well as a standard collection of recent G.M., Ford, and
Chrysler models—regular parking spaces filled, no—parking zones filled,
spilling out to line the street in front of the building. The signs
have been modernized. Staff Parking Only, Board of Trustees. Univ. of
Ma^s.
,
and many of the cars carry student parking stickers or no stickers
at all. There is a rainbow of license plates.
The activity and motion inside the building extends outside,
with groups and individuals constantly going in and out, meeting other
groups, melding and reforming, with conversations carried on gunong the
cars. On the grass inside the L, among a group of free-form sculptures,
are a number of class-size groups talking, moving and gesturing.
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Faculty
September 196?
The School of Education faculty in September I967 ie 35 in num-
ber; all white except one who is to leave the following year; predomi-
nantly male (there were six women faculty, two of whom had reached the
rank of associate professor); seventy per cent possessing doctorates;
nine with tenure; and with an average age of 42.3 faculty members
had been public school teachers or administrators before getting their
doctorates and entering university-level teaching,
4
There were three vacant faculty positions throughout the year,
and the University had not granted the School any new positions for the
past three years, 5 However, the faculty composition had not been static,
seven new faculty members having joined in 1967^ as a result of resigna-
tions. The average time at the School for the total faculty was 3.2
years.
7
Faculty are assigned to one of the five curriculvun areas of the
School (Elementary Education, Secondary Education, Curriculum and In-
struction, Administration, Counseling and Guidance) and teach all their
^See September 19^7 Faculty Profile, Appendix A.
^All but three of the 1 966-67 faculty had had prior public school
experience. See Evaluation of the School of Education [prepared by the
School of Education] by National Coiuicil for Accreditation of Teacher
Education (November I966), appendix,
derived from Purvis, 1 966-67 Annual Report , p, 24; and interview
with Oswald Tippo, May 31, 1972.
^See Appendix A. ^Derived from Appendix A.
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courses in that area. Areas are the major organizational entities of the
School and are responsible for hiring new faculty when vacancies occur,
for administration of area courses, and for proposing changes in form or
content of their courses to the rest of the faculty and administration.
All indications are that nearly all interaction of faculty members, both
academic and social, was limited to those in their particular Area.
Form, content, and even time of each course are, almost without
exception, predetermined and then faculty assigned to fill the teaching
slots in this pre-set curriculum. The faculty address each other formally.
Dr. or Professor, in public and, it is reported, most informal relations
as well. The Dean is almost invariably addressed as Dean Purvis.
There appears to be little interest among the faculty in change
and innovation. In the previous year some minor changes in curriculum
and educational processes had taken place, but it seems clear that the
major interest of the faculty is in fulfilling its teaching commitments
and publishing. (Each article or book published is reported in faculty
meetings and suitably applauded.)
The faculty at this time seems to hold a generally low opinion of
itself and a lack of ambition for professional advancement outside the
School. When asked how many of the faculty would have gladly moved to
higher-status institutions such as Coltimbia, Harvard, or Stanford, most
faculty interviewed replied that very few would, primarily because of the
Q
competition intrinsic to the higher—status institutions.
®Data for preceding four pareigraphs derived primarily from exist
ing faculty interviews. May and June, 1972.
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The picture of the faculty which emerges from my interviews was
one of a majority reasonably competent, but disinterested in innovation
or advancing their own careers outside the School; a few generally in-
competent and living out their failure at the School; and a very few,
ambitious and using the School as a stepping stone to more prestigious
institutions.
9
The low opinion which the faculty holds of itself is shared by
the University administration and by most of the University faculty,
a
product of (a) a general academic bias against schools of education
whose faculty are not seen as sufficiently competent to meet the demands
of teaching in their major field (i.e,, a good historian teaches his-
tory in a history department—a second-rate historian teaches methods of
teaching history or the history of education)
,
and (b) a shared feeling
that the School's faculty is inferior even among schools of education.
Many faculty members sense a condescending and patronizing atti-
tude toward them by members of the University faculty. It is reported
that there is very little interaction, either academic or social, between
School of Education faculty euid faculty of the rest of the University.
^Dean Purvis, in his final Annual Report, was not particularly
complimentary about the quality of the faculty: "Another problem which
must be solved if the School is to gain higher prestige is the problem
of quality of faculty. The School currently has several very high quality
faculty, but not nearly enough." ( 1966-6? Annual Report )
^^Prom existing faculty interviews and Tippo interview.
'’^'See James B. Conant, The Education of American Teachers (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 19^3) » PP* 1 & 2.
^^Prom existing faculty and Tippo interviews.
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November 1969
The faculty has more than doubled to 70 of which 50 have been
hired since September I967, remains predominantly white (there are four
black faculty members, all lecturers), and has become even more solidly
male (the number of women faculty has dropped to four). The percentage
of faculty members with doctorates has remained at about 70 per cent,
thirteen now have tenure, and the average age has declined substantially
to 37 years old. The average tenxire at the School of faculty members
has fallen to 2.2 years.
The five curriculum areas have been replaced by eleven "centers”
of teaching and inquiry and a number of other "programs." The eleven
centers include:
Leadership in Educational
Administration
Aesthetics in Education
Foundations of Education
Humanistic Education
Coxmselor Education Educational Research
Innovations in Edu- Teacher Education
cation Urban Education
International Educa-
tion
Educational Media
and Technology
and the major programs are:
Higher Education Vocational Education Early Childhood Education^^
This diversity of curriculum mirrors the diversity of faculty
members whose interests span the centers and progreuns and whose back-
grounds and training are uniquely diverse for a school of education. The
faculty includes film and television specialists, psychologists, ex-peace
“•^See November I969 Faculty Profile, Appendix C.
^^School of Education Interim Catalogue , transmitted to Academic
Matters Committee, Faculty Senate, and Graduate Council, from Dwight W.
Allen, Dean, School of Education ([April I969] School files), pp. 97-106.
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corps officials, historians, group facilitators, specialists in inner-
city education, research specialists, computer specialists, former law-
yers, former USOE members, and specialists in affective education. ^5
The center and program form of organization is not as restric-
tive as the Areas had been and faculty members often belong to more than
one center or program, although usually concentrating their efforts in
one. Typically the staff of each center offers both structured and in-
dividualized degree programs at both the graduate and undergraduate lev-
els. New faculty can be hired by a center or program by petition to the
Dean and School Council. Faculty interaction, both academic and social,
although often focused on others in the center or program, is on a con-
siderably more diverse, school—wide basis than previously.
In addition to teaching semester courses, usually of their own
choosing and design, faculty are also acting as classroom facilitators
putting students in touch with appropriate educational resources and of-
fering modules, usually defined as shorter than semester length educa-
tional experiences. They are also directing research projects, preparing
proposals for projects, traveling nationwide as consultants, and many
are participating in the governance of the School through the School
Council, which meets weekly. Most of the faculty are also spending a sub-
stantial amount of time with graduate students serving on advisory, com-
prehensive, and dissertation committees and supervising teaching of School
of Education courses by graduate students.
^^Lyman B. Brainerd, Jr., "A Thrust Toward Relevance: The Year in
Review," in Trend, Spring, 19^9» P» 5»
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The faculty almost without exception address each other and stu-
dents on a first-name basis and the Dean is on all occasions, formal and
informal
,
’’Dwight • ”
Change, experimentation, and innovation have clearly become a
major pursuit of the faculty. The previous year had been a year of plan-
ning culminating in thoroughgoing reform of the School’s curriculxim and
organization. Most faculty are teaching courses which they have developed
themselves and are teaching for the first or second time. All centers
are involved in planning for future years. Some have grants for new pro-
grams and others are developing funding proposals. Many faculty are ex-
ploring new avenues of cooperation with public school systems.
The influx of new faculty, most young, the success of the plan-
ning year just ended, and the national publicity which the School has
received seemed to have changed the tenor of the faculty as a whole from
passivity and complacency to one of activity, energy, and ambition. Pub-
lishing of faculty members has dropped substantially, both because the
planning year has focused the faculty’s energies inward on the develop-
ment of the School and because publishing has become a less valued ac-
tivity (in a Saturday Review article on the School the previous year,
the author had quoted a staff member as saying that ’’Education will not
1
6
be changed by throwing books at it.”).
There appears to be far more social interaction between the
School of Education faculty and that of the rest of the University—and
the condescending and patronizing attitude has for the most part
“•Wallace Roberts, ’’Clean Slate at UMass,” in Saturday Review ,
January 18, 1969i P*
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disappeared. As one School of Education faculty member put it: "They
n.o't like what we are doing| but they know we are to be reckoned
with. Indeed
I
the balance seems to have changed | the common criti-
cism of the School faculty by University faculty members having become
focused on their "arrogance" and disinterest in cooperating with other
departments.
Administration
September 196?
September I967 marks the beginning of a short transition period
in the School's administration. Dean Ralph Purvis, who had headed the
School since it had been raised from department status in 1956^® had re-
tired the previous June, and Ovid Parody, previously head of the School's
Administration Area, is acting Dean pending the arrival of a new Dean in
January.
Dean Purvis' administration appears to have been authoritarian
in style and bureaucratic in purpose as well as form. Most agree that
"he ruled with an iron heind" and that the major purpose of that rule was
the maintenance of order, stability, and predictability. He scheduled
all faculty meetings, prepared the agendas, and chaired the meetings
himself. He was apparently not reluctant to reverse faculty decisions
when he did not eigree with them.
^
^Existing faculty interview.
^®Office of Institutional Studies, University of Massachusetts,
Amherst, Facts and Figures: I967 (Amherst, n.p. [I968]), p. 12 (Here-
after referred to as Blue Book).
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It is reported that "He had a housekeeper approach to adminis-
tration," and rumor had it that he checked on all faculty offices at
8:30 a.m. to make sure everyone was in. A symptom of the pervasive
bureaucracy was the fact that one of the major powers in the School was
his secretary, chiefly because she was the repository of knowledge of
appropriate procedures for whatever action was to be taken.
Dean Purvis put great emphasis on "good" teaching of the curricu-
lum in the School and on publication, but is reported to have been gen-
erally disinterested in actively pursuing outside funding or in promoting
changes of any significance in the curriculum or acsulemic requirements.
It is also clear that during at least the last two years of his tenure
Dean Purvis had gotten a very strong message of non-support from the
University^ 9 vrtiich might explain some of his unwillingness to undergo
the risks associated with innovation.
Dean Purvis' Assistant Dean during this period was Ralph Pippert,
who it appears was among the most flamboyant of the faculty and who, it
is reported, was the subject of rather extensive criticism from some
faculty members for actions like "drinking beer and going tobogganing
with his students" and "dating his secretary." Dr. Pippert also left
the School, for personal reasons, in the spring of 1967*
^9ab he observed in his final Annual Report: "In summary. In
three years our enrollment has increased 69^ but our faculty has in-
creased only 12^ and our budget in the operational categories has actu-
ally decreased by 13^." (p. 11) "The inevitable conclusion is that for
a period of time ... the School has not had, to use a gross understate-
ment, adequate support." (pp. 9 & 10)
^^ata in previous four paragraphs derived from existing faculty
interviews.
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November 1969
The Dean is Dwight W. Allen, 37 years old. flamboyant in dress,
mannerism, and speech—with a national reputation as an educational inno-
vator. Some have called him the P. T. Barnum of education. He also
rules the School with an iron hand, but the major purpose of his rule is
change rather than stability and his major activities revolve around the
conceptualization, staffing, and funding of new educational programs.
His organizational orientation is clearly entrepreneurial rather than
bureaucratic. In University dealings he is clearly out to beat the sys-
tem rather than conform to it, and the School organization puts a premium
on aggressiveness, risk-taking, and personal power rather than the smooth
functioning of the system.
Many in the School, including the Dean, talk of shared power
among the faculty, students, and administration, but at this time none
of the attempts to create mechanisms for such power sharing have worked
so, controlling most of the financial resources of the School and know-
ing far more of the School, its programs, and its people than anyone
else, all power runs from the Dean—and he is a highly controversial
figure, both within and without the School.
He is often away from the campus consulting and speechmaking,
negotiating with fimding agencies in Washington and New York, visiting
school sites nationwide to explore collaborative relationships with his
School, and attending conferences. When in Amherst his days are long
and frenetic, often ending after midnight and beginning before dawn (he
has a standing guarantee that he will see anyone who asks within three
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days when he is on campus, providing that person is willing to meet him
before hie next earliest appointment ). 21 Most weekends find him either
traveling or working on School business in Amherst.
There are three Assistant Deans, all chosen by Dean Allen, all
31, all new to academic administration, and all at this point appearing
to be overwhelmed with their jobs—often described as "picking up the
pieces after Dwight has done his thing."
Students
September 1967
The School's major efforts are devoted to the preparation of
undergraduates for teaching positions in elementary and secondary schools,
most going to positions in the Massachusetts public school system. Uni-
versity records show a total enrollment of approximately 862^2
graduates and the prior year 157 received degrees from the School of
Education as elementary education majors. 2^ The School's undergraduate
enrollment at this time was overwhelmingly female, 24 white, 25 and from
rural and suburban Massachusetts.2^
Videotape, "What Makes Dwight Tick," Florissant, Colorado,
Sept. 19i 1968 (School of Education, Media Center).
22Blue Book
, p. 45« ^^Ibid . , p. 'JO,
^^There were only 24 males out of the 862 enrolled ( Blue Book , p. 45)»
^^There are no figures for the black population of the University
in September 19^7 available. However, in 1971 » after a concerted effort
to recruit black students, the black population had. risen to 4 per cent.
(Report of the President's Committee on the Future University of Massa-
chusetts
,
Vernon R. Alden, Chairman [Boston, n.p., 1971 ]» P» 2).
26 ~
As may be inferred from Blue Book , p. 99*
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The School also offers gradviate programs at the Master's,
G.A.G.S., and doctoral level through the Administration, Curriculum and
Instruction, and Counseling and Guidance Areas. The previous year five
doctorates and 99 Master's degrees2? had been awarded and there is pres-
ently a total of 604 graduate students enrolled, 28 most of whom are at-
tending on a part-time basis, us\ially in conjunction with full-time
teaching, counseling, or administrative positions in nearby schools. ^9
For the three years previous no doctorates had been awarded, and an
estimated 25 doctoral students are in full-time residence.
In the previous year students had, for the first time, begun to
have some voice in the School's educational policy. Undergraduates,
through an Education Club, had been granted minor changes in courses and
graduate students had gotten a change in comprehensive examination pro-
cedures, but in general student interest in participation in the School
was low. 82
November I 969
The undergraduate population has grown to a full-time equivalent
of about 1,325 students, of which 25O received elementary education de-
grees the previous year. 88 increasing number of men had joined School
^^Blue Book
, pp. 70 & 71 •
^^Ibid .
, p. ^2 »
^^From existing faculty interviews. 80B]^^e Book , p. 71 •
8
^Estimated from "Doctoral Student Support, IO/8/68" (School files).
82prom existing faculty interviews.
88»a View, A Review, A Vision," in School of Education Profile ,
ed. Lyman B. Brainerd, Jr. (Amherst, n.p.. May 1971 )i P» 30 .
101
programs, but the group remained primarily female, 34 „hite (although a
substantial number of the black population of the University took courses
at the School) and from Massachusetts (the result of University policy
limiting out-of-state acceptances to 5 per cent of the total student
body).
Major growth and change has occurred at the graduate level, al-
though this fact has not yet been fully reflected in degrees granted
which the previous year had amounted to nine doctorates and 132 Master's
degrees. 35 comparison with the twenty-five doctoral students in
full-time residence in I967, there were some 265 full-time doctoral stu-
dents, about 10 per cent of which were from minority groups, I5 per cent
of which were female^^ and most of whom were from outside the State of
Massachusetts, the 5 per cent rule not applying to graduate students.
University records show a total of 1,048 graduate students enrolled at
the School.
Doctoral students are considered part of the instructional staff
and as such develop and teach undergraduate courses, assist faculty in
teaching graduate courses, and teach graduate courses of their own de-
sign under the supervision of a faculty member. 37 Full-time doctoral
34Approximately 200 men were now enrolled.
View," Profile
, p. 30.
3^Derived from voting list for Graduate Faculty Election [prepared
by Office of Director of Graduate Studies] included in memorandum from;
Ad Hoc Grawiuate Faculty Election Committee, to: Members of Education
Assembly, Subject; "Election" (Sept. 19» ‘19^9» School files).
37"Degree Programs," Profile
, p. 7*
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students and representatives of other students also participate in the
governance of the School as voting members of all School committees and
assemblies,^®
The Master's programs have also expanded and taken on more full,
time students, but not nearly so dramatically as has the Doctoral program
Curriculum
September 196?
The School's undergraduate curriculum design and course offerings
are those that could be found in the best and worst of Schools of Educa-
tion throughout the country. There appeared to be a very narrow range
of coxirse options available to undergrewiuates. For example the I966-67
catalogue lists only I4 vindergraduate credit courses offered by the
School's faculty, most under names such as History of Education
.
Princi-
ples of Elementary Education
, Elementary School Curriculum
, Teaching of
Elementary Reading and Language Arts
, Teaching of Elementary Arithmetic
and Science , Also, the total curriculum itself is highly prescribed and
rigid. The catalogue, for example, lists all the courses (both education
and general) to be taken by Freshman elementary majors, and is rife with
statements like "During the junior year the student takes Ed. 251
, 054i
and 264, Psychology 260 or Home Ed, H.D. 272" and "All candidates for
secondary school teaching will major in the subject field to be taught
and minor in education, A maximum of 18 credits should be taken in this
minor, Ed. 25I and Psych. 301 are required during the junior year."
38"a View," Profile, p. 21,
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Doctoral students have five major hurdles to jump: (l) the ac-
cumulation of 90 credits of classwork, (2) the satisfaction of a -tools-
requirement either by mastering a foreign language or of research sta-
tistics, (3) the passing of a "comprehensive" exam including a standard
written test and an oral portion, (4) the writing of a research-
oriented dissertation, and (5) passing an oral examination based on the
dissertation.
All courses for all students are graded on an ABCDP basis, are
presented in semester-long segments for three credits each, and are pri-
marily lecture courses.
November 1969
For undergraduates the rigid specificity of courses to be taken
has been replaced by a more general "guidelines" approach in which the
student is expected to do one—half his undergreuiuate work in the college
of Arte and Sciences, one-quarter in the School of Education, and another
quarter divided between the two at the option of the student. Prepara^-
tion for elementary and secondary teachers is no longer administratively
divided, but organized on a K-12 basis.^®
For students wishing certification, state laws require a semester
of student teaching and courses in educational foundation, educational
psychology and educational methods. These requirements can, however,
^^erived from 1967-1968 Bulletin, Graduate School , University of
Massachusetts, Amherst, Mass.
^^Interim Catalogue
, pp. 73-75
•
^^In September I967 the School offered one course for satisfaction
of each of these requirements.
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be fulfilled by a number of course and experience options which give stu-
dents greater latitude in what they want to learn in each area, how. and
from whom. Undergraduates can choose from among II 3 courses, including,
for example, "Aesthetic Experience and Cognitive Growth," "The Learning
Theater," "The Education of the Self," "Educational Media, Technology,
and Systems," "Student Revolution ajid Curriculum Change," "Race Rela-
tions in Education," "Affective Human Development," "Urban Community
Relations," "Sexuality and Education," and "Alternative Structures in
Higher Education.
In addition, many of the centers are developing, or have devel-
oped, undergraduate programs focusing on their area of concern. In
November of 19^9 "this multiplicity of options is a source of considerable
confusion and dissatisfaction to undergraduates, primarily because there
is not an adequate advising system to guide them through the maze of
possibilities.
The School has also begun non—teaching majors in some centers
for st\idents who do not wish certification but who desire training and
experience for educational work in certain fields.
In addition to credit for semester courses, students can receive
credit for educational experiences of other lengths, locations, and for-
mats through the modular credit system. Under this system students are
awarded, in effect, fractional credit (accoxinted for in modules; I 5
modules equaling one credit) for experiences such as single lectures,
4^Pall 1969 course schedule in attachment to memo from Earl Seidman,
to Faculty and doctoral students, subject; School of Education Course
Schedule for Spring 19^9 (mimeo [fall 1969]i School files), n. pag.
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films or concerts, short lecture series, conferences or workshops, short-
er long-term internships, a paper on a given subject or guided readings,
or any other experience that the student can devise and get accepted by
a faculty member and the Modular Arbitration Committee,
All modular experiences are graded on a pass-no record basis
0^44 and all courses are graded on a pass-fail basis only ,^^
Master's programs are offered both through the various centers
and on an individualized basis in which a student can design his own
program in conjunction with a faculty member.
At the doctoral level the "tools" requirement has been dropped,
the oral examination requirement retained, and the other three hurdles
redefined in the direction of flexibility and appropriateness to student
needs. In place of the 90-credit requirement, a student is asked to
aggregate the equivalent of 90 hours in educational experiences as evi-
denced by a portfolio in which he has charted his educational goals, and
described hie educational experiences relevant to these goals with com-
mentary by himself, faculty members, and others involved in the experience.
In fact, although most doctoral students are enthusiastically pursuing
appropriate educational experiences, few are keeping formal portfolios
and the School has no administrative means for facilitating or oversee-
ing the process.
The standard written and oral comprehensive has been replaced
by a comprehensive whose form and content are chosen by the student in
^
^
Interim Catalogue , pp. I09 & 110. ^^Ibid .
^^Ibid.
,
p. 66.
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conjunction with, and subject to the approval of, a three^an comprehen-
sive committee chosen by the student. The definition of a dissertation
has been expanded to include project dissertations, which include re-
ports, analyses, and evaluations of field educational programs in which
the student had been involved. An additional guideline had been insti-
tuted defining the normal time span for the degree as two years beyond
the Master’s degree and three years beyond the bachelor's. 46
Funding/Outside Activities
September I967
During the year 1 967-68 the School, in ad.dition to its State
funds budget of $275»000,47 received approximately $500,000 in outside
funding, the major funded projects including the management of the
Tororo Girls School, a vocational school in Tororo, Uganda under a ten-
year USAID contract providing approximately $120,000 annually; the di-
rection of a $100,000 applied research training grant; and a $152,000
Upward Bound grant. 48
The other major outside activities of the School are the direc-
tion of the Cooperative Schools Service Center, an association of school
superintendents in Western Massachusetts, and an administrative
^^Ibid
.
, pp. 66-72.
^^Derived from School records. Office of Administrative Dean,
School of Education.
^®From William C. Wolf, Jr., "Research, Development and Training
Projects Administered," by the School of Education, University of
Massachusetts, during Fiscal Year, I966 (School files).
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internship program in which a dozen doctoral candidates do a year of
internship in a New England school superintendent's office in place of
the normal one year of residency required.
November I969
During the I 969-7O year the School's state fund budget had
nearly quadrupled to 11, 000,000^9 and outside funding had nearly tripled
to some * 1
,
250
,
000 . The largest grant, a *266,000 Office of Education
grant, was used to develop and maneige a series of leadership training
institutes for educational administrators. Other major outside grants
include a Head Start Leadership Training Program, another applied re-
search training program, support of the Tororo Girls School, a Teacher
Corps grant, a planning grant for a new program in educational leaxier—
ship, and the Contemporary University, a year of field experience for
undergraduates
•
Off—campus programs have become a major component of the School
and have expanded significantly. The School had cooperative relation-
ships with public schools in Temple City, California; New York City;
Philadelphia; Hartford, Conn.; Springfield, Worcester, and Lowell, Mass,
other suburban Massachusetts towns; and a small network of rural New
England schools.
^^Derived from School records. Office of Administrative Dean,
School of Education*
50..A View," Profile
, p. 38.
^^nnual Report, 1970, School of Education. University of Massa-
chusetts, submitted by Dwight W. Allen, Dean (mimeo, July 1970* School
files)
,
pp. 25-29*
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Governance
September 1967
Given the low level of innovation in the School and the routini-
zation of activity, very little governance is needed and what is comes
primarily from Dean Purvis—^whom some see as unduly influenced by a
small group of faculty members. Faculty meetings are held monthly,
based on an agenda prepared by the Dean, and by all reports very little
in the way of significant decision-making occurs at these meetings
which are made up primarily of "Dean's Announcements" and reports on
faculty activity, centering mainly around publications.
At the Area Level there is more decision-making, primarily on
the procedural rather than the policy level. Areas do have some lati-
tude in the filling of replacement positions and make recommendations
to the Personnel Committee on promotions, tenure, and merit increases.
Probably the major faculty influence centers in the Personnel
Committee, whose seven members at that time are heavily weighted toward
age (five of the seven members are over fifty) and tenure (four of the
nine tenured faculty members are on the committee), and two of the six
female faculty members are represented.
It appears that this outwardly smooth-running bureaucratic or-
ganization does mask a considerable level of hostility and backbiting
52preceding two paragraphs from existing faculty interviews.
^^Derived from Raymond Wyman, Memo to Faculty and Doctoral Stu-
dents, subject: "Personnel Committee History" (mimeo. Sept. 23| I968),
p. 5.
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among faculty members. In my interviews and in other discussions I
have heard strong criticism of the administration and other faculty mem-
bers that indicate that life as a faculty member at the School in I 967
was not as peaceful and calm as one might expect from the apparent
smoothness of the organizational functioning.
November I 969
In November I 969 the School faculty, students, and administration
voted to approve a Constitution with the following significant stipula-
tions:
~The Dean has agreed to share his authority with the School
Council, ... a 31-member body consisting of faculty and stu-
dents elected by the centers and at large, plus the Dean,
Assistant Deans, and three representatives from outside the
School.
—Students have extensive opportunities for participation
in all decision-making bodies of the School, including member-
ship in the School Council, the Graduate Faculty Assembly, and
all standing and ad hoc committees.
—The entire School community acting as the Educational
Assembly, has become the major advisory body and general forum
of the School with legislative authority in the most important
and controversial issues. 54
Despite the words of the Constitution, however, the fact remains
that the vast majority of the power flows from and to the Dean who can
control most decisions made in the School.
Faculty meetings are no longer held, their purposes having been
replaced by meetings of the School Council and School Assembly.
The Centers have become the principal vehicle of academic or-
ganization, including the development and administration of student
54..A View,” Profile , p. 21, and Constitution, School of Education ,
December 19^9i P» 16 (School files).
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programs, research and teaching, and the supervision of student work in
their field.
With the increase in power of the Dean, the Personnel Committee,
which now has two student members, has become of less importance to the
faculty.
The smooth surface of the well-functioning bureaucracy of the
earlier era has disappeared, replaced by a surface disorganization and
chaos which puts a high premium on entrepreneurial functioning (which
some call "hustling"). This new organizational environment combined
with the power of the Dean has engendered in some a sense of distrust,
fear, and paranoia, while others, probably a majority, find the environ-
ment highly exhilarating and uniquely appropriate for the pursuit of
their educational and professional goals.
Summary
I
In brief, the School of Education in September I969 was a far
I
larger, far more diverse organization than it had been in September I967.
I
Faculty had doubled in size and multiplied significantly in background
j
and training. Undergraduate enrollment had risen some 50 P©r cent and
I
had become more diverse, and the full-time doctoral student population
had grown astronomically. A spare, generally prescribed and inflexible
I
curriculum had been replaced by a more diverse, multi-optioned and often
j
chaotic one. Under a continued concentration of power in the Dean's
I
j
hands, the predominant organizational characteristic had moved from
1
I
bureaucratic maintenance, stability, and predictability to experimenta-
I
tion and innovation. Grading and other academic record-keeping had been
j
I
I •
I
Ill
thoroughly reformed. School of Education faculty statue in the Univer-
sity had changed from inconsequential to one of perceived threat and
students had moved significantly toward involvement and participation in
School affairs. A sharing of power between the School community and the
Dean had been approved by both.
Prom a quiet, well-behaved, but somewhat dull stepchild of the
University community, the School of Education had metamorphosed itself
into a rampaging, high-spirited enfant terrible of the University commu-
nity and an incipient force on the national educational scene.
In the perspective of the historic resistance of institutions to
reform and in contrast to other attempts at institutional reform described
in Chapter II, these changes, carried out over a 26-month period, appear
to be unique in scope, rapidity, and substance. Many of these changes
also appear to be in the directions proposed by the major analysts and
commissions, particularly in their emphasis on diversity of faculty and
programs
,
student responsibility, and experimentation.
The scope cind direction of change is highlighted in the follow-
ing comparisons:
Academic
September 19^7 November 19^9
Undergraduate
Grading
Requirements
ABCDP
Specific with limited
options
Pass-Pail/Pass No Record
Multi-options at student's
choice
Programs Certification only— Certification K-12 plus
Elementary & Secondary non-teaching major
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Undergraduate
September 196"^ November 1969
Credit Units
Course Options
Course Availability
Semester courses
Undergraduate only
14 semester courses^^
Semester courses plus modules
Graduate & undergraduate
113 semester courses^^
and various "modules"
Doctoral
Grading
Requirements
ABCDP
1 yr. full-time
residence
Pass-Pail/Pass-No Record/
Portfolio
1 yr. full-time residence;
2 yrs. beyond Master's and
3 beyond B.A.
90 units Portfolio and "equivalent
of 90 units"
"Tools" or language
requirement
No "tools" or language re-
quirement
Standardized compre-
hensive exam
Individualized comprehen-
sive exam
Research dissertation Project or research disser-
tation
Teaching Can teach undergradu-
ate sections of
faculty course
Can teach ovm undergreui
course and gradviate courses
under supervision of faculty
member
Programs Administration/Coun-
seling & Guidance/
Curriculum & Instruc-
tion
Choice of programs of 1
1
centers, 4 programs, or
individxialized
Influence None formally Voting membership on all
decision-making School
bodies
Course options 9357 170 semester courses^®
^^Above data derived from Undergraduate Catalogue of the University
of Massachusetts t Amherst, 1967-1968 , pp« 233-239*
^^Above derived from Interim Catalogue and "Schedule of Pall 19^9
Courses."
^^Above derived primarily from 1967~68 Graduate School Bulletin ,
University of Mass.
^^Above derived from "Degree Programs," Profile , and "Schedule of
Pall 1969 Courses. H
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Organizational
September 1Q6j
1 ) Dean has total fonnal power
2) Students have no vote
3) Administrative & curriculum
units located in 5 Areas
4) No formal appeal procedures 59
November 1Q6Q
Formal power shared - Dean and
School Council
All students represented on coun-
cils and committees
Administrative & curriculum units
include 11 centers, 10 programs
Formal appeal procedures including
ombudsman and conflict resolution^O
Change and Growth Statistics
Undergraduate
Total PTE Undergraduate Enrollment
Total Courses Taken^^
Courses Available^^
Elementary Majors^5
Undergraduate Degrees (Elem.)^^
Fall *67 Fall *69
771
0
1
1,264
2,005 4,489
14 84
862 1,212
1967-68 1969-70
205 332
59Above derived from existing faculty interviews.
60Above derived from "A View," Profile .
61
Faculty Senate Long Range Planning Committee, Directions for the
Seventies (Amherst, n.pub.
,
Sept. 1971), p. 9.
62
"A View," Profile, p. 30. 63Ibid.
,
p. 30.
^^rom 1966-67 UndergT2uiuate Catalogue and "Schedule of Pall, 1969i
Courses."
^^irectiion for the Seventies, p. 9» 66"A View," Profile, p. 30.
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Graduate
Graduate Students Enrolled^^
Pull-Time Doctoral Stizdents
Graduate Degrees^^
1965-66 66-67
Doctorates
^
Master's 58 II7
Courses Available^^
Graduate Student Support^^
Number of Students
Amount of Ptinding
Outside Funding^ ^ 1 967-68
'67 Fall '69
604 1,048
68
25 (Est.) 265
67-68 68-69 ^9-70
10 10 29
120 143 237
Pall *67 Pall '69
93 170
1966-67 1969-70
48 244
$232,000 $649,000
69
70-71
81
297
1968-69 1970-71
$494,270 $1,240,625 «3, 595, 552
1969.
^'^
Ibid .
^^Estimated from "Doctoral Student Support, IO/8/68" (School files).
^9j)erived from voting list for Gradiiate Faculty election. Sept. I9,
70,1965-70 derived from Direction for the Seventies
,
p. 11, 1971 from
"A View," Profile
, p. 30.
^Vrom 1967-68 Graduate Catalogue and "Schedule of fall, I969,
courses."
72
"A View," Profile, p. 30. 73Ibid. , p. 38.
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Facility Statistics'^^
Total Faculty
at
3/67
New Faculty
at
9/68
Total Faculty
at
11/69
Professor 3 4 11
Assoc. Prof. 12 6 17
Asst. Prof. 9 15 25
Lecturer 2 6 13
Instructor
_3 Jl
Total Faculty 35 34 70
Number w/Doct. 23 23 50
Number women 6 1 4
Number w/tenure 9 2 13
Number minorities 1 3 4
Average Age 42 34 37
^^Derived from Appendices A-C
SECTION II
CASE ANALYSES
Part I
Preparing for Change
Chapter IV — Establishing a Foundation for Change: September 196? -
September I968
Part II
The Planning Year
Chapter V — Initial Organizing Stages/The Retreat; September I968
Chapter VI — Academic Reform; September I968 - May I969
Chapter VII — Organization Building/Governance; September I968 -
November 19^9
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CHAPTER IV
ESTABLISHING A POUNMTION FOR CHANGE
Backgroimd
The State of Higher Education in Massachusetts
A significant factor in the growth and change at the School of
Education was the fact that prior to and during the change period the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts was rapidly expanding its funding of the
University. For example, during the I965-I97O period state funding rose
from $15.5 million'' to $55 million. ^ This high growth rate created a
condition which permitted the School to double its faculty in two years
without significantly affecting faculty availability for other depart-
ments of the University.
This rapid increase in funding for public higher education was
the result of a situation unique to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
Historically, the state had been uncommonly blessed with the most exten-
sive and prestigious system of private higher education in the world, its
80 private institutions^ including such nationally famous universities as
1
Office of Institutional Studies, University of Massachusetts,
Amherst, Facts and Figures; I967 (Amherst, n.p. [I968]), p. I46 (Here-
after referred to as Blue Book ).
*^Report of the Treasurer : Summary of Operating Funds [Univ. of
Mass.], Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1970 (mimeo. School files),
derived from Fall Enrollment in Higher Education, 1 969 j Supple-
mentary Information, Summary Data (Washington, PHEW, 1970)t PP« 103~^08«
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Harvard, M.I.T.. Brandeia. Boaton Univeraity. Boaton OoUege, Northeaatam.
and Tufta and collagea such aa AaJierat, WiUia«,a, Smith, Mt. Holyoke,
and Wellealey, Thie emphaaia on private inetitutiona waa reflected in
the fact that ae late aa I955 only 10 per cent of etudente in higher edu-
cation in the state were in the public sector.
4
The abundance and quality of these private institutions had for
many years blinded citizens and the legislature to the fact that the state
was not providing higher educational facilities to all its citizens, par-
ticularly those who did not have the financial capability to go to pri-
vate institutions or the background, education, and academic ability to
compete successfully for what scholarships were available. Thus, Massa-
chusetts had been last in the country in per capita spending on higher
education, and even in 1971 1 despite more than a quadrupling of enroll-
ment capacity over the previous ten years, the state still ranked 49th,
with a $16 per capita expenditure on higher education as compared to a
national average of $31 It has been estimated that in I97I between
6,000 and 9|000 eligible Massachusetts residents were denied higher edu-
cation for lack of places in the system.^ And in I97O 50 per cent of
Massachusetts students in higher education were attending private col-
leges^ compared with a national average of 75 P©r cent of students in
Report of the President's Committee on the Future University of
Massachusetts
,
Vernon R. Alden, Chairman (Boston, n.p.. 1971 ^. P. 15
(Hereafter referred to as Future University ).
^Ibid.
,
p. 15. ^Ibid.
,
p. 21.
^Long Range Planning Committee of the University of Massachusetts,
The Future ... Our Commanding Concern (Draft copy, summer 19^8 ) i P» 1 *
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public supported institutions .
8
Thus, in the late 1960*s, in a concerted effort to close a gap
oaused by earlier neglect, the University was growing at the unusually
high rate of some I 5 per cent a year.9 it was this growth which per-
mitted the doubling of the School of Education faculty in two years with-
out the necessity of directly requisitioning faculty positions from
other departments which would have resulted in, at best, strong resist-
ance from those departments, at worst, the unavailability of the posi-
tions necessary to support the radical changes and explosive growth of
the School of Eiducation.
Background of the School of Education
The initial impetus for the changes at the School of Education
can be traced to Oswald Tippo, Provost of the University, who had guided
the University through most of its growth period. Armed with the availa-
of new positions and the expectation of continued growth which
provided unus\ial opportunities for faculty promotions and tenure, he had
successfully attracted an unusual number of excellent scholars, primarily
in the Arts and Sciences, to the University and had transformed it from
the "Mass Aggies" to a position of high respect in the nation-wide com-
petition among the "Avises" to catch up with Harvard, Yale, Stanford and
^Future University
, p. 15*
derived from Blue Book
, p. 42, and "1971-72 UM/A Data Sheets,"
Office of Institutional Studies (mimeo, June 1972), p. 4«
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the few other •Hertz.' institutions of Academia. 10 ^
the success of his effort is the fact that between I965 and I970 Univer-
eity of Massachusetts graduate programs improved more than any other
University as rated by the American Council on Education. 1
1
However, the School of Education had not benefited from this
program and was generally regarded as one of the weakest links in the
University. Dr. Tippo, in my interview with him, recalled.
^e School was universally, by the Arts and Sciences departments,by the administration, and by the outside, recognized as pedes-trian, non-progressive, dull. We couldn't even claim it was
second rate. It was one of the weakest parts of the University
and one of the poorer around the country.
Much of the blame for the School's low estate was laid upon Dean
Purvis by the University administration. ("He had to start from scratch.
He did a good job of getting where he was, but he didn't seem to want to
go f\irther.")‘>2 The administration for the three years previous had been
reducing the School's budget (relative to numbers of students served) “I
^
and had not granted the School any new faculty positions for the past two
years, an indicator of its dissatisfaction with the School as well as,
in effect, stockpiling positions for the new Dean.^^ In late I966 Dean
Purvis decided to take early retirement.
10An apt analogy coined by Jencks and Riesman. Christopher Jencks
and David Riesman, The Academic Revolution (New York, Doubleday, I969),
p. 540.
1
1
Future University
, p. 1.
12Interview, Oswald Tippo, Amherst, Mass., May 31 1 1972.
^^Albert W. Purvis, Annual Report [I966-67] (Jxine I5, 1967)1 pp. 7-H»
^^Derived from Tippo interview and from transcript, "Testimony of
the Tenured Faculty" [before the Faculty Senate Tenure and Grievance Com-
mittee], May 12, I968, pp. 3 & 5» s-nd Purvis, Annual Report [I966-67].
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A search oomnittee to nominate a new Dean was formed consisting
of Tippo as chairman and six School of Education faculty members, two
Deans, and two representatives of other departments. '5 it was the con-
sensus of this group, it is reported, that they were looking for a man
who would make progressive changes at the School, one who would "take
an entirely new view of things," and one who would make things happen
at the School. An indication of the extremely high expectations that the
committee held for the new Dean was that they made informal approaches
to Harold Taylor, Harold Howe, and Francis Keppel, among the most promi-
nent names in American education.
The Hiring of Dean Allen
Dwight Allen was first approached by Tippo during a visit to
Stanford, Allen was at that time Associate Professor head of Stanford's
Flexible Scheduling and Curriculum Project, and a member of the Execu-
tive Board of the School's Research and Development Center. Dr. Tippo
was impressed by his energy, imagination, articulateness, and commitment
to improving education and, after consulting with the Search Committee,
invited him to visit the Amherst campus. ^7
Allen, for his part, had only recently begun to consider leaving
Stanford where he had received all his degrees and had intended to spend
his career. He was by no means dissatisfied with Stanford although, in
his words, "It was getting to be less fun and I had begun to respond a
little more positively to feelers from other Universities." He had made
^^Tippo interview and "Testimony of Tenured Faculty," p. 27.
^^Tippo interview,.
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one eerioue plunge into the aoade™ic
„.arket which had neeulted in the
offer of a Vice-Chanoellorehip in charge of teacher retraining in a
large, statewide university system—which he had declined. 18
At the time he came into contact with Tippo he was interested in
moving, but by no means committed to leaving Stanford. ^9
It IS significant to look briefly at the events of Allen's re-
oruitment, since some of the conditions he set and the understandings
reached with the University administration at that time were to set very
useful precedents for him in the future. One can speculate that a reason
he was able to make such demands was the fact that he was not particu-
larly interested in taking the job-unless it was on his own terms.
During his interviews he talked with the Search Committee, the
School of Education faculty, Tippo and other administrators, and the
Trustee Selection Committee. All groups were highly impressed with him
and unanimously supported his selection. 20 According to Allen, in his
interviews with these groups he talked of his educational philosophy, of
his desire for change, and of his plans for the School as openly and
straightforwardly as possible. For example, he told the Trustee Selec-
tion Committee not to hire him if they wanted a cheap dean or a safe dean.
And he set a number of conditions for his hiring, in particular
(1) a substantial increase in faculty members at the School, (2) the
1 ft
'°Prom interviews with Dwight W. Allen, July I 97 I - May I 972 .
‘'9ibid .
^^rom Tippo and existing faculty interviews.
2
1
Tippo and Allen interviews.
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appointment of two assistant deans and an administrative assistant,
( 3 ) a University commitment to micro-teaching, a teacher training method
which Allen had pioneered at Stanford, (4) the continuation of a
$325|000 grant upon which he was working, (5) the approval of some spe-
cific kinds of new faculty members (by area of specialty—many of which,
such as psychologists, it could be argued, belonged in other departments),
and (6) a delay in his arrival on campus vmtil January I968 together with
approval of monthly trips to Stanford during that spring,
The approval of these conditions created a number of useful
precedents which were exploited by Allen in the future—among them
(1) the expectation of increased faculty and the inclusion of people
from other disciplines on that faculty, ( 2 ) the legitimization of a rela-
tively large administrative staff for the Dean and the beginning of a
presumption that he would personally control those positions, ( 3 ) a com-
mitment of the School to the technical skills of teaching approach to
education, (4) the beginning of a legitimization of extensive use of
soft money in the School and, (5) the establishment of Allen’s geographi-
cal mobility while functioning as Dean of the School.
Thus in May of I967, Dr. Allen was formally neuned the second
Dean of the School of Education with a strong mandate to bring about sub-
stantial change at the School.
As a part of this study of change and of Allen’s leadership
strategies it is interesting to speculate about the extent to which he
had a ’’plan” for the School and the extent to which that plan described
^^Letter: Dwight W. Allen to Oswald Tippo, May 16 , I967.
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the actual changes which took place at the School—and it seems clear
from my discussions with him and from his public pronouncements that his
plans in late I967 were extremely modest in comparison to the changes
which in fact took place at the School. He wanted the School to pursue
three priority areas—higher education, international education, and
teacher education, with a concern for and focus on the problems of edu-
cational administration and urban education running through the programs
of these three areas. Also, he expected that the School would do con-
siderable work on the technical skills of teaching and innovations in
education, which had been his major fields of interest at Stanford.
That the School in fact became far more diverse in priorities
than he had planned and that it concerned itself far lees with teacher
education and the technical skills of teaching than he had hoped—^while
at the same time developing under his domination, provides some insight
into one of the unique characteristics of his leauiership style—^his
ability to learn, grow and change.
This characteristic of his style will be explored more fully in
Chapter VIII
,
but at this point it is useful to note that some of the
general views he held about education at this point in time, although
with no specific expectations of implementing them, were highly conducive
of growth, change and development of hie idea of what the School should
be. For example, he had a strong conviction that students should have a
^^Prcrni Allen interviews; also from transcript, "First Dean Dwight W.
Allen Testimony" [before the Faculty Senate Tenure and Grievance Commit-
tee] [May, 1968], p. 35, and from transcript, "Second Dean Dwight W.
Allen Testimony" [before same committee] [May, 19^6 ]f P* Hereafter
transcripts will be referred to as "Allen First Testimony" and "Allen
Second Testimony."
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larger voice in decisions about their education; a belief that formally
structured programs stifled the potential creativity of faculty and
stifled and discouraged most students; a conviction that most of what
was being done in education had not been proven worth doing; an impa-
tience with the inertia of conventional university attempts at change;
a conviction that the changing of structures was the most promising way
to gain new perspectives on the educational process; a conviction of the
need for social change and the centrality of educational change as a
vehicle for social change; and a strong predilection toward flamboyant
behavior. ^4
All these values contributed to the seemingly paradoxical situa-
tion of a change effort wholly dominated by the Dean but whose outcome
was both different and larger than his own vision for it.
Achievement of the Critical Mass
Introduction
If Allen was to be successful in bringing about significeint
change in the School of Education his primary task during the I967-68
year would be to bring together a faculty which would support and guide
that change. This task would appear to have two elements: first, the
hiring of a significant number of new staff who were chauige-oriented and
secondly, by some manner to convert the existing faculty from a status
quo orientation to one of change and innovation. This latter task, as
^4i)erived from 1972 Allen interviews, I972 faculty interviews, and
writer's August I968 recruiting interview.
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indicated in the case studies surveyed in Chapter II
,
was clearly a
fortnidable one in the Ught of the fact that most studies point to uni-
versity faculties as the locus of resistance to change.
The former challenge Allen accomplished beyond all expectations,
bringing in 34^5 new faculty members to join the 28 old faculty who re-
mained and also recruitinar 85^^ j .® o:? "planning doctoral students" to join
equally with the faculty in charting changes at the School. The latter
task, that of converting existing faculty to a change orientation, the
Dean by and large did not accomplish. In fact, he alienated many of the
old faculty so thoroughly that they became highly resistant to most change
proposals. However, their attempts to restrict change proved to have
little effect upon the success of change process, primarily because re-
sistant faculty members were outnumbered on the order of eight to one by
change—oriented people.
This strategy of overcoming resistance by adding support in over-
whelming numbers is what I will call the critical mass strategy, and it
was this strategy which permitted Allen to avoid the difficult if not
impossible task of changing the values and philosophy of the old faculty
and to focus the energy of the School on the planning and achievement of
change
•
Allen's critical mass strategy had two corollaries. First, in
order to achieve this critical mass, he did not depend merely upon the
25see "Appendix B, "Faculty Profile: New Faculty September I 968 ."
^^erived from Doctoral Candidates, School of Education (mimeograph
[January 1969]i School files).
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financial resources provided by the University, but raised an additional
1450,000 from outside sources and $170,000 from University sources to
recruit, pay, and support the projects of both new faculty and planning
doctoral students, allowing him to recruit many more change-oriented
people than was originally possible. And secondly, his choice of new
staff members was in fact an initial act of change and redirection,
since the diversity of background, experience, and field of interest
was unprecedented eunong schools of education.
In the remainder of this chapter I shall detail the process by
which this critical mass of change-oriented people was achieved by focus-
ing first on the recruitment of new faculty and planning doctoral students
and then on the fund-raising strategies by which the new staff members
were recruited and financed. In the final section of this chapter I
shall describe the reactions of the existing faculty to Allen's activi-
ties.
Faculty Recruitment
Faculty recruitment was by far the most crucial task of the new
auiministration, both because of the necessity of building a critical
mass and because the quality and diversity of the initial group of fac-
ulty would to a large extent determine the quality of the School and its
programs in the years to come—and the difficulties of that task cannot
be underestimated.
The task of recruiting, which began upon Allen 's hiring in May
1967 and moved into high gear when he arrived on campus in January 19^8,
was carried out by Allen and a staff of five (three of whom were doctoral
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students) whom he recruited prior to January, only one of whom, a doc-
toral student, gave his full time to the recruiting effort.
The announced goal of Allen and this group was to hire the best,
most exciting people in the country. Knowing that the School could not
compete either in status or remuneration for the big, established names
in educational circles, Allen consciously decided to seek out young peo-
ple, the most promising in the country.27 difficulties were
enormous
.
He was trying to recruit the best people for an undistinguished
school in a second-level university—a school with little soft money and
few ongoing projects. He was trying to recruit innovators for a school
whose reputation was conservative. He was looking for urban-oriented
people for a school located in the country. He was talking about a
school with a national and international focus in rural Western Massa-
chusetts.
In sum, he had primarily hope to offer, a vision of what those who
dared to join him could do together—
—if he was successful in persuading
enough good people to join him. Aside from this hope for the future, all
the situation had to offer of any solidity was the unique growth position
of the University and Allen's promised support from the University and
Trustees—for however long that might last.
Provost Tippo was also cognizant of the difficulties of recruit-
ing top-rate new faculty, especially given the January start, very late
in terms of the normal academic recruiting calendar. He had originally
27»Allen First Testimony," pp. 32 & 33.
no
agreed to allocate ten new faculty poeitions to Allen, but with January
having come and only three of these poeitions having been filled, he be-
gan to reconsider. His principal goal in faculty hiring had always been
quality, and since he was not certain that Allen could find even seven
people of appropriate caliber, he did not relish the prospect of having
to accept inferior people to fulfill his pledge of ten new faculty slots.
Therefore he rephrased his pledge to Allen as follows: that rather than
guarantee ten positions to the School of Education, he would accept all
"good people" whom Dean Allen proposed to him.
Tippo withdrew that pledge on March 25th with thirty new faculty
members hired^® and seven offers outstanding^9 and before September four
additional faculty members were to be hired.
Faculty hired, by rank, were as follows:
4 Pull Professor 6 Lecturer
6 Associate Professor 3 Instructor
15 Assistant Professor
^ major field of interest, new faculty included:
8 Teacher Education 2 Higher Education
5 Urban Education 2 International Education
5 Educational Research 2 Educational Media
4 Educational Administration 2 Vocational Education
3 Counseling and Guidance 1 Computer Assisted Instruction
I(y nearly all measures the recruiting campaign mounted by that
small group was an incredible success. The absolute number of people re-
cruited, about two a week for the January to March period, speaks for
itself; the quality, in accordance with Provost Tippo 's demanding
^®Allen interview.
^^The seven offers were a package offer to seven Harvard Graduate
School of Education graduates——who subsequently decided as a group not
to accept.
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standards, very high;^° the average age, consistent with Allen's empha-
sis on youth, was 34 (the oldest 59, the youngest 24); and the range and
diversity set a tone and direction for the future of the School. 31
Before going into specific examples of the range and diversity
of the new faculty
,
it is well to point out two gaps in the initial re-
cruiting year. First, only one woman was hired and, as far as the writer
can determine, no others were interviewed. Secondly, although three blacks
were hired, none had doctorates and thus were hired as lecturers meaning
that there were no black members of the senior faculty—a situation seem-
ingly inconsistent with the School's declared intention to concern itself
with improving education in the cities.
However, although comparative statistics are not available, it
appears that compared with most schools of education, the new faculty
was indeed unprecedentedly diverse. For example:
—There was Daniel Jordan, 36, a Jungian psychologist. Phi Beta Kappa
and Rhodes Scholar with Bachelor's degrees in Music from the University
of Wyoming and Oxford, a Master's in Music from Oxford, and Master's
and Doctorate in Human Development from the University of Chiceigo.
Jordan had previously been Director of the Institute for Research in
Human Behavior at Indiana State University and Director of their Upward
Bound program.
—There was David Schimmel, 35, s- Beta Kappa from Duke, with bache-
lor's degrees in political science, law, and Hebrew Literature who had
previously been a practicing lawyer and then director of the Virgin
Islands Peace Corps Training Center.
—^There was Gerald Weinstein, 38, hired as a full professor although he
held only a master's degree (an unusual event in academia). An author
^^Tippo interview and, as one standard, 3 doctorates from the Uni-
versity of Chicago, 2 from Yale, and 1 each from Harvard, Cornell, and
UCLA in addition to the 9 Stanford doctorates.
^^See Appendix B for derivation of the above data.
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of three books on urban education, he had previously been a lecturerin urban education at Teacher's College, Columbia and consultant to
Natha^el French, 59 , for 32 years teacher and headmaster atthe highly regarded Northshore Country Day School in Chicago, who hadparticipated as a student in one of the first experimental student-
oentered colleges, Black Mountain, and consequently had no accreditedbachelor's degree*
There was Atron Gentry, 33, Black, with a B.A. from California StateCollege at L.A., and founder of the Westside Study Center, one of thefirst commxmity action agencies in the Los Angeles area. Gentry had
received nine community service awards for his work in Los Angeles.
There was Robert Woodbury, 30, Phi Beta Kappa in American Studies at
Amherst, Ph.D. in U.S. History as a Danforth Foundation fellow at Yale.
He came to the School from the California Institute of Technology where
he had been an Assistant Professor of History and extremely active in
campus politics (minority and student rights), developing programs
which linked the institute with the Pasadena community and he also had
been a prominent member of the campaign staff of a successful Califor-
nia Assembly candidate. 32
In the face of the difficulties previously described, how was
Allen able to assemble so quickly such a large and diverse group of
highly competent educators? How was he able to bring people looking for
the mainstream of educational change to what was at that point a back-
water—^urban educators to the country, black educators to a predominantly
white university, young academics on the move to a low-prestige school?
Three major factors seem to have been instrumental to the success
of Allen's recruiting campaign.
1) The Dean's personal commitment to the recruiting, the energy
and determination with which he went about recruiting people, and hie
success in persuading people to take the risk of participating in his
vision of what the School could be
32Derived from individual vitae.
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2) Allen-s personal contacts, developed in previous years, with
people who were vitally interested in change and innovation in education-
and, in turn, their contacts with other such people
and (3) A number of uniquely appropriate and effective recruit-
ing strategies employed by Allen.
I shall explore these three factors separately below.
Personal activities
One of the most significant problems of recruiting was that the
new School of Education existed only as a vision in Dean Allen's head.
Therefore, as chief architect and dreamer of the dream he assumed the
responsibility for communicating it to others, for a visit to the campus
was merely a visit to the fallow ground, the uncultivated garden in which
the dream would hopefully bear fruit. And to this task of personal re-
cruiting the Dean directed most of his energies. Wherever he went
throiighout the co\intry from the classroom to committees to conferences
he talked of his vision for the School and asked of everyone he met "Who
is the most outstanding and exciting person you know?" Three new faculty
members eventually joined the School as a result of follow-up of this
kind of questioning and four more whom he first met in Washington and at
various educational conferences also were successfully recruited,
As Allen toured the country, he arranged to meet candidates in air-
ports, in restaurants, at hotels, and on airplanes at all hours of the day
and night, and when visits to the campus were to take place he made sure
^^See Appendix B.
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that he was in attendance in spite of his hectic travel schedule.
Dean Allen’s energy and intensity in the recruiting venture are
apparent in anecdotes like a seaplane ride to a remote Caribbean Island
to recruit David Schimmel; a breakfast-time call to Robert Woodbury which
begaUf "Hello, I'm Dwight Allen. Would you like to join a revolution?";
and the time when, as a result of his questioning of students at a New
York university about who was the most exciting teacher there, he walked
into the office of the teacher who had been nearly unanimously named eind
offered him a job—and then spent the next three months getting him to
accept it.^^
Personal and professional contacts
Secondly, a major part of the success of Allen's recruiting cam-
paign can be ascribed to his wide range of personal and professional con-
tacts, especially among innovative educators, their faith in him and
respect for him, and his faith in their judgment about other potential
faculty members. For example, Allen's students or ex-students clearly
made up the nucleus of the new faculty. Seven were initially hired, and
of these three recommended associates who were subsequently hired. One
of these associates hired was then responsible for the recruitment of
three other new faculty members.
Perhaps the most impressive example of this kind of multiplica-
tion begins with Richard Clark, a student of Allen's at Stanford who
strongly recommended Robert Woodbury, a close friend of his in his
^4Allen interviews.
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undergraduate years at Amherst. Woodbury was hired, and recommended
Atron Gentry, with whom he had been working closely in Pasadena, who was
also hired. Subsequently, four planning doctoral students joined the
School as a result of their contact with Gentry. Woodbury also himself
recommended three doctoral students who were accepted, including his
brother, to whom can be traced three faculty members and three doctoral
students. And there the string ended, at least in the first year. But
it is clearly imique that from one new faculty member should come five
other faculty members and ten doctoral students—and the Clark case was,
although the most outstanding, by no means an isolated instance of this
kind of multiplication.
Another source of faculty and students was Dean Allen's religious
affiliation. Allen's deep and energetic commitment to the Baha'i faith
had resulted in his election to the National Spiritual Assembly, the
nine-man ruling body of the Baha'i faith in the United States. In such
a position he was highly visible to Baha'is nation-wide, spoke often at
religious gatherings, and was highly accessible to Baha'is. He hired
Dan Jordan, another member of the National Assembly, as a full professor,
and there were eleven^^ Bedia'is among the doctoral students.
A summation of the first recruiting year by source of contact
shows the extent to which Allen relied on his own contacts and also the
extent to which he relied on his faculty for new people.
^^Author's estimate
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New Faculty - Total 34^^
Allen Stanford Students
On recommendation of Stanford Students
On recommendation of those recommended
by Stanford Students
, ,
Allen Washington contacts
From "Who is most exciting"
Baha'i associate
From conferences/professional meetings
Recommendations of other new faculty
Recommendation of old faculty «...
Allen friend as Stanford undergraduate
Stanford Students, not Allen's , , ,
Allen Stanford staff member
Allen
7
3
4
3
3
1
1
3
4
1
2
1
34
The same principle appears to have been at work in the recruit-
ment of planning doctoral students whose basis of recruitment appears to
have been as follows:
Planning Doctoral Students - Total 85
Recruited by Allen 26
Recruited by new faculty 20
Recruited by new doctoral students 12
Switched from Regular Doctoral Program 12
Recruited by existing faculty 3
Other and not known 12
85
In sum, it seems clear that a majority of the faculty and plan-
ning doctoral students joined the School as the result of previous per-
sonal and professional association with the Dean or other new faculty
members and doctoral students in contrast to the more conventional faculty
recruiting strategies in which job descriptions are made up, advertised,
and respondents screened, at least initially, primarily on the basis of
credentials.
^^oth compilations derived from Allen interviews.
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There are a number of very strong arguments in favor of Allen's
personal approach to recruiting based on the specific situation of the
School at that time. First, the pressures of time, the recruiting having
begun late in the recruiting year, made it nearly impossible to follow
the less efficient published job description route and still achieve the
numbers necessary for a critical mass. Secondly, the job description
route was also inappropriate to Allen's plan to develop a new school and,
in effect, new job descriptions for faculty members. To hire new people
by job description would have, in effect, locked the new school into
whatever pattern was decided upon in the hiring. Thirdly, Allen's repu-
tation as an innovator had given him prior access, through personal
associations, to those most interested in new approaches to education.
Therefore, in his associations there was a built-in selection mechanism
and in his judgment a built-in screening mechanism for those best suited
to the School. In effect Allen had, during his previous professional
career, been his own recruiting and screening device for innovative peo-
ple—the kind he was determined to have at the School.
Finally, it is probable that under the circumstances personal
and professional association was a more accurate indicator of appropriate
competency and potential for contribution to the development of the new
School of Education than credential checks, interviews, and letters of
recommendation would have been. Since Allen's vision for the year of
planning and subsequent years tended toward a creative, flexible, free-
flowing organizational model depending to a large extent on the ability
of participants to work effectively with each other without rigid b\xreau—
cratic controls, an important ingredient of the new School would be the
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ability of its people to work well together. To hire people with whot
Allen was familiar and had worked with before and to, in turn, enoourage
them to recommend people whom they respected and felt that they could
work with, was one way of developing an organisation which could work
creatively and effectively through informal rather than formal relation-
ships.
Recruiting strategies
Dean Allen's recruiting strategies were designed to accentuate
the strengths inherent in the School's situation while devaluing the
weaknesses as much as possible. One problem previously described was
the low prestige of the School and the second-level statue of the Univer-
sity. One method used by Allen to combat these weaknesses was to offer
top salaries. These salaries somewhat covinterbalanced the low prestige
of the position for new faculty, first because of the clear financial
advantages, and secondly because they represented prestige salaries on
a nation-wide basis. This strategy was especially effective for the
yoiinger faculty on which recruiting efforts were being concentrated.
Another strategy directed at the low—prestige problem was that
of "first class" recruiting, both as it reflected an attitude toward the
candidate and as a harbinger of the way in which the School intended to
operate in the future. Thus Allen willingly and enthusiastically flew
to people or flew them to the campus, hired private planes, often paid
for dinners and other gatherings, and took care of moving expenses—all
without the penny-pinching often characteristic of academic recruiting.
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The problem inherent in the fact that the new school was only a
vision and could become a reality only if a sufficient number of new
faculty decided to join the school was solved serendipitously in a situa-
tion which normally would have been a recruiter’s nightmare-a day when
five prospective faculty members arrived at once. It turned out to be a
highly successful day. Since the five were aware that there were posi-
tions available for all of them, there was little sense of competition
among them, and it became obvious that they enjoyed talking with each
other, that they were talking in the language of the new school, and that
they were already exploring possible relationships with each other at the
school. It occurred to Allen that here was an excellent way to recruit
because the reality of the school he envisioned was embodied to a far
greater extent in the people visiting the school than the people already
there. It thus beceune standard recruiting strategy to make sure that
people visited in groups and to give them time to recruit each other.
This strategy reached its apex on a day in late February when
nine prospective faculty members were on campus—and all subsequently
joined the School.
Other problems in recruiting, particularly the School's rural
location, its dearth of black educators, and its lack of soft money proj-
ects were obviated as much as possible by Allen's forceful and enthusi-
astic presentation of his vision for the School, one which would be far
more mobile than most, operating satellite centers in large cities, and
perhaps someday even having its own airplane. As for financial support.
^^Preceding three pareigraphs from Allen interviews.
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Allen talked of projeote already funded ae a result of his joining the
Sohool, of plans for new funding-and his oonnections with funding
soxirces and prior success as a fund raiser were well known.
Finally, there was the fact that Allen was not selling just vi-
sion, there were some hard realities to which he could and did point and
to which potential faculty members could look for indications of the po-
tential for realization of his vision. Ihere was the new funding which
he had brought to the School. There was the Planning Doctoral Program,
to be described below, for which the School had waived conventional re-
quirements (and which, incidentally, also was an added inducement for
new faculty to join the School since it gave them an opportunity to bring
promising students to the School with them). There was the recruiting
process itself, so startlingly atypical that it was almost inconceivable
that its outcome would lead to a "normal'* school of education. And fi-
nally
,
there was the number of new faculty positions available and the
fact that Allen had clearly discontinued all programs, courses, require-
ments, and degrees as of September, I969—indicative both of the potential
scope and direction of the School and of the support of the University
administration for the new school.
Planning Doctoral Program
In retrospect it becomes apparent that the Planning Doctoral Pro-
gram (originally called the Special Doctoral Program) was essential to
the achievement of a critical mass of change-oriented people at the School
and that it may have been the single most importajit factor in the success
of the change effort. It was originally devised by Allen not as a change
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strategy, but as a device for keeping one of the students in his original
group of five at the School, This doctoral student, who had joined Allen
after a number of years in the higher echelons of the Peace Corps, was
unwilling to stay at the School taking standard courses and denied any
real power to affect the course of the School, To encourage him to stay
the Deanes devised a special program with the following major ingredi-
ents; the waiver of normal School, but not University, requirements for
the doctorate; credit for work on planning committees; equal vote with
the faculty on planning matters; an individualized preparation program
worked out with three faculty members chosen by the student, who could
change this committee at any time; and a dissertation, which came to be
defined as a major piece of work in communicable form,^^
This program was approved by the School of Education grsuiuate
faculty in an early morning meeting on February 5i 19^8, with the suided
stipulation that such program be reserved only for those students of out-
standing ability and maturity, Also, although the minutes do not so
indicate, it was agreed by all concerned that the progreun would be limited
to fifteen to twenty students, Later in the spring it was proposed
38j)erived from Allen interview and interview with Gordon Schimmel,
member of original staff, February 1972.
^^Dick Ulin and Earl Seidman, Memorandum, "Procedures for Planning
Doctoral Students,” October 23 » 19^8 (mimeo. School files),
^^"Minutes of the Graduate Faculty Meeting, February 5, I 968 ,"
Phillip L, Bdgecomb, Recorder (School files),
^^See Albert S. Anthony, "Memorandum to Gradviate Faculty" on "Pro-
posal for Increase of Special Doctoral Students," p, 1 (School files).
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that up to forty Special Doctoral Students be admitted,42 and by the
fall eighty-five had been admitted.
The Special Doctoral Program did indeed draw a unique kind of
student. In this group, almost one-quarter black, the youngest 22 and
the oldest 46, with an average age of approximately 30, were artists,
dancers, musicians, computer specialists, a former salesman and a former
investment officer, a former Harlem gang leader and three leaders of a
California black community center, ministers, school administrators and
teachers from a wide range of schools and fields, community workers,
former business executives, former housewives, a draft-resistance leader
and ex-military officers, media specialists. Peace Corps members and
Office of Education employees, politicians, and psychologists. 43
The major vehicle for recruitment of these people was personal
contacts, the majority coming from relationships with either Allen or a
faculty member. A significant number of others were recruited by the
students themselves.44 j-t yjas as if there was a grapevine of innovation-
oriented people throughout the coxmtry, and the news spread rapidly along
it. A few others joined the program as the result of chance meetings at
conferences, lectures or even, in at least one case, a chance meeting
with Allen on a plane.
4^”Minutes of the Graduate Faculty Meeting, May 9i 1968," Joan
Chenault, Recorder (School files).
43])erived from Lyman B. Brainerd, Jr., "A Thrust Toward Relevance:
the Year in Review," in Trend
,
Spring 1969» P» 5» 3-nd School of Education
Interim Catalogue
,
transmitted to Academic Matters Committee, Faculty
Senate, and Graduate Council, from Dwight W. Allen, Dean, School of Edu-
cation ([April 1969 ] School files), p. 7*
^See p. 136 .
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In fact, as the spring progressed the personal nature of reoruit-
ing for the Planning Dootoral Progras, beoan,e erplioit in an informal
guideline which based admittanoe on the willingness of one faculty „ember
to put his name on the line in the support of that student.
This program, as previously pointed out, was a signifioant incen-
tive in the recruitment of new faculty members. It also turned out to be
an excellent way of recruiting "semi-faculty," highly competent people
without doctorates, especially in the case of black and minority group
members, but also among young, innovative, and successful teachers and
administrators. And most important, it tapped a group of people, bright,
energetic, and committed to reform who, disenchanted with the public
school system and with schools of education, had previously had no place
to go a They were, as a group, idealistic, independent, strong-willed
people who saw in the School an opportunity for realistic credentialing,
for having their ideas heard, and for making a difference in education*
My belief that the Special Doctoral Program was the single most
important factor in the change effort at the School of Education is based
on the following set of outcomes of the program:
—that it was a significant incentive in the recruitment of new faculty,
—that it incontrovertibly swung the balance of faculty power toward re-
newal and innovation. Haul Dr. Allen entered the new year with a faculty
split almost eq\ially between old and new, the resistance of the old to
the types of change espoused by the Dean and the new would have repre-
sented a strong restraint to achievement of the changes envisioned.
Also, the balance of power having swting, many of old faculty put their
energies into change, which otherwise would have gone to resistance.
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—that the new doctoral students provided both the manpower and the ex-
pertise without which the planning year would have had considerably
less scope and depth,
—that the program was a vehicle for the admission of black and minority
students and for giving them a voice in the School's program. Without
this vehicle and power it is difficult to see how the strong anti-
racism focus which came to be at the center of the School could have
ever gotten its start,
—that the structure of the program set precedents for some of the most
important innovations of the School including student participation
and vote in all School matters, relaxation of traditional doctoral re-
quirements, individualized programs negotiated with faculty members,
redefinition of the dissertation, non-course alternatives to academic
preparation, redefined admission standards, a less judgmental approach
to the work of students, and a more peer-oriented relationship between
faculty and students.
One drawback of the Special Doctoral Progreun, in retrospect, was
that it did not go far enough as regards inclusion of all students in the
planning process. Master's students and undergraduates were pretty much
excluded from the planning, and the Interim Catalogue reflected its crea-
tors as it was primarily oriented to the needs and aspirations of the
faculty and graduate students.
Fund Raising
Salaries for most new faculty members were provided by the Uni-
versity, but additional funding was crucial to the achievement of critical
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mass (1) to provide stipends for the planning doctoral students, (2) to
provide secretarial help and other support services to the administration
and faculty (secretarial help and other support was frozen by the Univer-
sity at the old faculty level of 45 4. jxojr xcvej. 01 jp, ^ and ( 3 ) to provide the money for
the "first-class" recruiting efforts, University funds for such travel
being manifestly inadequate.
As with the recruiting effort, the fund-raising effort was highly
successful. In the period September I967 through April I969 approxi-
mately $450,000 in additional outside funds and $170,000 in University
funds were generated, permitting the School to support all doctoral stu-
dents who needed such support, employ an adequate (although barely) sup-
port and service staff, and finance the recruiting ceunpaign.
The two most significant proposals funded during this early
period were a $120,000 Model Elementary Teacher Education planning pro-
posal and a $180,000 Education Professions Development Act proposal, both
Office of Education grants. The Model Teacher proposal was due on
January 1, I968, and thus was developed at Stanford primarily by Allen
and three of the Stanford group who were coming with him to Amherst,
Money from this successful proposal was available in the spring of I968,
The EPDA proposal was written in the spring of I968 at the Amherst ceunpus,
but was not actually funded iintil early in 1969* In addition a Compensa-
tory Education grant of $50,000 brought to the School by Dan Jordan and
a $45 ,000 Comprehensive Achievement Monitoring grant broiight by Allen,
together with a number of smaller grants, provided the basic incremental
45Allen interview
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funding sources for the recruiting and the planning year. 46
The difficulties of attaining such financing were potentially
large as it is a risky proposition for outside funding agencies to make
substantial grants to a new, untested school of education. It seems
probable that these grants were made primarily to, and because of, the
Dean as a result of his reputation and previous experience with these
funding agencies. For instance, he was chairman of the committee which
had drawn up the guidelines for the EPDA program and was well known among
the people who controlled the METED? funding. In addition, while at
Stanford he had had a n\imber of successful dealings with the Kettering
Foundation, which funded the Comprehensive Achievement Monitoring Proj-
ect, and was a close friend of Chuck Kettering who had been, in fact, the
person who had recommended that he look into the University of Massachu-
setts offer. 47
Allen's success in raising $170,000 in additional money from the
University is an example both of an imaginative approach to funding and
of his high-risk approach to leadership. The money came at two differ-
ent times and for two different reasons. An additional $45|000 was com-
mitted in the spring of I 968 for support of doctoral students and
S 125 fOOO came in the spring of I 969 "to underwrite all the activities of
the School.
The $45,000 in incremental doctoral student support money was
part of Allen's overall effort to support all the doctoral students. Upon
his arrival, he fo\ind that there was University money available for 20
4^Ibid. 47ibid.
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doctoral students. As it became clear that the planning doctoral pro-
gram would attract many more than that, Allen began to look for other
sources of funding. He found a University allocation of $15,000 for
supervision of student teachers. Most of this money had been going to
faculty wives who provided such supervision. Allen then persuaded the
administration that supervision was excellent preparation for doctoral
students and that $15»000 was an irresponsibly inadequate sunount to super-
vise some 400 practice teachers, and consequently the University increased
the supervision allocation to $60,000, an amount sufficient to support
20 doctoral students at the average stipend of $3,000 a year. Twelve
more were supported by a program of tutoring for minority students in
the University and by the Compensatory Education grant.
In this manner Allen was able to support 52 doctoral students,
but that still left some 20 students unfunded for the planning year with
receipt of the EFUA money, which would cover the unfunded students, a
probability but by no means a certainty. Some students were able to wait
until the receipt of this money, but most were not. To create money for
them, Allen officially terminated the grants of many of the previously
f\mded doctoral students at mid-year; in effect using much of the year's
stipend money during the first semester and counting on new grants, par-
ticularly EPDA, to cover the second half of the year. And the new grants
did arrive. 4^9
4&yj^(ig()-tapes of speech, Dwight W. Allen, "What Makes Dwight Tick,
Florissant, Colorado, Sept. 19i I968 (Media Center files under title
Dwight Allen, "I have a Dream" speech).
49ibid.
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Had Allen not taken the risk of, in effect, fxmding graduate
students when there was not money available, perhaps some 20 planning
doctoral students could not have joined the School, with possibly seri-
ous consequences for the progress of the new school. In speaking of
this highly risky strategy Allen observes.
It was a choice. Either I had to take the risk or they did. It
seemed to me that the personal risk of moving to Amherst with
support uncertain was more onerous to the student than was my
risk in guaranteeing money—especially since I was optimistic
that it would come through or that I could somehow do something
to continue paying those people. 50
Or, more succinctly, and with a puckish grin, "I had a choice between
ending up with lots of people and no money or lots of money and no peo-
ple. And that really wasn't a choice for me." 51
This risk-oriented approach to financing the development of the
School is characteristic of Allen's style, and was nowhere more evident
than in hie financing of the School during the planning year in which he
overspent his budget by approximately $125|000, knowing that the Univer-
sity had. some unallocated funds and confident that the administration
would bail him out—which was what, in fact, took place, with the corol-
lary benefit of establishing a new level of funding for the following
year . 52
In siimmary, Allen's recruiting and fund-raising efforts had been
enormously successful. He had unquestionably achieved his goal of assem-
bling a critical mass of competent, change-oriented educators in the
50Allen interview.
5Ullen, Videotape, "Vfhat Makes Dwight Tick?"
52Allen interview.
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School and this critical mass was to be extremely important in the plan-
ning year, since his relationships with the existing faculty had deteri-
orated continuously and seriously over the first five months of his
leadership, culminating in the filing of a formal grievance against him
by most of the tenured faculty and leaving the faculty for the most part
antagonistic, alienated, and distrustful of him.
Dealing with the Existing Faculty
Dean Allen's first full-scale encovmter with the faculty he had
inherited took place on September 22, I 967
,
at the Sweetheart Tea Room,
in nearby Shelburne Falls—a meeting which most involved generally refer
to as the Sweetheart Tea Room disaster. For this very important initial
meeting, Allen had invited the entire faculty for dinner at the Tea Room.
The mere circvimstances of his talk were symbolic of new things. To have
dinner at School expense was unprecedented—and the fact that cocktails
were served and free left many of the faculty incredulous. In this situa-
tion, there was, to Allen, a symbol of new beginnings, to the faculty a
symbol of the new Dean's unique powers over the School budget. 53
The purpose of his speech was to let his faculty know his stand
on educational issues and his dreams for the School. He had every expec-
tation that the faculty would share his dreams.
Memories of that speech on all sides are hazy, one indication
perhaps of the trauma of that event, but it is clear that he talked of
"a mandate from the University administration to bring change to the School
53Allen and existing faculty interviews.
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of Education," of his distaste for conventional schools of education,
of his view that the doctorate in education comes too late for most
( The median age of the award of the EDB is 39 » bo half those who get
it are older than that, and by the time they are reaxiy to do something
they are ready to retire”), of his dissatisfaction with the existing
School building (our present school building is impossible and should
be replaced), of his desire to have six "wild card" new faculty members
for which he would be the sole decision-maker, and of his intention to
discontinue all existing programs of the School in September 1969.54
He expected the faculty to be excited and enthusiastic about the
opportunity to begin anew. The result was just the opposite. They felt
unvalued, frightened, and threatened. Many were in the 39“Pl^s sig®
range and felt that they were being written off; his indictment of con-
ventional schools of education clearly seemed to apply to many of those
present; the mandate and the wild card were clear indications to the
faculty that the Dean had, and intended to use, the power to ride rough-
shod over them; and the discontinuation of programs implied clear and
specific disapproval of the School of which they were the central part. 55
In summary, the entire speech had the effect, as described in a later
petition, of making the faculty feel "just about as useless as the other
things he was in a hurry to discard. "56
54i)erived from Allen and existing faculty interviews and Albert S.
Anthony, "Memorandum to Provost Oswald Tippo (Copy to Dean Dwight Allen),
Subject: Grievances , Peb. 21, 1 968" [memo sent only to Allen], pp. 2 &
11 (School files).
55prom videotape, "What Makes Dwight Tick," existing faculty inter-
views, and Anthony, "Peb. 21 Grievance memo," p. 11.
5^Anthony, "Peb. 21 Grievance memo," p. 11.
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In retrospect Allen summed the impact of the speech up by saying,
"I wanted to tell them what I believed in; I wanted to tell them my
dreams for the School; I wanted to turn them on as much as I was turned
on; but instead I alienated them because they could see no place for
themselves in my dream." To compound the problem, Allen flew back to
California early the next morning, giving the faculty no opportunity to
communicate their fears to him, thus creating a breeding groxind for
anxiety. The tra\una of the speech lingered, rankled and festered in the
minds and conversations of the faculty, with no immediate way of reliev-
ing the pressure. 57
In the interim between this speech and Allen's arrival on campus
the faculty saw very little of him and the void was filled primarily with
rumors about the new Dean: "He is being eased out of Stanford," "He is
going to have an administrative assistant and she's Black" ; about new
faculty being hired, "He was his roommate at college and is going to heaid
the —
—
Area"
;
and about catastrophic personnel actions being con-
templated by the Dean. In short, while not physically at the School dur-
ing these months, Dean Allen constituted a mysterious and menacing
presence to the old faculty. 58
Allen formally took over Deanship of the School on January 2,
1968. With him were six people, five of whom were to form his staff for
the remainder of the year. All were from California and none were ac-
quainted with any of the Amherst faculty. The group was made up of Wilma
5Tit is perhaps significant to note that the Sweetheart Tea Room
burned to the ground three weeks later.
58exi sting faculty interviews.
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Brady, black and also a BahaU, who was his executive secretary, Richard
Ooffing, the new Assistant Dean for Administration, previously a county
administrator; Richard Krasno, a student of Allen's who held the rank of
Visiting Lecturer; and three doctoral students, Gordon Schimmel, Peter
Wagschal, and Todd Eachus.
The group quickly set about the recruiting and fund-raising
tasks which were their major effort for the remainder of the semester.
There was a strong sense of urgency about the tasks to be done, and the
pace was fast, frenzied, and disorganized. The group had located itself
in the former Dean's office and the two adjacent, and it soon became
apparent that these offices had become a sort of West Berlin, surrounded
by first neutral and then hostile territory and almost completely iso-
lated from the life of the surrounding area. One member of the group
has said that it felt like being in the middle of an armed camp. 59
There appear to have been three major reasons for the deteriora-
tion of relations between Allen and the existing faculty:
1) Isolation: The fact that there was little contact between
the Dean and the faculty led to a conviction on the part of the faculty
that Allen was making vinilateral decisions in areas where they should
have been consulted and that he did not value them or their opinions.
2) Alleged Favoritism: The fact that Allen was perceived as
unfairly favoring certain faculty members who, in general, were not
liked or respected by other faculty members.
59prom interviews with Allen and two initial group members.
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and 3) Alleged Bias in Personnel Decisions! The fact that cer-
tain personnel decisions Allen ™ade in the spring were perceived as un-
fair, biased, and in some cases dishonest.
I shall below describe and explore each of these three factors
in greater detail.
Isolation
Available evidence seems to indicate that neither Dr. Allen nor
members of the new group made any serious efforts to open up contact with
the existing faculty. For example, in a memorandum in early February, a
member of the faculty reported on his perceptions of the arrival of Dick
Krasno.
The faculty was first aware of this individual's existence when
he was assigned office space on the second floor. For a matter
of a few weeks he moved quietly through the halls without ever
formally meeting the faculty or any indications given as to
what his status might be. It finally came out that he was ap-
pointed a Visiting Lecturer. It seems that no credentials were
ever circulated on Mr. Krasno nor was any group asked to pass
judgment as to his qualifications for joining our staff.
For a small faculty group careful and jealous of its status, the addition
of an unannounced outsider clearly constituted a major breach of trust.
During the later grievance hearings the powerful effect of the
isolation of the new group on much of the rest of the faculty csune to
light.
One incident mentioned was what was described as "the humiliation
of Mrs. Horton" (the previous Dean's secretary). The description of this
^^Albert S. Anthony, Memorandum to Dean Dwight Allen (Copy to Prov-
ost Tippo), Subject: "Responsibility for Faculty Personnel Decisions,"
Feb. 12, 1968, p. 3 (School files).
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incident at the hearing alec highlights the paranoia of the existing
faculty about the new group.
In the minutes of the hearing, one of the existing faculty mem.
hers (EPI ) describes the sitxxation:
Answer, EPI;
Question;
Answer, EPI;
EP2;
Question;
Answer, EPI;
Question;
Answer, EPI;
EP2;
"Mrs. Horton was moved out of the office some time
before the new secretary came on board, his, what
he calls his Executive Secretary, whom he brought
with him from California. And she (Mrs. Horton)
had been working with the administrative group on
the second floor and is under orders not to come
down to the first floor."
"Is this what you mean by the humiliation of Mrs.
Horton?"
"Well, I think this is partly the case
. . . Mrs.
Horton has some thirteen years experience at this
institution. I think she is certainly entitled to
a little more respect than the \mceremonious
ushering her out of her office up to another re-
gion and ordering her to stay away ..."
"A week and a half ago was the first time that, ac-
cording to Mrs. Horton, that Dean Allen ever asked
her a question ..."
"Por easy future reference, what is the name of the
secretary he brought from California?"
"Mrs. Brauiy."
VHow had she served him there?"
"She had been hie private secretary, I believe."
"This is just a part of the total takeover by a
California group, you might say, and he (Allen)
wonders why anxieties and hostility is aroused.
The old group is not to be trusted apparently.
And later, talking of the communications gulf between Allen and
the old faculty and its effect on the existing faculty;
Dean Allen did not call a general meeting of this faculty for
over a month after he came here in January. He remained in his
office, aloof from his facility ... behind closed doors most of
the time. There had been built up such a backlog of anxiety and
. • • relative to this man, and the plans that were leaking out,
etc., that Dr. Parody, who was no longer Dean, happened to be in
the office one day, and Dr. Allen asked him how things were go-
ing. Dr. Parody very honestly said, "Terrible, terrible." And
^
^Transcript, "Testimony of the Tenured Paculty," pp. 7 & 8
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so he went on and said~"What do you mean?" and he said "Wellyou are just not getting through to this faculty. You should
*
have a meeting immediately with them and try to^convey some of
involve them in these plaL." Sohe said, Oh
,
I goofed again, all right." So usually what he
irwhiLT®^^^®
token kind of adjustment-getting a meeti^n ich he dominates things, talks down to his faculty, th^he goes away assuming that everything is wonderful. He neverstops to listen to people; he never stops to inquire what'seating at people, never tries to understand. He's got his ownplan that he is impatient to implement, and I think he reganisthe old people as an impediment. I'm sure that he would haveloved not to have anybody, to have started with a clean slate,
a clean program, a clean faculty, and we're a nuisance to him.
I think this reflects on action after action that he has taken. 62
A concomitant to the faculty's sensitivity to Allen's seeming
aloofness, was the belief that he was making unilateral decisions in
areas of faculty prerogatives. The recruitment of new faculty was es-
pecially subject to criticism in this regard. Among the complaints
registered was the fact that Dean Allen did not consult the faculty in
deciding whom to recruit and in fact that he ignored faculty suggestions;
that he did not recruit people by slot, but rather as "good people" in
such a manner as the faculty could not compare proposed appointments with
other possibilities in a field; that new people were being paid too much;
that his emphasis on youth was creating an inferior faculty; that cer-
tain specific people appointed were inferior in quality; and that, in
certain specific cases, Allen had broken agreements he had made with the
Personnel Committee.
^^Ibid
.
.
p. 13.
^^Above complaints described in Anthony, "Peb. 21 Grievance Memo";
in Some Tenured Faculty Members, "Grievance Against Dean Dwight Allen,"
submitted to the University Tenure and Grievance Committee, April 10,
1968 ; and in transcript, "Testimony of the Tenured Faculty," pp. 13-19i
22-37 (all in School files).
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other comments made during the grievance hearing are indicative
Of the faculty.s feeling that they were not being appropriately consulted
For instance;
The faculty learns about much of the Dean's
crucial matters of concern to the whole School
activity on
fait accompli . ^4
Althoj^h much of the decision making of the School shouldbe done through the various coordinators in the areas. Dean
their leaders and pretend that
neither they nor the areas exist.
Favoritism
In fact Dean Allen did make contacts with a n\w>ber of old faculty
and also attempted to reward and promote those who he thought had the
greatest potential for contribution to the new school. However, both
attempts turned out to be extremely divisive, only acerbating the situa-
tion with the remainder of the faculty.
For one thing, those faculty members with whom the Dean attempted
contact appear to have been the outsiders in the faculty. One was away
from campus much of the time doing fund raising, taught very little, and
was characterized by some of his peers as being arrogant in his relation-
ships with them.^^ Another was viewed as unconcerned and irresponsible
in his teaching and School and University responsibilities (absent from
classes, refused to serve on the Personnel Committee, rarely attended
the Faculty Senate and the third was a part-time instructor working
^^enured Faculty, Grievance
, p. 11.
^^Transcript
,
"Testimony of Tenured Faculty," p. 11.
^^Tenured Faculty, Grievance
,
p. 8 . ^^Ibid .
, p. 9 »
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for a doctorate in the English Depart,„ent. That Allen ohoee these three
only confined the rest of the faculty-s worst suspicions about what kind
of school he was creating and what kind of people he would value.
Acrimony over his support of these people came out during the
grievance hearing in statements like;
Prom the very start Dean Allen tended to favor certain faculty
members. He was already connected with [Dr. A] through connedtions both had with the Foundation. The two were inc^unication during the spring I967 at which time Dr. A gavethe new Deem his estimate of the School. 68
It is common knowledge in the School that [who had been
given a merit raise despite a low Personnel Committee rating]
has made a point of ingratiating [himself] with the Dean. 69
Bias in personnel decisions
As serious as were the aforementioned factors in the minds of
the faculty, Dean Allen's personnel actions with regard to the old fac-
ulty appear, from my interviews, and as reflected in the minutes of the
grievance hearings, to have been the single most important factor in the
creation of hostility and distrust on the part of the old faculty toward
the Dean. Nearly every person on the faculty was affected, in one way
or another, by Allen's decisions about existing personnel. These deci-
sions included promotion, merit increases, tenure, and non-renewal of
contracts.
The most serious general criticism of Dean Allen in these actions
was that he had agreed to follow the guide of the Personnel Committee and
University policy in making them—and then, in a large number of cases.
68
'Ibid.
, p. 7 « ^^ibid. , p. 9 *
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had not done bo. Most of the specific decisions enumerated below are
decisions that the Dean made, apparently in contradiction to the Per-
sonnel Committee decisions.
On merit increases—Dean Allen had asked the Personnel Committee
to arrive at a composite rating for each faculty member, which he would
turn into a dollar figure for compensation purposes . 70 vftxen the actual
dollar figures were awarded many old faculty believed that (1) the in-
creases were not in accordance with the ratings given by the Personnel
Committee, (2) that those whom the Dean favored were given unfairly
large increases, 7^ that those who opposed Allen's policies were
given either an unfairly small increase or none at all. 73
On promotions and tenure—
—In two cases promotions and/or tenure
were granted to people who, it was contended, had not been recommended
by the Personnel Committee. 74
On non—renewals—
—It was contended that two people who had been
recommended by the Personnel Committee to receive tenure, had been, in
effect, fired by the Dean. 75 one of these was to bring a grievance
against him, later denied, and the strong feelings aroxind this grievance
further widened the gap between Dean Allen and most of the faculty.
7^Transcript
,
"Allen Second Testimony," pp. 17-22 .
7
^Tenured Faculty, Grievance
, pp. 6-10; Transcript, "Testimony of
Tenured Faculty," pp. 34 & 36.
7^Tenured Faculty, Grievance
, pp. 6-9 .
7^Ibid
. , p. 9*
^^Ibid
.
,
p. 6
75por one, see Tenured Faculty, Grievance, p. 6. For the other,
see transcript, "Testimony of the Tenured Faculty," pp. 34 & 35*
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Svutimary
The hostility and antagonism which the actions of Allen engen-
dered in the existing faculty are aptly summarised by the follcwing
statements, excerpted frcm the grievance proceedings and an earlier,
highly critical, raeraorandum.
I think most of us throughout his tenure as Dean have bent
over backwards trying to cooperate with him. I think most of
us, through frustrations, have lost confidence in this man.
Week after week things come up which constantly set the facultyin turmoil, which introduce a distrust and feelings of frustra-
tions and alienation on the part of the faculty. I think we
conduct a great give-away—and I would be the first to admit
this, and I participate in give-aways of faculty prerogatives
in order to gain peace, but I find that these things, instead
of insuring peace, just whet his appetite for more concessions.”^^
I think Professor ———— clearly speaks for the tenured
faculty and what is more important, I think he clearly speaks
for the vast majority of the untenured faculty who are held now
in a kind of aceuiemic version of a reign of terror [the last
statement was subsequently retracted by the speaker]. 77
In over twenty—five years of teaching I have never had any
occasion where an administrator treated me in the disparaiging
and insulting mauiner as Dr. Allen did. 78
I am one of the tenured faculty who deeply resent the hu-
miliation and the shock of being evaluated as though we have
been and are detrimental to the growth of the School of Educa-
tion. Like other faculty members I hsid expected that "a new
broom would sweep clean.” However, I did not anticipate being
relegated to a refuse pile. 79
Up to this time I had never worked for a man who has shown
such utter contempt for hie associates. He obviously feels that
he neither need keep his word nor work as a team with his fac-
ulty. My obvious conclusion is that he has never worked
^^Transcript, "Testimony of the Tenured Faculty," p. I 9 .
^^Ibid . , p. 20.
^®Anthony, "Feb. 21 Grievance Memo," Exhibit D.
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I have had a number of contacts with Dean Allen and I getthe impression of a man who is profoundly indifferent to thosepeople he does not feel can be of service to him. Hie general
attitude toward his faculty is one of contempt. I find his
arrogant manner most distasteful.
Faculty conflict with the new Dean reached its apex in the late
spring when eight of the ten®^ tenured faculty of the School of Educa-
tion brought a grievance against Dean Allen to the Faculty Senate. This
grievance, dated April 10
,
I968, was based on the AAUP statement in Gov-
ernment of Colleges and Universities which states (p. 12 ) "Faculty status
and related matters are primarily a faculty responsibility: this area
includes appointments
. .
." and went on to detail grievances in the
areas of faculty and administration recruitment and hiring and personnel
actions on existing faculty—primarily those described in the preceding
pages. The University Faculty Tenure and Grievance Committee disallowed
all grievances, apparently ruling that the tenured faculty had not been
able to prove conclusively their allegations.®® However, their decision
did nothing to alleviate the distrust and hostility of the old faculty
toward the new Dean which they were to bring with them to the opening of
the "new school," September I968.
®Qlbid .
®hbid .
®^The ninth had recently been granted tenure by the Dean and the
tenth was on leave.
®®From Allen interview; I was not able to find a report of the de
cision of this committee in School files.
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Gonclueion
And thus, with the achievement of a critical mass of change-
oriented people through a highly successful recruiting effort and the
prospect of sufficient funding for a major planning effort to its advan-
tage, and a hostile and antagonistic faculty to its disadvantage, the
nucleus of the new School of Education looked forwaid to its first summer
in the town of Amherst, a university town noted for the peace and quiet
of its summers.
And the summer was, indeed, a relatively quiet transition period.
Many of the old faculty had departed for siommer appointments at other in-
stitutions or to study and write away from the School, Some members of
the new faculty began drifting into town and began to work into the ac-
tivities of the School as the summer progressed. The major activities
of the School were devoted to plaiming for the following year, especially
for the Retreat j to the development of relationships with other parte of
the University, especially the central administration; to swimitting new
planning doctoral students; to work on the Model Elementary Teacher Edu-
cation planning grant; and to the sponsorship of a program of siimmer
workshops at the School,
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Part II
THE PLANNING YEA.R
September I968 - November I969
INTRODUCTION
Ab Slimmer began to wane, from all around the coiintry came a
formication of moving vans, U-Haul trucks, and overloaded cars carrying
new faculty and doctoral students and their households toward Amherst
causing, among other things, the tightest real estate market in the
town's history. Gradually, as the fall arrived, they began to sift into
the School——if faculty, to take possession of their new offices; if stu-
dents, to make a place for themselves both personally euid physically in
the School, physically in the sense that planning doctoral students had
no offices or even an area, and the best strategy for finding a place to
hang one's coat and store one's lunch, and occasionally find something
to write upon, was to attach oneself to a faculty member and proceed to
carve out a small part of his office for oneself.
Throughout the building there were signs of renovation and recon-
struction; two-by-fours, paneling, buckets of nails, paint cans, tools,
wires, and equipment which were to remain a part of the gestalt of the
School throughout the year, physical symbols, one could easily feel, of
the renewal and reconstruction going on within the organization which
inhabited the building.
There were three major tasks to be accomplished during this year
—
which had been designated by Dean Allen as a "Year of Planning." The
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first was to find an effective means for getting the large and diveree
group of strangers who had been recruited for the change effort moving
together in an organized way to accomplish the objectives of the planning
year. The second was that of aoademio reform—to design new curriculum
and academic policies for the School which would be more relevant to the
needs of students and of society. The third task was that of organiza-
tional reform to devise organizational struotures which promoted vi-
tality and renewal and which would encourage continuing development in
the academic program.
The task of organizing for the planning process was primarily
accomplished through a week-long, school-wide retreat held in late
September.
The academic task included identifying the appropriate clientele
for the School} defining the major educational focij creating appropriate
curriculum, content, and educational processes} devising appropriate
grading and evaluation techniques } and determining relevant standards of
degree granting and credentialing. This \indertaking reached its cul-
mination in April of the planning year with the submission (and subse-
quent approval in late May) of a 2,400-page Interim Catalogue to
appropriate University approval agencies. This package featured:
—159 courses sponsored by eleven "Learning Centers,"
and ten "special progreuns."
—a school far more committed to graduate education than
formerly, with undergraduate education (teacher training)
specifically listed as a second priority.
—pass-fail grading for all courses.
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credit module format which provided credit, graded on al^ee no record baeie. for educational experi^nfee of T
forSt
different from regular oouree length and
-graduate ^ograme organized along the lines of the PlanningDoctoral Program, with a student "portfolio" replacing the
normal crod.i't accumulaliion forma'te
a request for a mandate for experimentation in all the
School's programs with evaluation at the end of a two-
year period.
The organizational task, which had become focused on the crea-
tion of an appropriate constitution for the School, was formally com-
pleted in November of the following year with the formal adoption by
the faculty and administration of the Constitution which featured:
—a sharing of the Dean's powers with the community as a whole.
—the inclusion of students as voting members of all School
decision-making bodies.
—the establishment of an ombudsman and a number of other
appeal mechanisms.
—the legitimization of the center—oriented organizational
structure.
The case analyses of the events of the planning year will be
presented in three chapters.
Chapter V will focus on the initial organizing stsiges of the
planning, particularly a School-wide, week-long Retreat, in which the
major thrusts of the School in both academic programs and orgeinizational
policies were developed.
Chapter VI will focus on the process by which academic reform
was achieved.
Chapter VII will focus on the process by which governing struc-
tures for the School were developed.
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CHAPTER V
INITIAL ORGANIZING STAGES/THE RETREAT
Opening School Meeting
The first formal meeting of the "new school" took place on
Monday, September 4
,
I 968 . It was an all-day meeting, beginning at 9 a.m.,
with luncheon provided by the School. The meeting began with a faculty
meeting in which Dean Allen, without notes, introduced each member of the
new and old faculty to the group. At 10 a.m. the planning doctoral stu-
dents joined the meeting and were individixally introduced by the Dean,
again speaking without notes. Allen then spoke to the group for approxi-
mately one-half hour, confirming for the first time to the total School
things that he had been saying individually to School members for the
past year. He spoke first of his conviction that the room contained the
most outstanding assembly of educators in the country and then of his
hopes for the year and vision for the future. He re-emphasized the fact
that the School had a mandate for change, that all courses, programs,
degrees and certification offered by the School were discontinued as of
the following September, and that the coming year was to be a planning
year in which the options for innovation were practically limitless. He
also outlined the deadlines for the task, the major goal being the prepa-
ration of a new "catalogue,” in effect the final step of the reconstruc-
tion of the School, for University approval by March 15» ^ 9^9 * He also
spoke of his hopes that the planning doctoral students would play a
major role in this task.
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The meeting then moved on to preparatory business for the year.
Although none of the actual decisions could be said to have had a major
impact on the year to come, this initial meeting clearly set the tone
and laid the groundwork for much of the year to follow.
For example, a number of the decisions reached tended to rein-
force the power of the Dean over the faculty. He was to chair faculty
meetings at least until after the Retreat and was to be responsible for
agenda. Further, graduate faculty would no longer meet separately on
graduate issues—^which were to be discussed at general faculty meetings
with only graduate faculty voting.
In addition, Allen proposed changes in the Personnel Committee,
which at that point was made up entirely of old faculty—an action which
the old faculty viewed as a continuation of the Dean's attack upon them.^
Finally, a strong opening wedge for the inclusion of planning
doctoral students in all faculty decisions was driven when the faculty
voted first to admit them to faculty meetings "with voice but no vote"
and then to "express its intent to include students on all faculty com-
2
mittees this year."
For many the import of the meeting caune as much from its medium
as its message. There was Dean Allen speaiking with confidence and messi-
anic enthusiasm of things that most in the room had dreamed of for years.
There was the sense of exhilaration and power inherent in the fantasy
Vacuity interviews. May and June, I972.
^Prior paragraphs derived primarily from Minutes of the Faculty
Meeting
,
Monday, September 4 » I968, prepared by Earl Seidman, edited by
Robert Wellman (miraeo. School files).
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that here was an auditoriun full of highly competent people talking in
strong, confident tones of the kind of academic revolution that was
usually discussed in guarded tones among small knots of people. And
there was a strong sense of potential and adventure in the veiy appear-
ance of the people, black and white, dress ranging from conventional
suit to patched jeans, smooth-shaven to expansively bearded, crew-cut
tc Afro to shoulder-length hair-all startling and exciting to those
accustomed to the homogeneity of conventional academic assemblages.
Also, the fact that there were two tape recorders and a video-
tape camera recording the events of the meeting strongly reaffirmed a
sense that, indeed, in this room were gathered a group about to under-
take a momentous and earthshaking step in the reform of education in
America.
On September 11
,
a School-wide convocation to mark the official
opening of School was held. At this meeting Dean Allen again focused on
his hopes for the School and again the meeting was punctuated by recording
equipment and dramatic diversity of appearance of those present.
The period from September 4 to September I 5 , when the group left
for its one—week retreat in Colorado, was primarily a time of settling
in, of preparation for the Retreat and of putting off significant deci-
sions "until we have decided at the Retreat." Prom early May when Allen
had adopted the idea of the Retreat it had beccane the most visible and
tangible symbol of the intentions and style of the New School, an event
toward which the psychological energies of most in the commiinity had
been focused for months.
168
The Retreat
Introduction
The idea of a Retreat for the entire planning group (faculty and
planning doctoral students) to mark the beginning of the planning proc-
ess, particularly a retreat to a distant and exotic location (originally
a Virgin Island setting had been planned and then Puerto Rico was seri-
ously considered) had special appeal to Dean Allen. It piqued hie pro-
clivity for the symbolic and dramatic. It was, to him, an ideal way of
clearly declaring the beginning of a new kind of school—of saying to
participants and outsiders "here is a special group of people engaged in
a uniquely important crusade."^ In effect, Allen saw in the Retreat an
opportunity to promote in his organization what has been called the
Hawthorne Effect.*’^ In addition, the trip served as a way of clearly
stating the high priority which he put on the planning component of the
year by his willingness to make a substantial investment, $30,000 and
152 man/weeks, in the planning.
It is also likely that Allen saw in the Retreat an opportunity
to focus the group's energy on resolving some of the potentially divisive
areas of conflict in the organization, particularly those of old faculty
vs. new faculty and Dean, Black vs. Vfhite, and conservative vs. experi-
mental .
^Prom interviews with Dwight W. Allen, July 1971 - May 1972.
^he Hawthorne effect, in brief, describes a situation in which
superior task performance on the part of an individual or group is the
direct result of the fact that that individual or group is being treated
as a separate, unique and important entity by someone of importance to
the group or individual.
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And finally, the Retreat was expected to provide a strong be-
ginning for the year, an opportunity for the entire group to get to know
and work with each other, and a chance to "dream big" unhindered by the
normal day-to-day pressures of the regular school environment.
It is impossible to define the specific expectations of Allen
and the School for the accomplishments of the Retreat. It is certainly
true that they were extremely high and that most felt that many of the
specific issues about the scope and direction of the School would be
virtually decided—leaving the remainder of the year for refinement and
implementation of those decisions.
The only before-the-fact written statement of expectations ap-
pears in a July 23 memo from Allen to planning participants in which he
describes the Retreat as a time to "discuss needs and operational assump-
tions and specify objectives for the School of Education with a time
frame" and also to "develop and adopt planning organization differen-
tiated on the basis of objectives auid support requirements. "5 After the
fact, an article on the Retreat written for Tabula Rasa states that "One
of the proposed conclusions of the planning retreat was the creation of
an on-going structure for the planning year."^
The events of the Retreat did, indeed, provide the basis for the
planning structure of the year, although the structure was by no means
^Dwight W. Allen, Memorandum to Faculty and Planning Staff, Sub-
ject: "Strategies and Logistics for Planning" (mimeo, July 23, 19^8)
,
p. 5 (School files).
^James Black, "Executive Council—Formation and Function," Tabula
Rasa
,
Sept. 26, I 988
,
n.pag.
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as organised and apeoifio as that apparently contemplated by Allen in
his memorandum, and no agreement on needs, operational assumptions, and
ebjeotives was reached. These major issues were discussed to the point
of frustration, and nothing firmly decided.
However, the Retreat was unquestionably the most significant
event of the planning year. The group went into it strangers, a form-
less, relatively disorganized and inchoate mass and emerged with con-
siderable group identity, with close relationships under way, and with
a planning process and the mechanism to support that process in the year
to come in a stage of dynamic development. In sum, the group of stran-
gers had come together and begun to move together.
of this chapter will focus on a description and
analysis of the major events and outcomes of the Retreat and will be
organized as follows;
A narrative description of the journey to Colorado—an at-
tempt to recapture and communicate a sense of the spirit of the time
the excitement, high spirits, and sense of mission which were to charac-
terize both the trip and the Retreat itself.
II » An analysis of the significant outcomes of the Retreat,
specifically;
A. Development of a planning process for the remainder
of the year.
1 . adoption of the "Center” model of organization.
2. adoption of the organic growth model.
3« election of the Executive Committee.
B. Development of facilitating mech2misme for the planning
process.
1. development of informal relationships.
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2. development of shared goals and esprit.
3 . expansion of the Dean's informal power.
C. The rise of the "myth of community"—a dysfunctional
outcome.
D. Acceleration of the planning process.
E. The genesis of a commitment to combat institutional
racism.
in. A narrative description of the return trip—the spirit of
the Retreat and a return to reality.
"The Ten-Year Projection"—An insight into dreams dreamed
at the Retreat.
En Route
As the sunshine broke through the mist, 8 a.m., on Sunday,
September 15 1 the I52 people, of whom no one person except Allen, who
knew them all, knew more than 20, boarded four buses in front of the
School. E!ach received a maroon soft—plastic case containing a name tag,
a packet of work to be done on the plane, including a list of possible
topics for discussion at the Retreat from which each was to choose the
three most important to him, and two large, colorful, psychedelic but-
tons to be worn, one inscribed "No is Not the Right Answer" and the other
"Now is the Right Answer."
Although the group was made up primarily of School faculty and
doctoral students there was a smattering of other guests including six
UMass undergraduates, seven faculty members of other universities, three
of whom had been hired to arrive in January, four of whom were being re-
cruited, the Superintendent of a New York State School System and an
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Assistant Superintendent of the Hartford School System, two young Cali-
fornia blacks, two faculty members of other departments of the Univer-
Bity, and a consultant from Synectios, a creative problems-solving
consulting
Arriving at Bradley Field in bright sunshine, the group swarmed
off the buses, through the lobby to the departure gate, milled about
briefly, and then boarded its chartered American Airlines intercontinen-
tal 707, filling it to capacity.
The plane was flown by, it turned out, a vmiquely hip pilot and
crew who allowed unrestricted use of the plane's cabin's communications
system for increasingly high-spirited announcements from the group;
Ladies and gentlemens, zis is your leader shpeaking. I
know dot you are vondering vhy I haf called zis meeting. You
vish to make a revolution, ya? Ve haf zherefore made shpeschal
arrangements to fly you to Habana vhere you are most needed.
Next year ve retreat to Amherst, eh?
and
Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to introduce a very
special stewardess to you, Mary Joe Malvernia. Mary Joe did
her elementary work at Watkins Qlen Combined Super School,
Watkins Glen, Alaska, where she amassed a perfect record in
all subjects except clay, maintained her fine record in Johnson
City Junior and Senior High, where she was finally permitted
to drop clay, and graduated summa cum laude. Phi Beta Kappa
from the American Airlines Stewardess Academy in Dallas, Texas.
Miss Malvernia will be serving you in the forward ladies' room.
The pilot encouraged visits to the cockpit and introjected his own com-
ments into the intercom competition.
The stewardesses provided some with aprons and assistant stew-
ardesses pins and by "accident" left the remainder of the liquor bottles
^Prom "Retreat Participants," memorandum distributed at the Re-
treat (School files).
!
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in the aisle after the twoKlrink-per-person li»it had been passed.
Allen made his way up and down the aisles in a vivid red. yellow and
Dean
green African shirt accompanied by a humming videotape camera Over the
plane's in-flight film system, two educational films and a series of
films on innovation starring Dwight Allen were being shown.
In sum, both by design and by accident, the Hawthcrne effect was
alive and well and flcurishing on the Boeing
^0^ winging its way high
over two-thirds of the oountry_and Allen's charisma quotient appeared
to be fast approaching the altitude of the plane.
For many, the events of the trip also provided a beginning of a
concern which was to affect them increasingly at Colorado and thereafter—
the race issue. Generally quiet and subdued in the academic atmosphere
of prior meetings of the School, the blacks were very much in evidence
during the plane trip. Apparently less inhibited than most whites about
walking the aisles of the plane, meeting new people, and using the inter-
com, the blacks, particularly Doctor Ne Gar, sinister-looking in his per-
manent shades, African shirt and hat; Willie in his Black is Beautiful
shirt; Chuck with his 200-plus pounds of concern and good humor; Maiso,
cool, handsome, and debonair; and Nate with hie enthusiasm and ever-
present videotape camera, maxie it very apparent that they were to be a
substantial presence in the week to come.
Five hours later the plane descended into the Colorado Springe
Airport, was met by a new fleet of buses, and shortly after noon the
group emerged into the clean and rarified air of Florissant, Colorado,
to find a bunk in one of eight cabins at High Trails Caump, a girls' summer
camp complex. After lunch, served as were all meals at rectangular tables
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for twelve with
.embers of each table handling the waiting chores, the
group spent the rest of the afternoon settling in, exploring the camp,
and beginning to get to hncw each other. Dinner was at 6 p.m.
,
followed
by a general meeting in which Dean Allen discussed his ideas about the
organization of the Retreat, followed by discussion and a multimedia
film presentation by one of the doctoral students.
The general plan of each day included a morning session of activi-
ties at 9 a.m. and an afternoon session at 3 p.m. Heals were used as
general announcement and discussion periods, and each evening a general
community meeting was held. Richard Clark, a young Assistant Professor
just finishing his doctorate at Stanford was put in charge of the organi-
zation of the Retreat. Under hie guidance, in consultation with Allen
and the two Assistant Deans, the Retreat moved from a hi^ly organized
and "controlled" structure to a more loose and flexible structure based
on the interests of those present.
Analysis of the Specific Outcomes of the Retreat
Development of a planning process
for the planning year
One of the most important accomplishments of the Retreat was the
development of a planning process for the remainder of the year. This
process grew out of two relatively imrelated developments, the ewioption
of the interest group model of academic planning and the rise of the or-
ganic growth model of organization building, and culminated in the deci-
sion to elect an Executive Committee to guide the planning for the remainder
of the year.
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Adoption of the Center model
of academic organization
Initial expectations were to have the entire group addrese the
major issues of the future of the School. The frustration over the lack
cf success of this approach during the first day of meetings (to be de-
scribed below) combined, on the part of many, with a low level of interest
in such areas, was manifested in an expressed desire among participants
to meet with others of similar professional interests to work out the de-
velopment of specific programs in their shared field of interest—a task
more consistent with their professional concern, one which was viewed as
less ambiguous than the attempt to plan for the entire School, and one
which offered the personal satisfactions of contact with people of simi-
lar interests.® Some suoh interest groups had, in fact, had their genesis
in Amherst before the Retreat, most particularly among those interested
in international education, urban education, counseling, and micro-
teaching.
3y the second day of the Retreat these interest group meetings
had moved to become the dominant organizational structure of the Retreat,
with people representing the various areas of interest announcing, either
at meals or via a bulletin board, times and places for meetings of those
with similar interests. The morning and afternoon sessions for the re-
mainder of the Retreat were primarily devoted to such meetings.
Q
°This tendency among academics to neglect institution-wide con-
cerns in favor of their own fields is well analyzed in Dwight R. Ladd,
Change in Educational Policy (New York, McGraw Hill, 1970), p. 214.
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By the end of the Retreat Tabula Rasa
, a biweekly school news-
paper born at the Retreat, could report that 22 separate interest groups
had been formed at the Retreat.
9
And there vrere some surprises, three in particular:
—The genesis of an interest in Aesthetics which was to grow into
the Aesthetics Center, although no faculty member or doctoral student had
been recruited specifically for his interest in that field.
The beginning of what was to become the Hiunanistic Education
Center which grew out of an interest of a faculty member who had been
recruited for his experience in urban education.
An approach to education called "The Learning Theater" which
grew out of a Synectics creative problem-solving session at the Retreat
and which was later to become the School's major program in the Open
Classroom/integrated day.
These 22 interest groups were to become the planning "committees"
around which the planning year was organized, and by a process of amalga-
mation and elimination, the 11 "centers" and four "programs" around which
the academic program of the "new school" as described in the Interim
Catalogue was organized.
Rise of the organic growth model
It was, as I have previously observed, initially expected that
the entire group would concern itself with school-wide policy decisions.
^"Committees Formed at the Retreat," Tabula Rasa, Sept. 26, 19^8,
n.pag.
177
These policy decisione were subdivided into three general areas:
(1) goals, (2) structure, and (3) decision-making. Two assumptions ap-
pear to have been implicit in this approach: (1) that the School should
proceed on a predetermined planning model and (2) that such planning
should take place in the context of previously agreed upon goals and
planned structures and decision-making processes by which those goals
would be accomplished.
Two major factors operated, early in the Retreat, to frustrate
this approach. First, as described, only a minority of participants were
interested in discussing such policy issues, preferring to work with those
of similar interests on specific program planning; and secondly, even for
those committed to such issues, the circularity of the three major ele-
ments became almost unbearably frustrating. For instance, in a group so
diverse in concerns and expectations it became impossible to agree on
goals at any satisfactory level of specificity without a formal decision-
making process—and any attempts to develop structure and decision-making
processes were thwarted by the absence of clearly articulated goals.
As the interest group meetings began to attract imagination and
energy, most participants moved away from the School—wide policy issues,
leaving a hard core divided into three committees; Goals, Decision-
Making, and Structure. However, the problem of circularity remained,
exacerbated in fact by the separateness of the three groups, and delib-
erations beceune increasingly confused, abstract, frustrating, and unsatis-
factory.
^^There is a videotape of one such discussion in the files of the
Media Center, School of Education.
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By late Tuesday, some members of those committees began to see
the beginnings of a structure for the School in the emerging interest
groups and also, in those groups, a process for defining organizational
goals since the interest groups clearly represented the goals of their
members and presumably the sum of the goals of interest groups could be
construed to represent the sum of the goals of those in the School.
Thus, out of frustration with the difficulties of developing a
planned growth model, and in hopes that the interest groups as they be-
came more defined would provide important data for structure and goal-
setting, the planned growth groups decided that further discussion of the
issues would be unprofitable, at least for the time being. The Structure
Committee thus proposed, on Wednesday, the election of an Executive Com-
mittee which would oversee, but not control, the planning process until
such time as the emerging goals and resources of the School became more
clear. ^ ^
However, the tension between planned growth and what I am calling
organic growth re-emerged at the first Executive Committee meeting on
Thursday. This tension was resolved primarily by the efforts of Richard
Assistant Dean for Administration, who convinced the group of
the desirability of depending on the emerging structure in combination
with some of the principles enunciated in Jay W. Forrester's "New Corpo-
rate Design" (described subsequently) for the delineation of important
organizational principles. Thus, in the first Tabula Rasa published upon
1 1 Ibid
.
,
"A Report Submitted by the Task Force on Structure to the
Entire Group for Consideration," Sept. 18, I 968
,
p. 2.
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return from the Retreat it was reported
or llTTZll, **'* -“foZle
its own struoturefl2
«>”tinued until that „omentur, produoed
Election of the Executive Committee
As proposed by the Structure Oonmittee, the Bceoutive Oommittee
was to consist of seven members, four elected at large and without nomina.
tion and three named by the Dean. The Committee would be
. charged
with the responsibility for structuring enterprise within the School of
Education," and also
creating procedural structure, gatherinformation (utilizing reports and other information generatedfrom committees and individuals at the Retreat), and apprisingfaculty and staff of developments. It will be responsible forbringing convergence to the array of options via consultingindivid^ls, convening study groups, offering open hearings,
and so forth. ’
The proposal also created a deadline of November 1, I968, for the adop-
tion of a plan for the conduct of the planning year.^^
The proposal was discussed, amended to include one regular doc-
toral student and one undergraduate upon the return to Amherst, and then
formally adopted at the Wednesday evening community meeting. The voting
took place on Thursday morning, and three faculty members and one combina-
tion faculty/doctoral student were elected to the Executive Committee.
Dean Allen named two doctoral students and a faculty member, his
12
Ibid., Black, "Executive Council," Sept. 26, I968, n.pag.
1
•^Ibid
.
.
"Structure Task Force," Sept. 18, I968, pp. 2 & 3.
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nominations including the fifth highest vote getter, and two other.
Who had received a substantial number of votes. '•4
This at-large method of election would seem to have assured that
the Executive Committee would be made up of the infonnal leaders of the
School-which was true, with the proviso that because of the relatively
short time the group had been together the informal structure had not
fully matured, tending to put a premium on quick visibility as the major
criterion of leadership, m fact, during the year other infomsal leaders
did arise-and some of the Executive Committee members- informal status
declined_a fact not reflected in changes in the Executive Committee
during the planning year. ^5
Since five of the seven chosen to lead the School in the months
ahead were, in effect, elected at large, it is useful to look more closely
at what these people represented to get an idea of the emerging goals,
values, and power structure of the School. Six of the seven were new to
the School, indicating that the old faculty had not become a major force
in the new group; none were tenured, indicating that age and status did
not seem important to the group or were, in fact, considered a negative
attribute; four were faculty, two doctoral students, and one had dual
status, indicating that doctoral students had become a major force in the
group; two were black and two others represented a major interest in
urban education and race problems, indicating an emerging interest in
^4Record of vote in School files.
^^vnien, with the adoption of the Interim Constitution in April I969,
a new Executive Committee was n€uned, only two members of the original
Executive Committee were included, one nominated by Bean Allen (derived
from Tabula Rasa
.
May 10, I969, n.pag. ).
181
xnese areas on the part of the group, six were ^le. indioating that the
group was still highly male^iominated
,
and all, with the possible exoep-
tion of one, had been highly visible at the Retreat, openly supportive of
Allen, and clearly committed to his vision for the School; four were from
California, It is also interesting to note retrospectively, that of the
original Executive Committee, three have subsequently been named assist-
ant deans at the School and one a Center Head, indicative of their high
Standing with Dean Allen.
The Executive Council took power Thursday evening, with one of
its student members, Louise Hall, chairing the Community meeting, those
previously having been run by Dean Allen or Dick Clark.
During this meeting the Council proposed a further definition of
its decision-inaking powers as follows: that the Executive Committee
... be charged with the responsibility of actively attempting
to sense the climate of opinion of the faculty and student body
and when it feels there is a substantial consensus it acts.
Further that when there is a sense that substantial consensus
does not exist, it refrains from making the decision in question
and refers it to the faculty as a whole.
The proposal goes on to state that anyone who objects to an Executive
Council decision can take the decision to the faculty as a whole.
This very flawed proposal (reference to the faculty rather than
the total group as review board, the ambiguities of "consensus," and the
option of review if even one person objects to a decision) was passed at
that meeting.
^
^"Committee of the Whole," Tabula Rasa
, Sept. 20
,
I968, n.pag.
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The flaws of this decision-making proposal can be traced to a
naive hope for government by a community ideal where adversary proceeding
and voting were not a neoessaiy prerecpiistte of decisions. It might have
worked With a very small group with easy and accurate communication among
them. However, since the group was made up of I50 people, since effec-
tive communication among all that group of people had not been developed,
and Since there were so many divisive issues in the air. decision-making
community model, in hindsight, was clearly unworkable. This very
ambiguous and yet demanding requirement of consensus of the community
model was probably a contributing factor to the Ekecutive Committee
-s
difficulty in asserting positive leadership during the remainder of the
planning year.
The Executive Committee met more or less continuously throughout
the remainder of the Retreat, its major decision, as previously described,
being to defer a decision on planning structure in the expectation that
such a structure would evolve out of the work of the planning committees.
Development of facilitating mechanisms
for the Planning Process
The decision to adopt an organic, unprogrammed approach to the
planning gradually solidified, although not without stresses and second
thoughts, in the early months of the planning year.
Two major functions of a programmed approach to organizational
planning are the specification of goals to be pursued by the organization
and the delineation of formal and structured relationships among members
of that organization to achieve those goals. The organic model adopted
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by the School, however, dieoarded formal epeoifioation. of goale and
structured means to those goals in favor of emerging goals and infomnal
and flexible means. Thus, a major risk of the organic model was that
chaos would ensue if informal mechanisms did not grow up to replaoe those
usually imposed by formal organisations. The Retreat did faoilitate the
development of three mechanisms which were to contribute signifioantly to
the operation of the organic model:
-The development of informal relationships among participants
sufficient to allow flexible and effective working relationships among
people.
The development of a shared culture and goals sufficient to
provide organisational cohesion to keep the group working together.
The expansion of the Dean's informal power to assure his leader-
ship of the planning.
The significance of these three mechanisms, and the way in which
the Retreat facilitated their development, will be described more fully
below.
Development of informal relationships
Among the wellsprings of the bureaucratic form of organization is
the fact that most people tend to have difficulty working with others,
especially strangers, in relatively ambiguous organizational situations.
Thus boxes, chains of command, and job descriptions are drawn up to tell
people their relative status and responsibilities each to each and to the
organization. This form of artificially imposed relationships is useful
in that it tends to assure a certain predictable level of functioning.
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but it is also limiting in that it prevents the use of one's total per-
sonality and talents in his job, restricting him primarily to behavior
and relationships delineated by the charts.
Thus, while conventional bureaucracy tends to assure a predictable
level of performance, it also tends to restrict the higher level of per-
formance of which people are capable when they are, as personalities,
totally engaged in a task. '*7 The School of Education throughout the plan-
liing year was able to maintain a relatively low level of bureaucracy and
high level of flexibility in its functioning, thus creating the potential
for fuller, more creative relationships among participants which appears
to have been reflected in many of the aspects of its new curriculum.
The fact that this flexible and non—bureaucratic planning struc-
ture led more to creativity than chaos at the School of Education can be
traced in part to the informal relationships developed among people dur-
ing the Retreat. These relationships were built through the random living
and eating arrangements; through the interest group meetings and through
randomly structured task group sessions; through the commvinity meetings
where many had a chance to be seen and heard; through the extracurricular
events, riding, hiking, swimming, fishing, volleyball, football, and card
geunes; and through the evening social events, both planned and spontaneous.
A significant factor contributing to the success of the develop-
ment of informal relationships was the reduction of status distinctions
among those at the Retreat. Since faculty and doctoral students were to
^"^See for instance, Warren G. Bennis, Changing Organizations (New
York, McGraw-Hill, 19^6), pp. 5“7»
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be working together on the planning, it was crucial to the development
of creative and we11
-functioning groups that artificial status distinc-
tions among faculty and between faculty and students be eliminated as
much as possible. Differentiated status of work group members seriously
impairs the potential both for close, trusting relationships and for
effective group problem-solving, since such distinctions tend to limit
the range of behavior available to group members. For exsunple, status-
oriented limitations upon behavior tend to maintain distances between
people which hinder the formation of close, trusting personal relation-
ships—and in problem-solving it is usually difficult for those of higher
status to admit ignorance or uncertainty to subordinates and similarly
for subordinates to criticize the ideas or behavior of superiors. In
this way whole areas of possibly useful feedback become unavailable to
participants.
At the Retreat there appears to have been a conscious effort to
play down artificial statue distinctions. All wore similar name tags
which included only name with no reference to rank or title. Since so
many of the new faculty were young and since a significant number of the
new doctoral students were older, it was very difficult to be certain of
the statue of new acquaintances. Perhaps more important, Allen from the
beginning called all his associates, faculty and student, by their first
naunes and made it clear to all that he wished to be called by his first
name. This norm became firmly established at the Retreat.
^^Ibid.
, pp. 6, 201 & 202
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While there is no objective data available, it is the writer's
perception that by the time the group was ready to return to Amherst a
strong foundation of informal relationships among participants had been
built. Most had made a strong beginning on the development of close
working relationships with all others of similar interests, had developed
personal contacts with many others in the School, and knew, at least by
face and often by name, most in the School and had some idea of their
professional interests.
The importance of all these kinds of relationships to the success
of the planning year cannot be underestimated. They provided a free-
flowing, flexible, informal structure for working relationships, an easy
access through personal acquaintance to needed skills, and a sense of
^^i"ty ia multiple relationships in what was clearly a very diverse group
of people. These relationships also made possible the "juxtaposition" of
people of different fields and interests, an important aspect of Allen's
strategy for creative planning.
Development of shared goals and esprit
Another function of bureaucracy is to assure the cohesiveness of
its members in pursuing a shared set of goals. Typically, bureaucracy
achieves this cohesion by administratively specifying goals and struc-
turally enforcing cohesion, since the School of Education chose to do
neither, these basic organizational needs had to be provided for in other
^^See, for instance. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic
Organizat ions (New York, Oxford Univ, Press, 1947 )» PP« 329-332 and
Bennis, p. 199 *
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ways-and the Retreat made a major contribution in this respect.
Although, as previously pointed out, no goals of sufficient
specificity for implementation were generated at the Retreat, a generally
shared goal appeared to have arisen as a result of the week. This goal
could be stated as simply as "Our mission is to change education." The
emergence of this shared goal can be attributed in large part to Allen's
powerfully articulated vision for the School, to his obvious confidence
in the group to share and carry out the vision, and to his strategic use
of the Hawthorne effect to make participants feel a central part of a
crusade of unprecedented importance. Along with the shared goal came a
sense of cohesiveness arising out of a shared culture
—
partly through the
simple fact that the group had spent a highly intense week in close con-
tact together sharing very similar experiences, and partly through the
informal relationships which developed over the period.
Although, as I will describe below, the sense of shared culture
and goals was exaggerated into a "myth of community," the group did leave
Coloreuio with some real sense of shared purpose and cohesion which in
later days became known as the "Spirit of Colorado" which was to provide
a reserve of centripetal energy and commitment which was drawn upon when
the going got rough during the planning year. And it was needed, since
that year was often stressful and chaotic, often personally threatening,
and at times fraught with conflict for participants. Such tensions might
have blown the commxmity into irreconcilable pieces. The fact that the
^^The controversy, to be described, over the euioption of an interim
constitution is an example of a situation with such potential.
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School was able to hold together in such eituations is attributable, at
least in part, to "the Spirit of Colorado"—the oohesiveness and sense
of shared pixrposes generated at the Retreat.
Expansion of the Dean's informal power
Another means of bringing order out of the potential chaos of
non-bureaucrat ic organization is the development of charismatic leader-
ship in the organization which allows the leader to influence the goals
and processes of the organization not so much through legislated power,
but by his own personal power. 21 in a subsequent section I shall deal
in considerable detail with the means by which Dean Allen was able to
accumulate extraordinary power in the School. His behavior at the Re-
treat, however, made a significant contribution to the development of his
charismatic role in the organization.
Quite simply, the close and prolonged contact between Allen and
School members at the Retreat gave him an opportunity to be himself in
an environment where all could be affected. For most he is a uniquely
powerful and charismatic personality and his very presence, more often
than not, elicited awe, adulation and loyalty from participants. It was
he who had the vision and the audacity to schedule the Retreat, which most
found such a powerful experience. He chaired most of the early meetings,
and when he did not do so more often than not he quickly ceune to be at
the center of discussion. He was central to a Tuesday afternoon debate
over the scheduling of black-white discussion groups, spoke for two hours
21Weber, pp. 360-63
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Wednesday morning on his background, on how he came to accept the Dean-
ship at UMass, and on his actions and strategies during the previous
year, and could be counted upon to make specific positive proposals,
which were accepted far more often than not, when progress foundered.22
Also, he was not modest about creating a mystique about himself or his
potential for power in the School, University, and national educational
scene, (Parts of his Wednesday speech, for example, included hie rapid
rise under difficult circumstances at Stanford, his central role in the
development of the Education Profession Development Act funding guide-
i®- Washington, his demands and conditions prior to accepting the
Deanship, and the ways in which he had been successful, in Stanford,
Washington, and Amherst at getting what he wanted by manipulation of the
bureaucracy,
Equally significant, he was available and accessible throughout
the entire Retreat, In his wild, brilliantly multi-colored African
shirts he appeared to be omnipresent—at interest group meetings, during
free periods, at meals, at Synectics sessions, and even at the late night-
early morning bull sessions, diet drink in hand, seemingly the last one
in bed at night and the first one up in the morning—a source of boundless
energy and enthusiasm. The writer remembers particularly, at 2; 30 one
morning when all but three or four had gone to bed, Allen, during a lull
^^See videotapes, Colorado Retreat, School of Education Media
Center,
^^Ibid , , Dwight W, Allen, "What Makes Dwight Tick," Sept, I9, I968
(under title "Dwight Allen, 'I Have a Dream' Speech"),
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in the conversation, asking brightly, "Suppose we abolished all schools?
What do you think would happen then?"-^nd subsequently crawling into
bed at 5:30, brain aswarm with pre-Illichian fantasies of a deschooled
society.
These personal contacts and ensuing loyalties developed during
the Retreat appear to have built up a string of personal loyalties which
were to stand the Dean in good stead in the months to come when those
bonds were tested by his frequent absences from the School and inacces-
sibility while there. Nor were they merely one-way bonds. In a number
of cases Dean Allen's vinderstanding of, and confidence in, people as a
result of his relationship with them at the Retreat permitted him to re-
main confident of them and helpful to them when they encountered diffi-
cult times during the planning year.
A confirmation of the establishment of Allen's position as leader,
primary initiator, and major source of power in the School might be read
into the report of the agenda of the first Executive Committee meeting
upon return to Amherst, "Today's meeting will be used to give Dwight the
opportunity to express his opinions on how the Council might function
most effectively."^^ On the one hand it does not seem unreasonable for
the committee to consult with the Dean on their functioning. But on the
other hand, the fact that this committee, which was formed to reflect the
will of the total community, should devote its first Amherst meeting in
its entirety to the Dean appears as a clear sign of his enormous power in
2%ichard Clark, "Memorandum to all Faculty and Doctoral Students,"
Sept. 23, 1968 (School files).
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the School. And there is no record of an Executive Ooimittee meeting
called to allow community members to express their opinions on how it
"might function most effectively,"
The rise of the myth of community
A dysfunctional outcome of the Retreat from which the School did
not recover for some six months, was the rise of the myth of community.
The myth was born at the Wednesday evening meeting of the entire group
which was devoted to discussion of the Structure Committee's proposal for
election of an Executive Committee. The discussion had been highly acri-
monious and legalistic until one of the doctoral students, who had been
active in the draft resistance movement and was a strong advocate of the
community form of organization, made an impassioned, articulate, and com-
for honesty and trust in dealings among the group because the
group had, as a result of the Retreat, become a community organized around
a single goal. The speech was enormously effective, partly because of
the speaker's talent, partly because it was what people wanted to hear
since it offered them a way out of the conflict—ridden atmosphere which
had prevailed in decision-making situations. As a result of the speech
the legalistic and specificity quotient of discussions dropped sharply,
replaced with a sense of "we are a community and will trust that these
decisions will be meide fairly euid for the benefit of all,"
The fact was that although the group had made progress toward
community, they had by no means reached it. In the first case, because
there had not been time to build the close and trusting relationships
which are the basis of community, and secondly because issues of old
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faculty-new faculty, black-white, traditional-experimental, and faculty-
student-adminietraticn relatione had by no means been resolved or even
addressed sufficiently to allow a sense of community to arise.
Nevertheless, the speech had its effect and for much of the plan-
ning process the group continued to view itself as a community—with two
serious negative effects: first, the pervasive myth that there was com-
munity prevented the group from taking the necessary steps (open forume,
group work, organization development work, conflict resolution, etc.) to
develop a real community; and secondly, the myth of community seemed to
require consensus decisions, 25 and since there was no real consensus,
there was very little decision-making on the part of the group during the
planning year.
Acceleration of the planning process
An important outcome of the Retreat was the acceleration of the
planning process for the year. Quite simply, the week of intensive plan—
n.lng work was worth a month and probably more of normal day—to—day func-
tioning in Amherst with normal teaching, academic, and family demands on
participants. Further, such '•normal” demands would almost certainly have
affected attendance at meetings, further slowing attempts to organize the
group and implement planning. One might also speculate that under normal
school conditions the opportunity to develop interest groups and informal
relationships with other school members would have been considerably re-
tarded.
^5por example, the unworkable decision-making rule which the Execu-
tive Committee imposed on itself.
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The acceleration of the planning proceee also provided an impor-
tant psychological lift to participants. Most felt, despite s^e of the
frustrations of the Retreat, that the planning had gotten off to a firm
start and there was a sense of momentum carried forward to the rest of
the year.
Genesis of conunitment to combat
institutional racism
Another significant outcome of the Retreat was the beginning of
a heightened awareness of racial issues in participants. This awareness
was to begin a percolating process during the planning year in which in-
dividuals were increasingly to grapple with their own racial biases and
many of the interest groups were to begin to focus work in their fields
on combatting institutional racism—^which many caune to see as the most
pernicious problem in American education. During the planning year, the
most tangible, school—wide outcome of this concern was a decision to de-
vote 40 per cent of recruiting funds for the following year to recruiting
black and minority faculty.
The process in which racial issues and concern became increasingly
important was to culminate in March of 1971 in a school—wide commitment
to the elimination of institutional racism as its first priority.
The beginnings of this heightened awareness seem to have taken
place, as I have previously described, on the plane trip to Colorado.
The next major step began at a late-evening bull session on the first
^°'*A View, A Review, A Vision," in School of Education Profile
,
ed. Lyman B. Brainerd, Jr. (Amherst, n.p., 1971)i P« 29*
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night of the Retreat and reached fruition in the Tuesday evening black-
white awareness session for the entire group. At the Sunday evening bull
session, a small group of white faculty and doctoral students got together
with two of the black participants, Atron Gentry and Leroy Ray, to ex-
press their concern over the fact that it did not appear to them that
those at the Retreat intended to make any effort to deal with racism-a
problem which this group felt was at the core of the problems of American
education. Out of this discussion grew a plan to use the resources of
the West Side Study Center (WSSC) of Pasadena, which Gentry had previously
headed, to run an evening of black-white awareness sessions. 2?
The plan was broached to Allen the following morning and received
his enthusiastic support—and Gentry proceeded to arrange for facilita-
tors from WSSC to come to Colorado. The plan was not, however, accepted
so enthusiastically by some members of the total group who questioned
whether race was of sufficient educational significance to justify the
commitment of an entire evening to it. At a Tuesday afternoon meeting.
Dean Allen became the focus of the defense of the plan, and responded with
a very personal accounting of his feelings about racial differences and
the places in which he felt he' wanted to become more aware and sensitive.^®
The session was held on Tuesday evening, beginning about 11 p.m.
due to the late arrival of the people from WSSC. It opened with a film
in which a number of blacks described their encounters with racism in
^^WSSC was a black community center with considerable experience'.in
facilitating black-white relations.
^^Videotape, Colorado Retreat, "Group Meeting of September 16, I 968 ."
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society, followed by a tough, earthy confirmation of the major pointe of
the film by a WSSO staff member. ^9 Afterwaids there was a series of
black-white discussion groups led by one black, one woman, and a facili-
tstor. For many of those in the groups, especially whites, who had pre-
viously had only narrow interracial experience, the events of that night
were very powerful. For the editor of Tabula Rasa one of the most sig-
nificant events of the Retreat was "meeting myself Tuesday night at about
2 a.m.,"30 another person was shocked at his assumption that the two
blacks in his discussion knew each other, when in fact they did not; and
many were affected by the recognition of similar blind spots in them-
selves. Some of these sessions continued until almost dawn.^"'
Awareness of racial issues was re-emphasized at the Thursday
evening meeting when Louise Hall, a black graduate student, led the meet-
ing as representative of the Executive Committee and when later that eve-
ning Joseph Rhodes, at that time a senior and student body head at Caltech,
black, highly articulate and confident, addressed the group and told it,
the faculty
,
in unambiguous terms that they were criminally
shirking their responsibility as educators by ignoring the plight of
ghetto and minority students to focus on the more esoteric, ivory—tower
aspects of lily-white, suburban education.
Awareness of black—white issues was also provoked by an attempt
to create a Black Caucus early in the week. Although this attempt was
^^videotape, "WSSC Presentation," Sept. I7, I968.
^
^aplas Rosa
,
Sept. 20, I968, p.
31
"Why Retreat," Tabula Rasa, Sept. 26, I968, n.pag.
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ultimately nearly unanimously rejected by the blacks present, it shocked
many members of the white group because up until that time there had
existed a strong norm among participants against the formalisation of
epeoial interest groups in "non-academic" areas in favor of a total com-
munity approaoh. For many, coming to terms with the reasons why some
blacks might feel that a caucus was necessary was an important step in
the understanding of black problems and the black perspective.
Because of the interracial mix of the total group, all events of
the Retreat had the potential for increasing racial awareness and sensi-
tivity by forcing racial interaction where avoideuice had previously been
possible. This fact was particularly important to those with limited
interracial experience, as it tended to illuminate their own previously
submerged racial attitudes.
The writer can recall a number of interest group meetings in
which racial issues came to the fore. But perhaps even more important
to the heightening of racial sensitivities were the social events.
The light Colorado air together with the intensity and excitement
of the planning meetings seemed to energize nearly everyone. As a re—
I
I
suit there was always considerable activity going late into the night
after the evening community meeting. There were always bull sessions
going on in various cabin living rooms, and in others open, free-flowing
parties were taking place. Many of these late-night sessions also con-
I
1 tributed to increasing racial awareness and sensitivity on the part of
I
{
participants.
j
I
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For instance, on Monday night there wae a party in the living
room Of the Ponderoea Lodge32 was apparently initiated by the
blacks and attended approximately equally by blacks and whites, most of
whom were new faculty and doctoral students. There was music and dancing.
and it soon became an exuberant, loud, high-spirited, and smokey party
which reached its peak in a writhing snake dance through the sleeping
quarters of the cottage, directly and unequivocally awakening the old
faculty who had surely felt themselves unfairly assaulted by the noise
emanating from the living room for the previous three hours. Soon there-
after the group was informed by a sleepy and undeniably angry head through
the living room door of its rudeness and Insensitivity
—and the party
quickly subsided thereafter. For those involved, the party was a major
factor in closing the distance between black and white, while at the same
time it surely exacerbated the tension between the old faculty and the
newcomers.
Another party, held after the Talent Show on the final evening
provides another opportunity for insight into black-white relationships.
^ Which "by coincidence" housed most of the black men and old fac-
ulty—two of the three minorities at the Retreat. Women, the third mi-
nority, were also hoiised in a segregated lodge.
^^Closing the gap between old and new was probably one of the im-
plicit goals of the Retreat—and there was some progress in this direction,
particularly in that some old faculty members were able, through the close
personal contacts, to, in effect, switch their allegiance from old to new,
no longer having to depend on the old for support. However, a hard core
of old faculty opposed to the new direction did emerge at the Retreat,
the events in Colorado, one might speculate, contributing more to their
alienation than to their integration. Thus, although some new channels
of communication were opened and some faculty did buy into Allen's vision,
closing the gap between old and new faculty cannot be considered as among
the significant outcomes of the Retreat.
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By that time a group of late-night partyera had pretty muoh been estab-
lished, and they 4 plans for what was to be the "best party of
all" to be held in one of the lodges, not Ponderosa. They had even im-
ported beer for the occasion. The affair was pretty well under way when
someone noted that there were no blacks present. Another commented that
he had seen them meeting together and that they would probably arrive
shortly. However, they did not and someone went to look for them, report-
ing that the blacks were partying in the main meeting hall—which posed a
real dilemma for those present. It was generally assumed that the blacks
had been invited, or at least knew of the party which, like all the
others, was open to everyone—but clearly did not intend to come. All
previous parties had been freely and easily integrated and it confused
most that the blacks had chosen to be separate that final evening. There
was also concern expressed that whites would not be welcome at the blacks'
party. After some more perplexed discussion, the party lapsed back into
what it had been before, although somewhat more subdued, until someone
angrily declared, in a voice that could be heard throughout the room,
"This is too much like too many things I've been to before. I'm going
down there." And he did, and within the hour most of the group at the
cottage had done the same.
A Talent Show, held following a steak roast on the final evening,
provided, for at least this viewer, an incident which seemed to indicate
perhaps some progress in resolving two major internal issues of the group
—
that of the old faculty and of the blacks. An old faculty member appeared
^^As later became apparent, "they" were an all-white group.
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on stage in a carefully-lettered T-shirt "Old Faculty is Beautiful" and
the audience burst first into laughter and then into applause.
In summary, the events of the Retreat, both planned and spontane-
ous, made it difficult for all but the most encapsulated of participants
to remain untouched by some awareness of the implications of racism in
his own attitudes and behavior and also for education.
The Return to Amherst
The Spirit of the Retreat
and a Return to Reality
The events of the last eight hours of the Retreat both exempli-
fied the spirit of the Retreat ajid provided a dreunatic contrast of pos-
sible outcomes when this spirit, which it was hoped would be the spirit
of the new school, clashed with two different types of reality.
It began at the Colorado Springs airport when the group assembled
to board the plane—to find that the 707 was to be an hour late. Chad
got out his guitar, Gerry his melodian, Mark some drums and the singing
began—"This Land is Your Leuid," "We Shall Overcome," "Where Have All the
Flowers Gone," "Blue-tailed Fly" and the like. In the foregroxind a par-
ticipant with videotape camera added to the scene with a series of pre-
carious perches to secure \inusual perspectives on the scene. Little by
little others in the airport, an airman second class and his wife and
young baby, a burly weathered Colorado rancher, a black Army corporal, a
huge woman with unbelievably curly hair, and even the two state troopers
in attendance at the airport began first to join the singing, later, many,
to join hemds with the UMass group in concentric semi-circles around the
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r.u.ic.35 It was a heady ti„e for many participants, a result both of the
singing and the integration of the nameless outsiders into the group_a
portent that perhaps the group could, indeed, make an impact on the broad,
vast and countless numbers of people in America.
The airplane was a different story. Many, remembering the trip
over, knowing the group was now much more together, anticipated it as the
climax of the entire trip—but the captain of the plane had other ideas.
The focus of ambitions for the return trip was "the other group" which
periodically during the Retreat had met at "the other place" and "the
other time." A day earlier they had issued a manifesto to the community
which included;
Regulations for the Return Flight to Amherst
1. All first-class cabin accommodations will be resei*ved for
members of the other group.
2. Use of Public Address Equipment on the plane
—
A pre-screening apparatus (to be filled out in triplicate)
will be used to determine your qualifications for using the
P.A. system.
3* Use and Misuse of Stewardi
—
a. All stewardi, with the exception of those making the
rank of junior stewardess on the last flight, will be
confined to the first-class cabin.
b. Consequently, all misuse of stewardi will be limited to
the first-class cabin.
Reality intruded upon the first use of the public address system,
when the announcement reiterating the other group’s flight regulations
was cut off, and an angry voice from the flight deck intruded.
This is Captain . I will not permit unauthorized use of
the cabin communication system. That system is intended only for
routine announcements of the captain and crew, and emergency use.
^^ideotape, "Colorado Springs Airport," Sept. 21, I 968 .
^^"Total Bag Sacks It to the Community," Tapias Rosa , Sept. 20,
1968
,
pp. TR-1 & TR-2.
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attempt to interfere with thenormal operation of this aircraft's equipment or its personnel.
The group had met its first uptight, autocratic, traditional
School-master type in a week. Many had forgotten such types existed and
certainly did not expect to meet one on this charmed journey to the West.
But, not about to admit defeat by one man over I50, even if he
was the pilot, the group, through Dean Allen, submitted three requests/
demands to the pilot.
1) That the group be permitted to use the cabin communication
system——since the captain clearly had an override switch
which would allow him to talk whenever he wished.
2) That passengers be allowed to visit the cockpit.
3) That in view of the full plane, passengers be permitted to
assist the stewardi in their assigned tasks.
The latter request elicited another lecture from the pilot sprin-
kled with references to the FAA, the enormous responsibility of the pro-
fessional crew, and clear inferences of his conviction that if any one of
the 150 entered the cockpit the plane would soon, unquestionably, be wing-
ing its way to Cuba. And so, powerless in their sullen defiance, and
somewhat shocked by the defeat of the previously all-powerful Dean, the
group solemnly repressed their high spirits, and with resignation per-
mitted themselves to be carried back to Amherst.
"The Ten-Year Projection "
The Dream that was Dreamed
Often during the Retreat Allen held talked of rapid and thorough-
going change, of "dreaming big" and audaciously, and of "going down with
flying colors if we have to go down."
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Kvidenoe that at the Retreat the group did, in fact, "dreajj big"
and some of the specific hopes, plans, and expectations which made up
that dream can be found in the -Ten Year Pro jectiori' prepared in October
for the University Provost by members of the Executive Committee at the
request of Dean Allen. This projection was not subjected to any review
by the total community. However, in the writer's opinion it did reflect
the views of the majority of the group.
Among the proposals of this document are:
——We will be, in part, a resident center for teacher training
for teaching at all levels from the two—year—old through all
aspects of continuing education for adults.
We will not, as a school, espouse any one approach to educa-
tion or one area of interest.
“At present we have under planning twenty areas of activity
[the centers], and would expect to see that number at least
double in ten years.
—The preparation of [educational personnel] will be character-
ized by pluralism, alternative entry and exit points, fluctu-
ating roles and responsibilities, aesthetically pleasing
learning experiences, and a level of involvement and activity
that far exceeds the current norm.
—^Heavy use will be made of technology.
—^Par less of our teaching at UMass will tedce place in the class-
room and far more will take the form of experiential learning.
—More than half of our activities will be non-resident including
satellite schools of education throvighout the U.S. and abroad.
The projection goes on to predict in the tenth year a resident
faculty of 400 and a non-resident faculty of 1,050; 1,100 graduate assist-
ants, 1,700 resident graduate students, 3,000 resident undergraduate
students, 1,500 non-resident graduate students in degree programs and
15,000 non-resident graduate students part-time; 200 secretaries; a
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* 15
,
000,000 investment in technical equipment, *35.000,000 in physical
plant, and a $17,000,000 annual operating budget.^?
With dreams of such dimension, and with a planning process and
the mechanisms to support that process well begun, the group began to
undertake the rigors and decisions of the planning year.
^^Summarized from The School of Education; A Ten Year Projection
([Oct. 14i 1968 ] School files).
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CHAPTER VI
ACADEMIC REFORM
Introduction
One of the two major tasks of the planning year was that of aca-
demic reform the creation of new educational programs together with
overall academic policies to govern those programs which would be more
appropriate to the needs of students and of society.
This task had. two components;
—One conceptual in nature—the conceptualization and development
of the educational programs and policies.
—One political in nature—securing approval of the new programs
and policies first by the School as a whole and then by the various Uni-
versity bodies which controlled academic programs and policies.
As described in Chapter V, the general organizational plan for
dealing with these tasks which emerged at the Retreat was to have the
development of specific programs primarily the responsibility of the
planning committees. There was, at the Retreat, no specific allocation
of responsibility for the development of overall academic policy and for
political concerns, except that such matters presumably fell under the
mandate of the Executive Committee and were, of course, of vital interest
to the Dean.
A review of the events of the post-Retreat planning year shows a
relatively distinct chronological ordering of focus of the School's ac-
tivities into the following three areas.
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Prom October through January major emphasis was on the develop-
ment of programs in specific interest areas by the planning committees.
Prom late January throxigh mid-April major emphasis was on the
synthesis of the individual programs into a coherent whole and develop-
ment of school-wide academic policies by which to govern those programs.
^Prom mid-April through May emphasis was on gaining approval of
the finished product (called the Interim Catalogue or "the package") by
the total School and appropriate University bodies.
The remainder of this chapter will be organized along these three
chronological divisions with a final section of summary and evaluation.
Program Planning; The Planning Committees
October 1968 - January 1 969
Introduction
The conceptualization phase of the planning year contained two
distinct components:
Acaidemic Policy Pormulation
1 ) Identification of the appropriate clientele for the School
2 ) Definition of the major educational foci of the School
3) Adoption of relevant grading and evaluation techniques
4) Determination of appropriate standards of degree granting
Program Planning
1 ) Creation of appropriate educational programs including
curriculum, specific content, teaching methods, and program
evaluation
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In accordance with the organic planning model adopted at the
Retreat, the initial focus of the School's activities was on program
planning with the idea that viable decisions about overall academic
policies could best be made in the context of the specific programs de-
veloped by the planning committees. In this way the academic policies
adopted could be made more nearly consistent with the programs themselves
and appropriate to the clientele, educational foci, and desired standards
of the aggregate of programs. It should also be pointed out that the
decision to focus on specific programs was consistent with the desires
of most participants, who appeared far more interested in working on
programs in their own particular field of interest than on the more dif-
fuse problems of overall academic policy.^
However, as will be described, during the planning year the School
as a whole was not able to shift its emphasis from the program planning
phase to the overall academic policy formulation phase. Program plan-
ning was in fact by far the major focus of the School's energies during
the planning year—first on the basis of time alone, since the initial
four months of the planning year were devoted almost entirely to program
planning and the final four months saw the work of these committees con-
tinue while the package preparation and approval process was going on—
and secondly on the basis of participation, since nearly every member of
the planning staff was involved in prograun planning while only a rela-
tively few were concerned with the package preparation and approval
process.
Vs previously cited, Dwight R. Ladd, Change in Educational Policy
(New York, McGraw-Hill, 1970)i P» 214*
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To describe the work of the planning committees is either a ve.,
long story, tracing the development of each, or a relatively short one,
summarising the process as a whole. Since the focus of this study in-
cludes the process of organizational reform and the change strategies of
the Dean, I shall attempt to work a viable compromise in length by focus-
ing first on the influence of the Dean on the work of the planning com-
mittees and then on a summary of the processes by which these committees
developed their programs.
Influence of the Dean on
Program Planning Process
In retrospect, one can view major portions of the outcome of the
planning year as primarily preordained by the Dean but also channeled
and directed by his leadership, although without attempting to directly
control the form and content of programs being planned.
It was preordained in the sense that the Dean had set the goals,
parameters, and to a large extent the style, tone, and even much of the
content of the academic innovation of the planning year by his choice of
faculty and doctoral students and his decision to constitute them as the
basic planning group.
Once this group arrived on campus, the Dean provided the direc-
tion and parameters of their efforts primarily by judicious use of his
change strategies (to be discussed in detail in Chapter VIII ) and by
articulately communicating the wide parameters under which this planning
group could operate.
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The most dramatic statement of possibilities for the planning
year was intrinsic to the Dean-s statement of the discontinuation of all
courses, programs, degrees and requirements as of September I969. This
decision, which the Dean reiterated many times to individual faculty and
students and confirmed in the initial School meetings and at the Retreat
took written form in the Dean's memorandum of July 23, I966, as follows:
has
catalog of the School of Educationbeen discontinued as of September 1, I969 and the new cata-
School
replanning of the curriculum of the
opportunity among SchoolsOf Education to be imaginative and creative across the fullspectrum of educational concerns. We have the capacity to de-sign progr^s leading to quantum improvements in the field of
education.*^
In addition, in both public and private pronouncements the Dean
emphasized both the wide range of possibilities available and his views
of what the future School might look like. He talked often of innova-
tion and experimentation, especially of his conviction that much of exist-
ing education was inappropriate and that new programs were being stifled
because they were subject both to premature evaluation and a standard of
evaluation not applied to existing programs. He spoke of flexible pro-
grams, alternative routes to specific educational goals, of wide ranges
of curriculum options and alternatives, and he encouraged the existence
of competing programs within the School. He talked of a network of field
training sites and of the potential of the computer and videotape for
pDwight W. Allen, Memorandum to Faculty and Planning Staff, Sub-
ject; "Strategies and Logistics for Planning" (mimeo, July 23, I968),
p. 1 (School files). It is an interesting and significant footnote that
this decision, which had the effect of galvanizing so many into action,
was not within the Deein's power to make. It is also indicative of his
perceived power that no one chose to challenge it.
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off-ca„pus education. He alec talked of hie conviction that education
could and ehould be an inetrucent of eocial refo™, with particular ea-
phaeis on urban and racial probleae, and of hie hope that aan, of the new
programs would challenge the basic assumptions on which education had
been based.
All indications are that the major influence of the Dean in the
work of the planning committees was of this type_to encourage innova-
tion, experimentation, and creative thinking and to attempt to set over-
all goals for the planning. He did not, to the writer's knowledge,
attempt to influence membership of the planning committees, the compo-
nents of the specific programs being developed, or the emerging education
foci of the School as defined by the interests of the various planning
committees.
Faculty members thus had unprecedented (in terms of conventional
academic organizations) freedom to direct their own activities and to
develop programs in their field of interest, a factor which tended to
increase the potential for the development of innovative programs and
which also, in retrospect, had a dysfunctional effect on the development
of governmental structures (to be described in the following chapter).
The Dean clearly took a hands-off approach to the work of the
committees and, in fact, in its final form it seems clear that the School
was far more humanistically oriented than he would have preferred, less
interested in the technical skills of teaching, and more interested in
graduate education than teacher education. On the other hand, it did
fulfill those goals of innovation, experimentation, and alternatives
which were hie major interest and toward which he put most of hie influence.
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Work of the Planning Committees
The planning committees were the outgrowths of the interest
groups formed at the Retreat. In early October the following planning
committees existed:^
Administration
Aesthetics
Compensatory Education
Early Childhood
Financial Support
Goals
Guidance and Counseling
Higher Education
Human Relations
Humanistic Studies
Innovations in Education
International Education
Most faculty and doctoral students focused their efforts in one
planning committee, while maintaining membership in one to three others.
During the fall and early winter the work of the planning committees
went on—the general goal being the development by the spring of specific
programs for students in the various interest areas. Most committees met
two or three times weekly and were characterized by a core group of five
to eight people with others floating in and out. New committees formed,
occasionally by the development of a new interest area, more often by
the merging of two or more existing groups, and also by the formation of
"rump" committees dissatisfied by the work of the original committee in
that interest area.
M.E.T.E.P. (Model Elementary
Teacher Education Progreim)
Reeuiing
Research
Sociological, Historical, Philosophi-
cal Pormdations
Student Centered Teacher Education
Technology
Theater 2000
Urban Education
Vocational Education
files)
derived from data collected for The Ten-Year Projection (author's
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Not all, especially among the faculty, participated equally i„
the planning process. Rslative participation was determined to a cer-
tain extent by interest in the planning, but mere by a pre-condition
which existed primarily along old faculty-new faculty lines-that of
responsibility for the conduct of the day-toMiay operations of the School.
Soon after the return from Colorado it was formally decided in
a faculty meeting that both faculty and doctoral students would divide
their time between "planning" (one-third) and "maintenance" (approximately
two-thirds).4 Maintenance activities were composed primarily of servic-
ing the existing undergraduate and graduate programs, teaching courses,
advising, and supervising student teachers. Each person was to consult
his own conscience, as well as his own sense of what the rewards of each
type of behavior would be, to decide specific time allocations for him-
self.
In fact there was less choice for the old faculty members than
the new. The old faculty, in effect, were forced to take most of the
responsibility for "maintenance." Their courses were listed in the cata-
logue and students had been pre—registered for them the previous spring.
These courses comprised the major predictable offering of the School,
and thus the old faculty were in a position where whatever planning they
did was either at the expense of their regularly scheduled activities or
in addition to them.
^"Minutes of the Faculty Meeting," Tuesday, Sept. 24, 1968, Phillip
L. Edgecomb, Recorder, Tabula Rasa
,
October 4» 1968, p. 1 (School files
and University ArchivesTT
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The new faculty were in a far better position to devote their
efforts to planning. Few were committed to, or needed for, any mainte-
nance courses at all. Many of those who were so committed turned their
courses either into
he types of innovation in which they were concerned. Most others ran
planning courses in their own • 4.xn fields of interest or as planning seminars.
The planning doctoral students were in the best position of all
to participate in the planning process. Approximately 65 were receiving
stipends from the School .
5
Normally such stipends carry the condition
that one-half time be devoted to the speoific activity from which the
funding was derived. In order to emphasize the planning process Allen
had, from the beginning, made it clear that for the planning year doctoral
students were not committed to the specific activity from which their
funding was derived, but rather they were to involve themselves with the
planning in whatever area most interested them on the assumption that
manpower for funded projects would come from students naturally inter-
ested in these programs—a situation which put considerable strain on
some of the project directors.
:^y and large the planning doctoral students responded with com-
mitment and enthusiasm to the opportunity to follow their interests and
talents and as a group came to play a central part in the work and de-
cisions of most of the planning groups.
The planning was carried on in the planning groups in varying
ways with varying degrees of success. Somey probably a minority, became
derived from internal summary of "Doctoral Student Stipends"
(mimeo [Pali, I968], School files).
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highly structured with strong leadership, process charts, routine assign-
ments, and decision points while most were far more loose and free-
flowing. Perhaps as a generalization the least successful planning was
done by those groups which viewed the planning as entirely a theoretical
undertaking_a program to be devised out of "heads” of the committee in
combination with appropriate readings. The basic difficulty of this ap-
proach was that its output, at best a position paper or other written
material, provided little in the way of tangible evidence of success to
motivate further effort. This defioienoy was oompounded by the fact that
many faculty and students, heady with a feeling of freedom from what they
saw as overly rigid academic discipline, and also feeling pressured by
time constraints, did very little in the way of research or preparation
of position papers. For instance, as one indioator, the number of books
loaned by the Education Library dropped 12§ per cent from the previous
year, despite the substantial increase in enrollment during the planning
year.^
In many cases planning committee meetings of the theoretically
oriented groups consisted of little more than ongoing bull sessions re-
flecting the biases of those present, and worse, since the meetings them-
selves were usually undocumented, the same issues were often being
addressed, without conclusions being reached as membership shifted from
meeting to meeting*
This combination of disorganized meetings, inconsistent attend-
ance, and theoretical approaches was sufficiently prevalent so that by
derived from library records. School of Education Library, Louise
Addison, Head Librarian*
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December of the planning year eome membere of the oommunity were openly
predicting that the "new school* would represent a massive reinvention
of the wheel.
The more productive planning activities appear to have been
carried out by those groups who took a more action-oriented approach to
planning. This action planning approach involved the various groups in
one or more of three levels. Some groups wrote proposals for outside
funding. Although only one small proposal was successful during the
first year, 7 preparation of these proposals had the advantage over the
theoretical approach of providing "real world" incentives for groups to
agree upon goals and specifics of programs. It also provided them feed-
back on their ideas from outside sources. This approach was used, for
instance, by the Administration, Aesthetics, Humanistic Education, Human
Relations, and Urban Education groups as well as a niunber of others.
A second, more action-oriented level of action planning was the
design and offering of new courses at the School itself. Some of these
were designed and implemented in the fall by parts of planning committees
which had constituted themselves as seminars, others were planned in the
fall and offered in the spring. Perhaps the most dramatic example of
this kind of action planning was the development of the first "marathon”
an alternative educational fonnat which was to become an integral part of
the School's curriculiun. In an early planning session for a "block"
course in the history of the secondary school, a doctoral student teaching
^Many of these initial efforts did, in the second and third year,
turn into fully-funded projects, most notably those in Humanistic Educa-
tion and Administrative Leadership.
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assistant suggested a ••smorgasbord" day for the course-^ day in which
students could go to a wide variety of activities and events to get an
idea of the range and variety of the activities of the faculty and doc-
toral students. The idea was expanded to include activities sponsored
by all faculty, doctoral students, and even outsiders and open to all
at the School, University and outside. Approximately 4,200 people at-
tended this ^rathon I, originally intended for 225,8 and described as
"part carnival, part happening, part educational fair.^^ The Marathon
proved to be a highly successful event which dramatically commiinicated
much of the emerging ethos of the "new schooP^-^ctivity, excitement,
experimentation, diversity, multiple options, and non-linearity—and,
expanded to a week, became a semi-annual event in the School's curricu-
lum.
Another "action planning" event relative to the School's academic
processes was the fact that at the end of the fall semester the School
was surprised and the University surprised and shocked to find that a
vast majority (75 per cent was the general rumor) of the grades for stu-
dents in School of Education courses were A's, including, it was said,
an A for a student who had not been to a class all fall. This ratio of
A's was astronomically above the University average. 9 This situation,
Q
A Thrust Toward Relevance [mimeo, the first written description
of the "new school," written late October I 968 ] (School files), p. 6 .
have no documentation of the validity of this very prevalent
rumor. The closest validation I can find is in the minutes of the Faculty
Senate meeting at which the package was approved. A senator asked Dean
Allen if it was true that the School had given 75 per cent A's in the
fall, and Allen answered that he did not know the exact percentage, but
that an unusual nvimber of A's had been awarded. (Minutes of the 143rd
Faculty Senate Meeting
,
Third Session, May 29i I 969 [.University Archives],
p. 38.
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which aroee spontaneously, was apparently the result of a dissatisfac-
tion with conventional grading on the part of „ost of the School of Edu-
cation faculty.
One might speculate that this situation may have played a major
part in the relatively easy acceptance by the Faculty Senate of the
School's proposal in the "package" for pass-fail grading for all courses
—since senators may have feared that if they did not approve pass-fail,
they would be rewarded with an avalanche of A's and a trickle of P's for
School of Education students in the future, thus hopelessly corrupting
the all-important student cumulative average—and this issue was brought
up in the Faculty Senate Meeting at which the package was approved.
(See footnote 9»
)
A third level of action planning was the design and implementa-
tion of programs in the field which was carried out by a number of inter-
est groups. Perhaps the most notable example of this approach was carried
out by the Urban Education group which designed and ran a teaching in-
ternship program in the Hartfordj Connecticut public school system under
a $10,000 grant secured from the New World Foundation.
As a generality, the action planning approach proved superior to
theoretical planning for a number of reasons. First, it provided plan-
ning groups with clear goals toward which to direct their efforts and
feedback on the success of their work. Secondly, it became clear that
developing programs on an entirely theoretical level, even if done rigor-
ously, very quickly hit a point of diminishing returns without a testing
ground for the ideas generated. Thirdly, with the extensive and often
conflicting demands made on participants' time during the planning year.
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the demands of commitments to action programs tended to take priority
over hull session approaches. And finally there was another, very prac-
tical reason for the greater success of the action approach. It was
more visible to the Dean and also more consistent with his approach to
planning. Thus he tended to encourage and support those programs being
developed on an action basis over those that had not produced anything
tangible.
Perhaps the beet available interim review of the progress of the
planning committees can be found in a series of committee statue reports
submitted to Dean Allen in the late fall and published in the January 28,
^9^9 I edition of Tabula Rasa . Taken as a whole, these reports are a
disappointing reflection of the three months' work of I50 people (which
may, of course, be a reflection of the reporting rather than the work
itself). Many contain only a description of purposes at a high level of
generality, high-soionding rhetoric, and little indication of specific
program components or resources available to or needed for carrying out
the programs.
Records of the products of the planning committees can be fovind
in the "French Committee" proposals (the original submissions by the
committees) and in the Interim Catalogue
,
Section I, pp. (as these
submissions were amended by the committees and packeige writers). In the
writer's opinion these documents, althotigh considerably improved over the
interim reports, are not as a group particularly impressive given the
time and manpower available to prepare them. Many abo\ind in vague
^^chool files
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generalities, educational jargon, pretentious rhetoric with small sub-
stance to support it—and precious little documentation or evaluation
procedures—nor did many address the problem of available resources.
The above, it should be pointed out, is not necessarily an in-
dictment of the programs themselves, but rather of the "paper product"
of the planning process. In fact, in the writer's opinion, some veiy
effective programs were written up very badly and vice versa.
Preparation of the Interim Catalogue
January - March 1~9^
Introduction
The "Package" vras to be the culmination of the academic planning
portion of the planning year and was to contain a description of the
School's academic organization, programs, guidelines and policies; a
rationale for them; and a specific description of the courses to be
offered.
Work on the package began in January 19^9 under the direction of
the Executive Committee, faltered in mid—February, and picked up again
in early March when Dean Allen took a major role in the remainder of the
process which ended internally on April 11, I969, with the approval of
the package by the School of Education Assembly and externally on May 29,
19691 with the approval of the University Faculty Senate.
Preparation of the package had three major components:
1) Collection of data from the planning committees on proposed
programs and courses in a form usable in the report.
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2) Development of guidelines and academic policies for the
School as a whole*
3) Conceptualization and writing of the document itself.
Collection of Planning Committee Data
Upon return from Christmas vacation, most planning committees
had been aware that information on their programs would be needed for
preparation of the package, but no specific directions or outlines for
the package preparation process were given them until January 29, when
the Executive Committee submitted a memo called ’’Programs and Offerings
for September; Proposal for Refinement and Approval Process (for commu-
nity action, February 3, I969).”
This memorandum proposed that:
In essence, ANY and EVERY anticipated offering of our School
in September, 1969* should be submitted in five (5) copies . • .
on Friday, February 7, I969. It is anticipated that three (3)
categories of submission will be made;
(a) existing programs which are proposed for continuation
next year.
(b) new programs which are proposed for initiation dtiring
the next academic year.
(c) existing and new offerings which are basically independ-
ent of any particular program and which are proposed offerings
for the next academic year.
The memo went on to outline guidelines for submissions which were
to include:
fa^ a clear rationale
(b) a definite statement of objectives
(c) identification of student target groups
(d) courses or experiences which would be included
(e) personnel desired (using neunes, and indicating the level
of involvement of each).
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The memo also asked oommittees to include, if possible, antici-
pated enrollments, expected sources of financial support for graduate
students, personnel requirements for the first year, and "a comment re-
garding the utility of (a) a modular system of course offerings and (b) a
portfolio record for the proposed offering."
The memo also proposed a two-step process for review and approval
of submissions;
First, a reading committee, soon called the French Committee
(after its Chairman, Nathaniel French), was set up to review and rate
proposals on the basis of clarity and comprehensiveness. This committee
was to submit its review and ratings to the community on February I4 and
continue to review and rerate rewritten proposals through February 28.
This committee was made up of three new faculty, two old faculty, and
two students (one black), one of whom was on the Executive Committee.
Secondly, another review committee was set up to "make written
recommendations to the community by March I4, I969, on which programs
should be approved for September 1, I969." That committee was charged
with making its decision based on;
1 ) The French Committee ratings
2) The Community's priorities, both implicit and explicit
as determined through hearings and/or solicited written
statements
3) Pre-existing commitments, if any
4) Available and potential resources
5) Students served
6) Any other factor deemed relevant.
This committee was also charged with defining "any processes
seen as relevant and desirable for [carrying out its charge in such a
manner] that community sentiment is accurately reflected and such that
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all offerings will reflect the best quality which we can prcduce at this
stage of development.” The E^cutive Committee recommended that this
group consist of the three Deans and four elected community members.
H
The proposal was passed at the February 4 Faculty meeting, with
one amendment—that the second review committee be the Executive Commit-
tee rather than the three-dean-plus-four committee proposed. ’2
action on the part of the community could be construed as indicating
their unwillingness to let the Executive Committee turn the review proc-
ess over to a group which the Dean could presumably control. In fact,
the Executive Committee never, as a whole, acted as a review committee-
which function was handled by the writing committee, which included the
three deans and was selected by Allen and the Executive Committee (and
contained two Executive Committee members).
The French Committee was formed and performed its charge—-as
will be described below.
The Executive Committee memorandum of January 29 is indicative
of a condition that was prevalent throughout the planning year, but was
particularly characteristic of the package preparation process——one of
unpreparedness for decision points, extreme haste, and tight and often
unrealistic deadlines. This memorandum was circulated on January 29, a
Wednesday, for approval by the faculty the following Monday (the meeting
was delayed until Tuesday) and submission of reports, expected to be a
^
^Summarized from "Memorandum from the Executive Committee," Jan. 29,
1969 (School files).
^^"Paculty Meeting, February 4i Phillip L. Bdgecomb, Re-
corder, Tabula Rasa, Feb. 21, 1969» n.pag.
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summary of the entire planning work of the committees, due four days
later-with the French Committee to complete its review of those doou-
merits a week later.
The haste, confusion and unrealistic deadlines became evident
on February I 9 , five daysafter the French Committee Report was supposedly
due-when the French Committee reported orally to the Executive Committee
that there was a "misunderstanding of what should be submitted. All
courses old or new should have been presented to the French Committee
by February 7 , 1969 . Submit immediately if you have not as yet done
This oral report also gave a first inkling of a condition which
was to increasingly characterize most of the package preparation process
that of low participation, when it observed that "only one-half of the
community were represented in the proposals." The committee's report
also pointed out three other factors which were to be viewed by many as
significant weaknesses of the finished package, that little attention
was paid to the task of certifying teachers, that most proposals did not
with many students, and that little attention was paid to evalua-
tion.
The French Committee finally reported, a report which expressed
clear dissatisfaction with most of the proposals, in an undated memo
imder the title, "There is less here than meets the eye." The report
^
^"Faculty Meeting, Feb. 19t ^9^9 t" Phillip L. Edgecomb, Recorder,
Tabula Rasa
.
Feb. 28, 1969i n.pag.
“•^ibid.
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did not refer to epeoifio proposals, whioh had been returned to their
co^ittee rated 0-10, but the ™emo was openly sarcastio in tone, inolud-
ing a definition of the word "rationale," for those who seeningly did
not understand it, with a glossary of 50 "amusing terms" found during
the reading, and a hope "that the good ideas in the School of Education
can be translated into understandable English." ^5
However, by February 24 the task of generating somewhat \miform
committee reports was apparently under way, and, as indicated in the
minutes of the faculty meeting that day,^6 Executive Committee had
turned its attention to the development of overall guidelines, policy,
and rationale for the School and also developing criteria for inclusion
or exclusion of programs for the package.
Development of Academic Policies
The task of designing overall acad.emic guidelines and policy had
been handled primarily as a part of the conceptualization and writing of
the package as a whole—a task which had been handled beginning in early
January by a doctoral student in consultation with an Executive Committee
member. By February 24 they had produced two major products. First, a
recommendation that the package be viewed as a "progress report" rather
than defended as a finished product and, as a part of this approach, to
propose a two-year experimental period to be evaluated by a 15-man
^^French Committee, "There is less here than meets the eye" (mimeo,
undated [February 1969]f School files).
1
^"Faculty Meeting, Feb. 24, 1969i" Phillip E. Edgecomb, Recorder,
Tabula Rasa, Feb. 28, 1969i n.pag.
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Evaluation Committee (made up equally of School of Education, University,
and outside representatives). And secondly, they had produced a rough
first draft of proposed major school policies and guidelines, together
with a rationale.
The next step then was to find a method for getting the partici-
pation of all School members in decisions about the overall academic
policies and practices of the School. During the year all of the basic
innovations, the modular system, the portfolio system, pass-fail, and
the K-12 undergradiiate program had been discussed generally in the fac-
ulty meetings, but no concrete research had. been done and no firm deci-
sions reached.
This step was a difficult one because the organization of the
pl^^aing process, focused as it was on specific programs of the interest
groups, had left the overall decisions about school policies unexplored,
and there was, at that point, no process developed for dealing with such
questions except for presentation of them to the entire group in faculty
meetings.
On February 24 the Executive Committee made a niunber of proposals
for expanding participation in the decision-making process. It proposed
that the School spend an entire week focusing on questions of "policy,
procedure, and principle." It appointed a series of three-man commit-
tees, two each of which were to discuss and report, independently, on
the major issues facing the School, including "Decision-Making," "Indi-
vidual Freedom," "Degrees and Target Student Groups," "Portfolios,"
”’’^Ibid.
225
"Competing Programs," "Admissions," and "Modular Credit. "’8
ports were completed and submitted to the writing team. The week of
focus on questions of "policy, prccedure, and principle" produced a num-
ber cf hearings but by and large it appeared that the ncrmal work of the
School continued unaffected.
At approximately this point, the morale of the Executive Commit-
tee and the School hit a low point, primarily because of the enormity of
the task confronting it, the absence of successful processes for dealing
with it, and a feeling of inadequacy about accumulating the data and
making the decisions which would be needed to complete the Package. Two
actions on the part of the Dean succeeded in returning enough energy to
the organization to get it moving again. First, he held two meetings of
faculty and doctoral students in which he listened to frustrations and
made proposals, but more important constantly reinforced the theme that
the group was not as badly off as it thought it was. He used a number
of times as an analogy to the School of Education, the image of an in-
ternal combustion motor which, although it works at a relatively small
percentage of its theoretical capacity, is nevertheless able to get the
job done.
But more important than the rhetoric, was his presence. In late
February, a delegation from the writing team, which was probably the
most discouraged group of all, had approached him saying that the deci-
sions for the package would never be made unless he stayed at School and
1ft
^Memorandum; From the Executive Council to the Commxinity, Sub-
ject; "Three Man Committees" (mimeo. Mar. 4| ^9^9
t
School files).
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participated fully in the process. He agreed to cancel hie appointments
for the week of March 9 and give hie full attention to the package. He
did so, and for the remainder of the preparation process was clearly its
leader. After a series of hearings (again sparsely attended), after a
re-review of the planning coimiittee proposals, and after submission of
position papers by various members of the community, the writing commit-
tee, which consisted of three new faculty, one old faculty member, and
three doctoral students, met with Dean Allen and often the two assistant
deans and during the week of March 9 forged that data into the policy,
principles, procedure, and guideline proposals for the interim catalogue.
The major decisions of the initial version of the package were
only slightly amended during the review process which ensued. The fol-
lowing is a summary of the final version of the package (with significant
amendments noted). It is included both to give the reader a sense of
this document which constituted the culmination of the School's planning
yeari and also to give an idea of the scope of decisions made by Dean
Allen and the writing committee. All policies in the following descrip-
tion were made by this committee—although some of the issues, but by no
means all, had been discussed, but never voted upon, in faculty meetings.
Summary of Interim Catalogue
Section I of the package included:
—A specific request for "a charter to experiment" (p. I7)
—A rationale for experimentation based primarily on the inability
of existing educational approaches to prepare students for the
rapidly changing future (p. 5)
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—The contention that the School
its means innovative (p, 6 )
s goals were conventional, but
—A summary profile of School members,
diversity (pp. 7 & 8 )
emphasizing quality and
A description of School activities during the year (featuring
Off-campus progress, and funded
—An apology for the bad cross-campus relationships,
grading policies, and bureaucratic chaos (pp. 11 &
incongruous
12 )
A statement of priorities—First priority: experimentation,
research, and teaching at the graduate level. Second prioritvt
undergraduate education (pp. I4 & I5)
^A three-page description of evaluation schemata ("The freedom
to experiment carries with it the mandate to assess accurately
and conscientiously the results of that experimentation.")
which included evaluation of faculty by the students and of
the administration by faculty and doctoral students (pp. 18-20 )
Following the above was a forty-page listing of the "Instruc-
tional Staff" (faculty and doctoral students) together with one-paragraph
summaries of their interests—which was intended as a means of communi-
cating the breadth and depth of the staff's interests and also of rein-
forcing the notion that the real catalogue of the School was its people
(pp. 21 -62 ).
The document then took up the specific details of the proposed
organization and academic policies, the following of which could be de-
scribed as innovative and/or controversial:
—the Interim Constitution which included:
a) the creation of the Education Assembly as the decision-
making body of the School. This assembly was to be made
up of faculty, all doctoral students in full-time resi-
dence, representatives from other departments of the Uni-
versity, and some 25 tindergradiiates and graduate students.
including doctoral and other students in the assembly,
and by the fact that they far outnumbered the faculty.
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students were theoretically given control of the decision-
making of the School by this proposal (p. 63 )
b) the inclusion of faculty and doctoral students as "Instruc-tional Staff" (p. 63)
c) a policy of non-confidentiality on "internally generateddocuments" (the initial proposal had been non-confidentiality
on all documents) (p, 64)
d) a statement of organizational policy goals—emphasizing
autonomy and participation (pp. 64-66)
—Scheduling of two one—week marathons annually (p, 66)
—Pass—fail grading for all courses (p, 66)
portfolio system for graduate students to replace courses
and credit hours (p, 67)
—A modular credit system for undergraduates graded pass-no
record as an alternative to the standard semester course for-
mat (p. 67)
—A statement that there would be no formal distinction between
graduate and undergreiduate courses (p« 68)
—A new doctoral program, based on a series of three-man faculty
committee approvals, in effect that which had been followed by
the planning doctoral students during the year (pp. 69-72)
—A statement on admissions, including a statement that either
the Dean's office or a faculty member might accept a student
who did not meet the normal criteria
—A statement that the School would offer the Ph.D. as well as
the Ed.D. (p. 72 ) (amended from a specialist/generalist dis-
tinction to one based on researcher/educator)
—A considerably more flexible undergraduate program on a K-12
basis (rather than divided between elementary and secondary as
previously), and one that provided for non-teaching majors in
education (pp. 73-75 )
Thereafter followed a general description of the eleven centers
and ten special programs established by the School as follows:
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Centers (pp. 97-106):
iiducet ionel Innovations
Media and Technology
Povindations of Education
Urban Education
Teacher Education
Special Programs in Teacher
Education
Student Centered Degree
Systems Application in Educa-
Program in Education and Public tion
Policy Vocational/Technical Education
Compensatory Education
These were followed by an equally general description of all
courses
y 208, proposed.
Volume II was a 250-page accvunulation of course request forms,
those normally required for the approval of new courses, accompanied by
2,000 pages of supporting data.
Formal Approval of the Interim Catalogue
March - May 19^9
Aesthetics Education
Counselor Education
Educational Research
Hximanistic Education
International Education
Leadership in Educational
Administration
Special Programs;
Contemporary University
Early Childhood Education
Higher Education
MAT (Community College)
Upon completion, by late March, of the majority of the conceptual
work involved in preparation of the package, the final task was to secxire
approval of it—first by the School and then by the appropriate Univer-
sity agencies. Approval at both levels was handled primarily by Dean
Allen.
^^Summarized from School of Education Interim Catalogue , trans-
mitted to; Academic Matters Committee, Faculty Senate, and Gred-uate
Council, from Dwight W. Allen, Dean, School of Education ([April 19^9]
School files).
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School Approval Process
It was decided that the firet order of business at the School
level was to secure approval by the faculty alone of the Interim Consti-
tution included in the package. This action would permit the entire
planning group, faculty and doctoral students, to vote on the academic
pcrtions of the package. Approval of the Interim Constitution was sched-
uled fcr a March 20 Faculty Meeting, but a significant number of faculty
members opposed the proposed constitution with the result that the In-
terim Constitution was not finally approved until just before the April 11
meeting at which the total package was voted upon.^^
As a result of the prolonged debate over the Interim Constitu-
tion, the academic content of the package was addressed at only one fac-
ulty meeting, April 2, before the final April 11 meeting at which it was
voted. At the April 2 meeting a straw vote was taken on the major inno-
vations proposed in the package. The writing committee proposals were
carried in all but two cases——the first was its distinction between the
proposed Ed.D. and Ph.D. degrees (the committee had proposed a generalist/
specialist distinction, the meeting favored an educator/researcher dis-
tinction), and the second was its policy of total non-confidentiality
(which was amended to apply to internal documents only).^^
On Friday, April 11, the Education Assembly met to vote on the
academic portions of the package under the direction of an old faculty
^^See pp. 267 through 2'J2 for a description of this prolonged and
difficult process.
^^"Education Assembly, April 2, 1969i" Phillip L. Edgecomb, Re-
corder, Tabula Rasa
,
April 11, 19^9? n.pag.
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n.e«.ber who haa, as a .ssuU of the adoption of the InteHs. Constituti
been eleoted moderator of the Assembly. The Assembly oonsidered 11
amendments to the dooument and approved six. the most significant of
Which was a provision that each Center be reviewed by the Education
Assembly at least svery five years and that their charter to
a Center expire unless specifically renewed by the Assembly
operate as
as a result
of that review.
Five amendments, all proposed by an old faculty member, were
rejected. These amendments all expressed implicit dissatisfaction with
the course of the School and were intended to slow its rate of growth
and change. For example it was proposed:
That the pass-fail grading practice be tried on an experi-
mental basis by one Center for the coming year and that theAssembly reconsider the question of a more general applica-tion of this procedure one year from this time
•That the School agree, as one condition for getting approvallor the package request by the University, that it will bythe end of the next academic year, reduce its curriculum
offerings to one-half of the number of courses and programs
presently being proposed.
Ihe writer's recollection of this meeting is that it was in many
ways a disappointing culmination of the planning year. It was not par-
ticularly well attended, especially by the faculty, in the first place
and many left before the final vote.23 Despite the clear hostility to
22Agenda from memorandum from Robert Wellman to the Education Com-
munity, subject: "Agenda for Community Meeting," April 11, I 969 (mimeo,
^9^9i School files). Minutes from "Education Assembly, April 11
,
1969 ," Phillip L. Edgecomb, Recorder, Tabula Rasa
.
April 18, I 969
,
n.pag.
^There are no records of attendance at this meeting. My percep-
tion of the limited attendance is supported by my own notes taken at the
meeting, "It looks like 30 faculty here. Where is everyone?" and by a
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the paohage of eo^e of the a«e„d.e„tB proposed, the meeting oould best
be oharaoterized as a ..tired.' meeting. Most seemed very tired of debat-
ing the issues, combined perhaps with the feeling that nothing signifi-
cant oould be Changed at that late date, and as a consequence seemed
willing to accept the proposals of the package. There is no record of
the specific vote on the Interim Catalovue. although according to the
transmittal letter which accompanied it through University channels the
vote was unanimous. The final approval of the package was greeted, in
my recollection, not so much with elation but with a feeling of relief
that the planning process had finally ended.
Thus, on April 11, a few days less than a month after the origi.
nal target date, the Package was approved by the School and, following
a frantic weekend of editing and duplicating, was made available for
University channels on Monday, April I4.
University Approval Process
In order to become official policy, relevant portions of the
Interim Catalogue had to be approved by four University agencies: the
Provost’s Office, the administration's office on academic policy; the
Graduate Council
,
made up of graduate faculty elected by the departments;
the Dean's Council
, made up of School, Department, and other Academic
description of the meeting given by an old faculty member at the Faculty
Senate Meeting at which the Interim Constitution was voted: "Mr.
j^said] that the vote took place late in the afternoon at the conclusion
of a meeting which he had been told would be carried through until the
bitter end. By the time the vote was to be taken less than half the
faculty was present" ("Faculty Senate Minutes," May 29, I969, p. 39 ).
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Deans; and the Faculty Senate , made up of kK » 01 laculty members elected by
their respective Schools and departmentR t+os
. its record with these agencies
vfas as follows:
Pfovost's Office - Approved, „o apparent oonditione
Dean's Council - Approved, no apparent conditions
Graduate Counci l - Approved, with condition that graduate stu-dents meet standart University graduate stu-dent requirements^4
Faculty Senate
- Approved on a two-year trial basis with small
modification of pass-fail grading for master's
candidates, a more specific definition of
when the pass-fail policy would apply (to
School of Education courses taught by School
of Mucation teachers), referral of the student-
centered degree to a subcommittee, provision
that other departments could protest courses
that appeared to duplicate their own offer-
ings, and the proviso that the proposed School
of Education Evaluation Committee be selected
by the Faculty Senate Committee on Commit-
tees, and the specification that the Faculty
Senate Academic Matters Committee "review
specific courses in the usual way next fall
and report to the Senate in the usual way. "25
Approval by the Faculty Senate had been expected to be the most
difficult first, because the Senate had the reputation of being a con-
servative body slow to move on educational change and secondly, because
there had been many reports of the strong hostility of many faculty
senators toward the School of Education. Excerpts from that meeting
^^Derived from memorandum, Dwight W. Allen to the Education Commu-
subject: "Ratification of the New School of Education Program,"
June 2, 19691 Tabula Rasa , June 4» 1969i n.pag. , and "Faculty Senate
Minutes," May 29, I969, p. 35 .
^^Summarized in "Unofficial Minutes, Faculty Senate Meeting of
May 29 I 19691" Tabula Rasa , June 4| I969, n.pag.
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give use..! in.,,,,3 into .ot, t,. ,33tiUt, of senate an. the con-
ditions which contributed to the approval of the Paokage-by that body
as well as the other University agencies.
One significant factor was thp f-im-ivi,* autiming of the consideration of
the Package by the Senate. It was the last ite. on the agenda of the
third continuation of the last Faculty Senate meeting of the year, a
meeting which began two hours before the normal starting ti^e to assure
that all business would be completed. One can assume that, as with the
School Of Education Assembly. Faculty Senators were tired and felt under
considerable time pressure.
After discussion of other. non-School of Education matters, the
discussion of the Package opened with a report by the Chairman of the
Academic Matters Committee, who happened to be an old faculty School of
Education member, describing the length of the Package (I40 pages of
program description. 250 pages of courses. 2.000 pages of supporting
material), the number of courses involved (159 new courses and 86 old),
the difficulty of deciding what elements of the Package required Faculty
Senate approval and what did not. the fact that it was physically impos-
sible to review all the courses by the usual method in less than a year,
and the fact that the Package had received approval from the Provost.
Deans' and Graduate Council.
In response to a question from the floor during this presenta-
tion, it was established by a show of hands that "a great majority" of
26
"Faculty Senate Minutes, May 29
,
I969," pp. 35 & 36.
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the Faculty Senators had not seen the Package. 27
The Academic Matters Oc^nittee had decided that the Faculty
senate ™ust rule on the courses to he offered and on pass-fall grading.
On the former it reco^ended provisional approval, with review of courses
to be handled by the Committee the following year, and it recommended
approval of pass-fail, with a minor amendment. 28
The debate on these two issues was lively, at times heated, and
in general more negative about the procedures used by the School in
bringing the Package tc the Senate than about the proposed programs, al-
though a number of Senators questioned the Dean closely, and to the
writer's mind, with considerable sarcasm and effectiveness, about the
proposed methods of evaluation. Minutes of the meeting do not quote from
this debate, but other quotations give a feeling for the flavor of the
discussion.
• ~ asserted that many faculty members are pleasedby the prospect of a revitalized School of Education. However,the faculty is bothered by the somewhat coercive nature of theprocedures used. It seems that no matter what the Senate be-lieves to be the proper course of action, the School of Educa-
tion will offer its new curriculum next fall.
Dean Allen reiterated that it was not his intent to subvert
the system customarily used in approving new courses . ^9
argued that the School of Education's undue
haste is what has upset the Senate more than anything else.^^
————— spoke in favor of the motion to permit the
School of Education to offer its curriculum on a pass-fail basis.
[He] suggested that this seemed to be "Get the School of Educa-
tion Day." He objected to the condescending attitudes displayed
by those who opposed the motion. Such attitudes were unprofes-
sional.^'
^^Ibid.
^
p. 36. ^®Ibid., pp. 36-38.
^^Ibid.
.
p. 37 . ^^Ibid.
,
p. 40 . ^''ibid., p. 39 .
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The acting Dean of the Graduate School,
tion described below,
in supporting the mo-
admitted that he had reservations ahmi+ +via
then, to go ahead and then to carefully evalSItf^e reeilt^™^*
There were two motions made and passed with reference to the
School of Education's program. The first was to permit the pass-fail
grading system,
.*ioh passed by a vote of 30-16,33 and the second, more
general one was as follows
j
MOVED:
That the Faculty Senate approve on a two-year trial basis thenew program of the School of Education, including fo^ th^ finthe new courses proposed to which no objections are raised by
review all of the specific courses in the usual way early nexta and report to the Senate in the usual wayj and that a re-
“ described in Senate Document 69-075
which should report its findings to the Faculty Senate on a se-
mssxer u3.si6 during the two years# ^4
A Senator, an old faculty member of the School of Education,
moved an amendment to have the Evaluation Committee named. by the Faculty
Senate's Committee on Committees rather than by the School of Education,
as implied in the document. This amendment was passed, and Dean Allen
tried, unsuccessfully, to have appointments made to that committee by
July 1.^5 (This attempt had provoked the Senator's comment about "undue
haste" quoted above.)
^^Ibid
.
, p. 40. ^^Ibid ., p. 39.
^
^Ibid
.
.
p. 39 .
fact, these appointments to the Review Committee were not com-
pleted until January 19?0| 3- time when, under its charge, it should have
been submitting its first report.
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With vary little more diaouaaion the entire motion was voted
and paseed by the Senate. The minutes give no reoord of the vote, tat
one might speculate that it was probably similar to the 30-16 vote by
which pass-fail was approved.
In view of the radical nature of the changes proposed in the
Package and of the widespread hostility to the School voiced by other
members of the University, the speed (just over a month) and ease with
which approval was achieved came as something of a surprise. In retro-
Bpeot, it seems probable that a combination of the following factors
was primarily responsible for the easy passage.
1
)
The fact that the innovations were proposed on a two-year
trial basis, with continuous and final evaluation by an "objective"
committee, made it very easy for those with some doubts to temporarily
approve the plan and very difficult for those with serious doubts to
"rationally" refuse to give the School the opportunity to try out its
theories—especially in the context of the time pressure described in
3-6 below.
2) The clear support of the Provost and the Administration for
the Package carried considerable weight in the Councils and some weight
in the Faculty Senate.
3) The fact that the Package had been submitted so late in the
year and did not anywhere list the specific decisions to be made by the
various bodies meuie it almost necessary for the ruling bodies to either
accept it or reject it as a whole if the School was to begin its pro-
gram the following year. If, for example, specific decisions had been
outlined and requested, there is no question in the writer's mind that
238
the Faculty Senate would have
made many more amendments to
had more specific objections and probably
the Package,
For example, on page I09 of the Package there is a stipulation
that modules would be offered on a pass-no record basis. Nowhere in
the minutes of the Faculty Senate meeting is there any mention of this
even more radical (than pass-fail) departure from standard grading which
also implied a system of retroactive credit, and it is doubtf^rl whether
many were aware of the implications of this proposal. And on page 71,
there is the statement,
"Doctoral students in Education are considered
to be part of the instructional staff.
. . ." This statement, which
opens up the possibility of a redefinition of traditional faculty-student
roles, also went unchallenged by the Senators.
And also, running through the Evaluation section (pp. 18-20) is
the clear intention to do most evaluation during and subsequent to ex-
periments (post-hoc evaluation), rather than screening them before the
fact—as is the norm in most academic organizations. (Por instance,
all new courses in the University were supposed to be approved by the
Faculty Senate before being offered.) Again, no strong objection was
raised to this substantial departure from normal procedures,
4) The fact that the School, during the year, had made little
attempt to "check with" the various responsible groups again contributed
to a "take the whole thing or leave it" situation during the final month.
5) There were so many assumptions, conclusions, and proposals
in the Package, many of them vulnerable or highly questionable, that it
would have been impossible for any of the responsible groups to deal
with them in their normal responsible fashion in the time available.
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The course approval requests are a
my knowledge, the Academic Matters
the course proposals.) This again
it situation.
good example of this situation. (To
Committee never was able to deal with
tended to create a take-it-or-leave-
6) The timing of the presentation of the Package proposed to
the Faculty Senate was also a factor unique to the situation which
aided its quick and easy passage. Coming last on the agenda at the
third attempt to finish the year's business, the Package benefited from
an effect similar to that by which legislative bodies in their haste
to finish for the year quickly pass bills which under normal oiroum-
Stances would be subject to far closer scrutiny.
Summary and Evaluation
Since one of the purposes of this dissertation is to describe
and analyze the process of change at the School of Education for possible
replication, some judgments as to the relative strengths and weaknesses,
successes and failures, of the academic planning process are in order
recognizing that most judgments are highly tentative because of the
shortness of the period under review.
Based on the data presented above, the following judgments of
the relative success of the planning process appear appropriate;
—^That the School successfully achieved its conceptual goal of
developing new academic progreuns and policies
—^That these progreuns and policies generally satisfied the stated
goals of diversity, alternatives, and experimentation
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-That the School suooesefuUy achieved its political goal of
gaining the approval of all appropriate University agencies for its
Packaige
—That the active participation and purposeful leadership of
the Dean was central to the development of the overall academic poli-
cies of the School
—That the strategies of the Dean were central to the political
components of the process and that those strategies which tended to put
reviewing agencies in a "take it or leave it" situation were very suc-
cessful strategies for dealing with the University as a whole
—That the major strength of the academic planning process was
the development of specific programs by the planning committees
That "action planning" was generally the most successful ap-
proach to the planning process
—That the major weakness of the planning process was the rela-
tively low participation of School members in the making of decisions
on the overall academic policies of the School
—That the qiiality of programs developed by the planning commit-
tees | although unjudgeable in the period xonder review, was not reflected
in the generally low quality of the verbal descriptions presented for
them at all stages of the planning process including the Interim Cata-
logue
—That the planning period was too short relative to expecta-
tions raised for it
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—That the organizational ambiguities and time pressures of the
process increased the
cisions of the Dean
reliance of the entire organization upon the de
-That the fact that the planning was done primarily by faculty
and doctoral etudente resulted in programs and policies devoted primarily
to the interests of these groups_to the relative exclusion of the in-
terests of undergraduate and master's students
—Ind finally that although there is evidence by which to ques-
tion the quality of academic programs and effectiveness of the overall
academic policies developed during the planning year, the School unques
tionably achieved its most important goal. It gained approval of its
commitment to experiment and innovate and had thereby put itself in an
excellent position to bring to reality, in the years to come, its goal
of developing programs more relevant to the needs of students and of
society.
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CHAPTER VII
ORGANIZATION BUILDING/GOVERNANCE
Introduction
The second
.ajor task of the planning year was the development
Of governance and organisational stmotures which would promote the con-
tinued growth and development of the School in future years. This task
begun at the Retreat and culminated in the adoption of a constitu-
tion in November I969 whioh was predicated upon a sharing of the Dean's
formal organisational powers with the faculty and students.
Three highly important building blocks of the ultimate gover-
nance of the Sohool as well as of the organisation of the planning year
had been formed at the Retreat.
Planning Committees
—which were to be the major vehicle
of academic planning during the year and, as centers, of the academic
organization of the School in subsequent years.
2) The Executive Committee—which was to be the most significant
non-administration group guiding the planning, developing a governance
structure, and ultimately becoming the executive organization of the
School's governing assembly.
The Power of the Dean—^which was to give him the leverage to
carry out his goals and desires for the School.
I have discussed the major role of the planning committees in
the previous chapter. The committees, as such, did not take part in the
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deliberatione on governance, but the fact of their
effect, solve a major organizational problem—how t
existence did, in
o organize and govern
the academic programs of the School.
In this chapter I shall be discussing the School
-s effort to
develop an appropriate governance structure in terms of two general types
of structure,
"participative" and "leader-dominated."
The twin goals of participative governance are (l) to give or-
ganization members appropriate influence in decisions which affect them
and ( 2 ) to give the organization the benefit of the aggregate of the
wisdom of its members in its decision-making process. Some distinguish-
ing characteristics of participative governance would include: a rela-
tively decentralized and diffused decision-making process but also one
that permitted optimum participation in the major policy decisions of
the organization; a system whereby power and legitimacy were derived
from those in the organization rather than externally imposed; a system
in which resource allocation was arrived at through processes ratified by
the group; a system of information distribution which would permit all
members, if they so desired, to be equally well informed on the activi-
ties of the organization; and a channel of appeal and conflict resolu-
tion for those who felt aggrieved by any decision made in the organization.
In my view the School of Education community set out to develop
this kind of participative organizational structure and, in large part,
believed it had achieved it in the adoption of the November I969 Consti-
tution. The major feature of this document was a moving away from the
unilateral power of the Dean, under which no participative organization
would have been possible, toward a sharing of power between the Dean and
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a representative School Council. ThiRi s sharing of power, together with
the stipulation that the entire School oo^unity could, hy a refere^iu.
procedure, ^he decisions which superceded any policy of the Bean or
school Council and with the adoption of systems of mediation, arbitra-
tion. and judicial resolution, seeded to provide a strong fras.eworh fbr
effective participative governance.
Leader domination as a structure for governance and organisational
decision-making is characterized by unilateral decisionmaking power on
the part of the leader and the absence of an effective countervailing
power structure by which members of the organization can, through insti-
tutionalized means, legitimately overturn a decision of the leader or make
a decision for the organization without the approval, explicit or tacit,
of the leader. In a leadermlominated structure all power and legitimacy
tends to run to the leader and/or persons designated by him. The leader
has, whether he employs it or not, the power to make or overturn any de-
cision at any level of the organization. The leader's power is derived
both from the legitimization of his position by higher powers and from
his control over the most important sources of power in his organization.
It is my view that thro\ighout the planning year and at the time
of the approval of the Constitution the School was operating primarily
under this leader-<iominated mode.
The fundamental thesis of this chapter is that the search for
appropriate governing mechanisms was seriously hampered, and the ultimate
governance mechanism adopted tragically flawed, by a school-wide illusion,
never seriously questioned during most of the year, that governance should
be, would be, and was democratic and participative—^when in fact the mode
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Of governance arising out of the year was one of leader^on.inanoe
.
There appear to have been three major factors contributing to
the emergence of the leader^ominated mode in a group apparently so com-
mitted to a search for a democratic and participative fo™ of governance.
First: Members of the community, for reasons to be described,
maintained a very low level of involvement in the process of conceptullis-
ing and negotiating a participative governance system for the School
thus leaving the job to the Executive Committee and the Dean.
Second: The Executive Committee, although committed to the de-
velopment of a participative structure of governance, did not provide
effective leadership for the community in that effort.
And third: the Dean, as will be described, although apparently
genuinely believing in participation and the sharing of his power, was
by his behavior in pursuit of his commitment to academic change building
an organization whose major characteristic was his domination of that
organization.
It is not my intention in this chapter to make any judgments
about the relative merits of the two types of governance, but rather to
attempt to answer the perplexing question of how an organization which
appeared so thoroughly committed to participative governance could end
up with a leader-dominated governance system.
This chapter begins with a description of the initial commitment
of the School to the development of a participative system of governance,
goes on to describe the reasons behind the abdication of community mem-
bers in the development of such a process, and then traces in some de-
tail the work of the Executive Committee and the actions of the Dean as
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each related to the development of governing mechanisms for the School.
Commitment to Participate,,, n.
The oo™it.e„t to participative governance appears to have arisen
out of a Widely shared goal of governance and a belief that participation
in governance was the most effective means to that goal. The goal was
first published in a series of "understandings" presented by the Struc-
ture Committee in preface to their proposal for the establishment of an
Executive Committee: "Whatever structure we have, it will guarantee and
^ T ^ a —facilitate everyone's desire to do his own thing.
. .
,.1
This goal,
variously described, was a central part of most of the Constitution drafts
prepared during the fall. For instance, one, attempting to use the United
States Constitution as a model, begins, "We, the participants ... in
the School of Education, in order to provide an atmosphere wherein all
faculty and doctoral students have maximum opportunity to pursue their
unique interests"2 and another, that proposed at the November I 9 , I 968 ,
Faculty Meeting, begins its "First Principles" section with "It is our firm
conviction that the overall goals of the School will be optimally achieved
only by free and mobile individuals working through a community which
supports individual creativity, growth, and vitality."^
1
"A Report Submitted by the Task Force on Structure to the Entire
Group for Consideration," Tabula Rasa
. Sept. 18, I 969
,
p. 1 (School files
and University Archives).
2Peter Wagschal, Constitution
. First Draft (mimeo [November 19681.
author's files), p. 1 .
^"First Draft of Preamble, First Principles and Organizational
Principles for School of Education Constitution," Tabula Rasa, Nov. 19.
1968
,
n.pag.
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This goal statement appeared in the Interim Catalog., as
-It is
crucial that we devise organizational structures which promote growth
and Vitality rather than stifle these values under a blanket of the
motivation-managing, people-predicting paraphernalia of conventional
organizational structures . "4
It was assumed by most that this kind of individual freedom
could best be achieved through a participative system of governance.
For instance, the Interim Catalogue follows the goal statement quoted
above with the observation that the School had found no satisfactory
models for the kind of organization it was seeking, and then goes on,
"The guiding principle of the structure we are seeking is that our or-
ganization must be genuinely democratic and
-human- with a minimum of
controls on personal action and a maximum of support for personal risk
taking."5 The 15-^0 Annual Report is even more explicit,
-Our primary
efforts thus far have been directed toward
. . . creating a viable model
Of participatory governance within the School."^
„ . ,
^hool of Education Interim Catalogue
, transmitted to AcademicMatters Committee, Faculty Senate, and Graduate Council, from Dwight W.Allen, Dean, School of Education, ([April I969] School files), p. 63.
^Ibid .
,
p, 63»
Annual Report
, 1970 ? School of Education. University of Massa-
chusetts
, submitted by Dwight W. Allen, Dean (mimeo, July 27
,
I970,
School files), p, 3. This report also contains, in a later section, the
statement that "After an extraordinary year xmder a modified form of
participative democracy, a third phase was developed—
—governance under a
Constitution which tried to find a middle ground between participatory
democracy and oligarchic rule" and goes on to observe that, "it became
clear to the majority of faculty and students that participatory democracy
was not viable for the School. ..."
I believe that this statement did reflect the consensus in July
1970 of those engaged in developing the permanent constitution whose
purpose, as described in the Interim Report on the Constitution, was
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thrust toward participative governance beoaa,e
.anifeet early
in the structure of and deoisicnMnahing processes adopted for the He-
treat and in the charge, described earlier, to the Executive Oc^ittee
which included
ara^Zle
Clearly, the charge to the Executive Committee and decision-
making processes delineated implies a strong commitment to participative
governance.
This commitment was manifest in two major drafts of a Constitu-
tion prepared during the fall. Article I, Section I, of the
-U.S. Con-
stitution" draft states "Decision-making power ultimately resides in the
faculty and student body of the School, but shall be vested in a Council
of the School , "8 and the draft written by the Executive Committee pre-
sented to the November Faculty Meeting states under "First Principles"
The community of the School of Education shall be a free and
open one, without status distinctions, in which all members
"to provide a framework for decision-making that would result in the
highest quality decisions made with the greatest economy and with maxi-
mum feasible participation," (p, 22) However, it is my belief that es-
pecially early in the planning year, but throughout the year as a whole,
most community members tended to see governance in the more simple di-
chotomy of participation versus authoritarianism.
^"Committee of the Whole," Tapias Rosa
, Sept. 20, I 968
,
p. SS-1.
Q
°Wagschal, Constitution
, p. 1.
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and all'^pinHnrwill^be giverr^'^l'’ policies
This thrust toward participative
.overnanoe was stros^ly sup-
ported both by the writings of the most influential organizational theo-
rists Of the time and by the burgeoning student movements in the oountxy
which were calling for greater participation by students in the govern-
ance of university. Most theoiy and rhetoric of the time stood firmly
on the side of participative governance, it would, in my opinion, have
been unthinkable at that point in time for any group claiming to create
a new and more relevanf school of education to publicly state that its
goal for governance was to create a smoothly functioning system charao-
terized by leader domination.
Although participation appears to have been generally agreed
upon as the general means to effective governance, the specific justifi-
cation for such participation varied among different segments of the
community. Some talked of creating a system of governance "as flexible
and innovative as the School"; others talked of governance as a realiza-
tion of their ideals of community living; others saw governance in terms
of freeing School members "to do their own thing"; others spoke of
creating a participatory model for other organizations to replicate;
still others talked of participation as the most effective way of re-
leasing the potential of the organization; and some spoke, in thinly
veiled words, of curbing the power of the Dean.
9 ..First Draft Constitution," Tabula Rasa
. Nov. I9, I968, n.pag.
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in su._i„ October of 1968 .cet obeervers would have been highly
opti^ietic about the realization of a viable form of participative gov-
ernance at the School. The community seemed in general agreement about
both the goals of governance and participation as the fundamental means,
the Dean appeared to support these goals and means (see pp. 274 . 275).
the group had just returned from a very successful experience under par-
ticipative governance in Colorado, and the Executive Committee which was
to lead the process had the respect of both the community and the Dean,
was committed to participatory governance, and indeed represented an ini.
tial manifestation of community participation.
And in fact the School did, thirteen months later, adopt a Con-
stitution based to a large extent on participatory mechanisms.
However, it will be clear from the ensuing analysis that at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution the School was, in fact, being
governed primarily in the leader-dominated mode, that throughout the
planning year the leader-dominated mode prevailed, and that all indica-
tions were that the School would continue to be so operated.
How could this attempt at participatory governance, so hopefully
begun, have failed so completely?
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to an attempt to
answer this question.
Community Abdication in the Development
of Participative Mechanisms
As will be described in a later section of this chapter, the proc-
ess of developing participative mechanisms was characterized by general
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disinterest and very low participation on the part of ooo»unity
.e.bers.
To understand this disinterest one must go back to the goals of such par-
tisipation, first described in the Structure Committee memo as oreating
a structure which would "guarantee and facilitate everyone's desire to
do his own thing"-a goal which one might paraphrase as "the achievement
Of academic autonou«,." it was, as previously described, the assumption
that participative mechanisms of governance would lead to this academic
autonomy.
But by the second month of the planning year a very subtle transi-
tion had apparently taken place. Faculty and doctoral students had found
that they had, with no effort on their part, achieved the kind of autonomy
that they had expected would arise out of the participative governance
system. Faculty saw that the administration was not interfering, and
clearly had no interest in interfering, with the work of individual fac-
ility members or the programs being developed by the planning committees.
Many found that they had almost total control over their academic activi-
ties, their curriculum and teaching methods, and even student admissions.
They also found that their requests for support were being routinely
honored by the administration. Doctoral students, for their part, found
that the freedom promised by the planning doctoral progreun was not empty
rhetoric; that they could indeed choose their own committees and plan
their own programs.
In these very few weeks faculty and doctoral students had come
to take for granted what was in fact unprecedented academic autonomy (com-
pared to most aceuiemic institutions)—and with the achievement of that
autonomy
,
the major impetus behind the commitment to participative
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governance dieintegrated and faculty and doctoral students turned their
energies to
,,,,,
pation remained, but much of the energy had gene out of it, and the dif-
ficult process of conceptualizing and negotiating a viable system of
governance was left tc the Executive Committee and the Dean.
What community members did not fully understand, or at least ig-
nored in the flush of their new freedom, was the fact that their autonomy
had not been negotiated and legitimized, but had been granted to them by
the Dean who still controlled the major sources of power in the School
and could, if he so desired, in the absence cf a formal system of par-
ticipative governance, modify or eliminate the autenomy which he had
granted.
In sum, deluded by the autonomy which they had achieved, many
community members did not see the necessity of involving themselves in
the development of a formal system to assure some control over the con-
tinuity of that autonomy, and a major source of energy behind the thrust
for participative governance was lost.
There are some elements of paradox in this situation. For one,
it appears that the Dean's attempt to give the faculty and doctoral stu-
dents the autonomy they desired had the ultimate effect of defusing the
effort to create mechanisms to assure the continuity of that autonomy.
another
,
it can be held that community members unwittingly gave
away the assurance of autonomy in the future as the price of "doing their
own thing" during the planning year.
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The Role of the Executive Committee
With the abdication of most community memhera, the responeibility
for the development of a partioipatoiy system of governance fell to the
Executive Committee and the Dean. And it becomes clear in retrospect
that the Executive Committee failed to take strong leadership for the
community in this effort, but rather handed the reins of governance over
to a very willing and decisive Dean.
The reasons for the failure of the Executive Committee to pro-
vide adequate leadership for the community are numerous and complex.
Chief among them are;
1) Their attempt to operate from the community model which, as
pointed out on page 182, led them to adopt decision-making roles which
almost guaranteed inaction.
2) The fact that, as previously described, the major focus of
efforts of School members had turned to program planning had two more
implications for the Executive Committee. First, since there was little
interest in or energy available for developing organizational structures
among the School members. Executive Committee members found themselves
"going it alone" in this area; and secondly, this interest area focus
also personally affected Executive Committee members who were often torn
between the conflicting demands of making a place for themselves in their
developing subject areas and carrying out the lonely and often unreward-
ing task of trying to develop overall organizational structures.
3) The continuing eimbivalence evident in the Executive Committee's
behavior between the creation of a planned governance model and the
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adoption Of a »odel baaed on the delineation of prooeeeee whioh were
growing organioally in the day-to^ay operation of the Sohool prevented
them from suooesefully pursuing either approaoh.
4)
The fact that the Committee saw the oreation of the govern-
ance system as primarily a task of theoretical conceptualisation exposed
them to all the same frustrations, inefficiencies, and circularities as
those of the planning committees whioh adopted similar approaches.
5)
And perhaps most important, the Exeoutive Committee did not
realise that, in effect, a governance system was being created while it
theorised—and that thus its aotual behavior toward the Dean and the com-
munity was a far more oruoial determinant of the future organisational
structure then wa.s its theorizing*
6)
Finally there was the fact that the Dean did not effectively
support either the Committee or their work toward participative democracy.
I shall deal in the next section of this chapter with the Dean's
behavior in this regard, but in this section it is important to point out
that the Executive Committee acquiesced in the diminution of its influ-
ence by the Dean in two important respects. First, even with a clear
mandate from the community to develop a participatory governing structure,
the Committee never exerted pressure upon the Dean to share with them the
most important powers of his office—particularly those related to finan-
cial resources and personnel policies. And secondly, when faced with
specific decisions the committee appeared all too willing to hand them
back to the Dean on the grounds that they were not yet prepared to axie—
quately deal with such decisions.
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The analysis and description of the development of the Constitu-
tion which follows provides numerous illustrations of most of these fail-
ures of the Executive Committee to lead the School to the participative
governance which it apparently desired.
The Development of a Charter
The first three months of the Executive Committee's work were
devoted largely to the conceptualization of the governance system. The
agenda for the first two meetings upon the return to Amherst were devoted
almost entirely to communications (a central part of any governing struc-
ture), goals and priorities, and "the role of the Executive Committee. "^0
A crucial event in the development of a governance system took
place at the October 2 meeting when Assistant Dean Coffing read the group
a paper, written by himself and a doctoral student, which strongly sup-
ported the organic growth model of governance planning on the basis of
the organizational theories of Jay W. Forrester, an M.I.T. systems analyst.
In this paper the two made a strong case against conventional bureau-
cratic organizational structures and for an organization based on 11 or-
ganizational characteristics described by Forrester in an article, "A
New Corporate Design" (some of which were (l) no superior—subordinate
relationships, (2) policy-making separate from decision-making, (3) free-
dom of access to information, (4) no internal monopolies, ( 5 ) balancing
1 o
"Executive Cotincil," Tapias Rosa
,
Sept. 20, I 968
,
p. ss-2; "Minutes
of the Faculty Meeting, Tuesday, September 24
,
I 968 ," Phillip L. Edgecomb,
Recorder, Tabula Rasa
,
Oct. 4» i9^8t n.pag. | and Richard Clark, "Memorandum
to All Faculty and Doctoral Students," Sept. 23 1 I 968 (School files).
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Of reward and risk, and ( 6 ) individual mobility within and without the
organization). They further argued that many of the oharaoteristics
enunciated by Forrester had already begun to appear in the School of Bldu-
oation (for example, the reduced status distinctions that had resulted
from the Retreat) and concluded that, in addition to further investiga-
tion of this and other innovative organizational models, the School should
look to its own organic growth for the principles of a new organization.
The concluding paragraph of the paper sums up that point.
In sum, the most significant practical lesson to he learned from
Forrester's insights at this stage in our development is that we
are not, and will not be, a purposeless, structureless mass which
will grow without coherence or direction. We already have a rela-
tively well-formed structure, and the dynamics of shared goals
and mutual self-interest already have headed us in the right di-
rection and can be trusted to do so in the future. We cannot let
oxir \mcertainties and impatience push us into compromising for
traditional structure. Sy doing so we would be settling for cer-
tain mediocrity
,
when the seeds of excellence have already taken
root in our organization. ^ "I
The effect of this paper, which was enthusiastically received by
the Executive Committee and reprinted in the School newspaper. Tabula
Rasa, was to increase the confidence of the Executive Committee and the
community in the organic growth of appropriate structures sufficiently
to just about balance both their instincts and the pressure from Dean
Allen described below, in the direction of a more formal, planned approach
1
1
Lyman B. Brainerd, Jr., and Richard Coffing, "The School of Edu-
cation and A New Corporate Design," Tabula Rasa
,
Oct. 10, I 968
,
n.pag.
1 P
'^Its impact on subsequent documents can be traced in "Charter for
Executive Council; Working Paper for October 23| 19^8 ([Oct. 21, I 968 ]
Author's files); Letter from Gerald Weinstein to G. Jon Raush, Carnegie
Corporation of New York [a proposal for documentation of the planning
year] (Dec. 11, I 968
,
Author's files), p. 2; and Interim Catalogue , p. 63.
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to governance structures. This balance turned out to represent a very
dysfunctional ambivalence. To have committed itself to the development
of formal structures at the time would have required an extensive search
of organizational literature and research on other organizations. To
have committed itself to the organic growth theory would have meant the
establishment of extensive feedback/sensing mechanisms to determine what
was actually happening at the School. But, perhaps primarily because of
the uncertainty involved in choosing between the two dissimilar alterna-
tives, the Executive Committee did very little in either direction; its
compromise solution being to respond to Dean Allen's demands and their
ovm felt demands for more structure by developing proposals based pri-
marily on their ovm intuitive feel for what was growing out of the organi
zation.
A contributing factor to the Committee's unwillingness to do the
research necessary to either approach was probably the fact that Committee
members had neither the time themselves nor could they induce others to
do staff work for them because of the time and energy demands of the pro-
gram development focus on themselves and others in the School.
But the fact was that
,
in spite of the general support of the
organic model suggested by this paper, governance efforts for the remain-
der of the year tended to be focused on the conceptualization of formal
structures. This effort soon became focused on the development of a
charter for the Executive Committee—and, as was clear perhaps only in
retrospect, since such a charter would delineate relationships between
the Executive Committee and all other parts of the School, the charter
was, in effect, a constitution for the School.
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Pressure for the charter surfaced in the October I5 Faculty Meet-
ing in an interaction between the chairman of the Executive Committee and
the Dean which illuminates the conflict between the participative and
leader-dominated modes of governance. (See comments.)
tive Ooltiiee ihn operation of the Execu-
r‘
• * • requested that the Faculty and ExecutiveCo^ittee make recommendations on the role of the Executive Com-
tionsv" recommenda-
the process!]^
Dick Clark [Chairman of the Executive Committee] requested
suggestions on the development of a charter for the ExecutiveC»ttee. [Ccmmenti An attempt to put the responsibility forCharter development back on the Executive Committee.]
Dean Allen requested that the Executive Committee develop
a charter. LComment: Note that it was Dean Allen who made this
request, not the Community to whom the Executive Committee was
theoretically responsible.]'-^
The Executive Committee decided that it would be unable to de-
velop a satisfactory charter under the normal day-to-day pressures of the
School, and so scheduled a one-day retreat at the Northfield Inn for
October 23 to accomplish the task. Expectations were that most of the
groundwork for a charter could be accomplished at that time. In fact
these expectations were unrealistic since insufficient data on the de-
sires of School members had been generated and the group still had not,
and did not, address itself to the inconsistencies between the organic
growth model, to which most seemed implicitly committed, and the struc-
tured growth model, the demand for which had provoked the meeting. As a
result of this pressure the group arrived at the Inn without an agenda
^
^"Minutes of the Faculty Meeting, Tuesday, October 15i 19^8,"
Phillip L. Edgecomb, Recorder, Tabula Rasa, October 18, I968, n.pag.
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and the meeting itself was disorganized and unfocnsed-creating a high
level of frustration, resolved by devoting the final three hours of the
".eeting to a brain-stonsing session on specifio organizational polioies
which members of the group felt would foster the growth of the School in
appropriate directions.
Specific policies agreed upon at that meeting included the elimi-
nation of tenure, the elimination of 10 per cent of the School's programs
each year, the non-confidentiality of all School doouments, the establish
ment of off-campus learning centers, the appcintment of a large number of
adjunct faculty members, a Retreat to be held at the beginning of each
year, and the commitment of 40 per cent of faculty recruiting funds for
the following year to black and minority recruitment. ^4
Feeling somewhat relieved because they had at least accomplished
something concrete, the group returned to Amherst. However, it should be
noted that some of these decisions were proposed as motions at a subse-
quent faculty meeting to the considerable discredit of the Executive Com-
mittee—as will be described.
In total this retreat, which lasted from 10 a.m. until midnight,
was not a success, and in fact did not even appear to constitute a useful
beginning to the process of charter development.
A review of the minutes of Faculty^ 5 and Executive Committee
^4t«Policies Decided at the Retreat," Memorandum (mimeo [October
1968], Author's files).
^5as a result of a vote at the opening Faculty Meeting, planning
doctoral students were allowed to attend all Faculty Meetings with voice
but not vote. During the year Faculty Meetings were thus the equivalent
of meetings of the entire community.
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meetings of the fall provides a painful panorama of the Exeoutive Oomn,it-
tee's seeming paralysis in the faoe of its task of developing a oharter.
In these minutes we see the pressure brought by the Dean on the Committee
for a oharter, we see their inability either to develop a satisfactory
one themselves or design a process for doing so, and we see their inoreas-
ing willingness to turn major decisions over to the Dean.
Thus we find a report from the Executive Committee to the
October 29 Faculty Meeting that:
Most items [on the charter] are still in the discussion
stage , . . They will report later.
And the agenda for the October 30 Executive Committee meeting
notes;
The single order of business planned is continuing the dis-
cussion of one week ago—developing a charter.
Except for emergencies, it is requested that all other items
be deferred until next week.^
The November 6 minutes of the Executive Committee laconically
observe;
Two additional policy decisions were discussed;
a) Faculty of the School of Education will no longer be
granted tenure
b) Forty (40) per cent of all recruiting funds will be
spent on minority groups.
And then go on to report;
Dick Coffing will order ash trays for the School.^®
^
^'Faculty Meeting, October 29, I968," Phillip L. Edgecomb, Re-
corder, Tabula Rasa
,
Nov. 7 i I968, n.pag.
^
^Tabula Rasa
,
Oct. 29
,
19^8
,
n.pag.
^
^'Minutes of the Executive Committee, November 6, I968" (Author's
files)
.
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Executive Committee meeting attended by Dean
Allen was focused squarely on his demands for a charter. The minutes note
as follows:
Dean Allen brought three concerns to the Committee:
1) The administration of the School needs a formalized
structure, not as a conservative factor, but as clarifi-
cation of the method of decision-making to members of
the community so they can get feedback on what is hap-
pening. ^
2) There is an immediate necessity for the committee to
set groxmd rules for recruiting new faculty.
3) There is a feeling within the commvinity that there is
an "in-group,” a Royal Court, that certain people get
asked to help him more and more. He feels that a system-
atic feedback to the community might be the answer so
that people feel they have a real access to decision
making.
And the minutes continue, almost unbelievably in view of the work
the committee had done previously:
In beginning to work on a charter
. . .
And another paragraph neatly illximinates the inaction of the com-
mittee, the reasons why they chose to be inactive, and their willing-
ness to leave important decisions to the Dean:
In Personnel Recruiting it was decided that the urgency of the
matter and the need for a well thought out system for recruit-
ing outweighs the importance of having that decision made by
the Executive Council this year. It was eigreed that hiring
will be in Dean Allen's hands this year because he knows the
40^ minority groups rule and he has all the resources available.
In other words the Executive Committee did not feel it could come up with
a "well thought out system," did not consider delegating it to a school
community committee, and thus, without even consulting the community
^^Tabula Rasa, Nov. 19, 19^8, n.pag.
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returned the power of recruiting to the Dean'e hands.
The minutes of the November 19. lofia Faculty Meeting note that
First draft outline of
stitution was distributed,
presented.
proposed School of Education Con-
Nine policy statements were also
The Executive Committee was asked to develop a rationale
s^::mLr::vi:rd:;e.v»- p"u:.
The events of this meeting merit additional attention, primarily
because they make clear the loss of contact between the Executive Commit-
tee and the community and because it was this meeting which discredited
the Executive Committee in the eyes of many community members.
The "first draft of the proposed Constitution" was a document
based primarily on Forrester's eleven principles ("It is our firm convic-
tion that the overall goals of the School will be optimally achieved only
by free and mobile individuals working through a community which supports
individual creativity, growth, and vitality" stated as principle but
without any attempt to operationalize them in the context of the School,
The document was intended to be read and commented upon by community
members
,
The "nine policy statements" were, however, a different story.
They are clearly labeled "Policy Proposals to be Voted on at this meet-
22mg and included the policy that all personnel files would be non—
confidential, that there would be no degree requirements for hiring of
20
Phillip L, Edgecomb, Recorder, Tabula Rasa
.
Nov, 26, I 968
,
n,p£ig,
21
"First Draft of Constitution," Tabula Rasa
.
Nov, I 9 , I 968 ,
22
Author's files (distributed at Nov, 19t 19^8, meeting).
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faculty or admission of students, that 10 per cent of the School. s pro-
61-as.e would be disoontinued annually, and that 40 per cent of all re-
cruiting funds would be directed toward minority groups. These policies
were presented to the meeting by a doctoral student member of the Ibcecu-
tive Committee.
The Executive Committee apparently had selected what it had
thought were the least controversial proposals of the Northfield retreat
(for example the recommendation to eliminate tenure had been discaiMed)
to be voted upon. But it had misjudged the tenor of the community, many
members of which expressed surprise and shock at the fact that such pro-
posals had been presented for decision without prior notice and without
written rationale and documentation (and incidentally by a doctoral stu-
dent); and the Executive Committee agreed to restudy their recommenda-
tions and resubmit them with notice and with rationale—which was never
done, although some of them resurfaced in the package.
This incident, combined with an increasing awareness of the impo-
tence of the Committee, all but totally discredited it in the eyes of
most community members.
But the Executive Committee's anguished labors over the constitu-
tion, and increasing reliance upon the Dean to make current decisions,
even those with long-term implications, continued unabated—and the meet-
ing minutes march on giving a depressing sense of the paralysis of the
group.
Prom the Executive Committee minutes of November 20 ;
We decided to refer all on-going business to the Dean until we
can come up with the Charter.
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sst:.s
But at the November 26 meeting:
Two proposals for a constitution were studied and discussed.
The Council decided that:
1 ) Greater effort would have to be used in developing a
constitution which reflects and guides the aspiration01 this school
2) ^ch member of the Executive Council, next week, shouldbecome actively involved in ascertaining the status andproblems of all planning groups in the School and
i) Any decision needing immediate action should be referreddirectly to the Dean.24
And at the December_^ meeting:
Dick C offing and others will continue work on the document
which will be presented to the Executive Council before
Christmas,*^^
But no ’'document” was presented.
Thus, after two months of hard labor, it appears (from the
November 26 minutes) that the Committee had begun to realize that the
constitution could not be written in a vacuum and that research on the
state of the rest of the community was needed. It did not realize that
by referring decision-making to the Dean it was putting hopes of a par-
ticipatory form of governance further and further out of reach.
^
^
Tabula Rasa
.
Nov. 26, I968, n.pag.
^^"Executive Council Minutes," Tabula Rasa
.
Dec. 3,
^^"Executive Council Minutes,” Tabula Rasa
,
Dec. 6,
1968, n.pag.
1968, n.pag.
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Executive Committee members did approach the planning groups-
but work by the Committee on the constitution effectively ceased shortly
after the November 26 meeting, which was followed by Thanksgiving vaca-
tion and Marathon II, an expansion of Marathon I, held December I7
through 19 which commanded the energies of most Executive Committee mem-
bers. After that came Christmas vacation and then work on the prepara-
tion of the Interim Catalogue began.
Thus, from early December no additional work on the constitution
was done either by the Executive Committee or the community until the pre
vious work done by Executive Committee surfaced as the major part of the
proposed interim constitution.
There is a somewhat ironic final footnote to the futile efforts
of the Executive Committee to develop a set of formal structures for the
School. In the December I7, I968, issue of Tabula Rasa Dean Allen wrote
a cover page editorial summarizing his view of the progress of the plan-
ning year. In this editorial, apparently seeking to quiet the fears of
those who had become concerned about the lack of formal structure. Dean
Allen surprisingly takes the organic view of organizational growth:
And we are, at times, immensely frustrated by the very
unstructured process which has so helped us achieve what we
are achieving. ... This is not to say that structure, or-
ganization, and the setting of limits to our pursuits are
alien to the planning as a whole. The limits are being set,
priority areas are being defined, and organizational struc-
tures will emerge as they should—out of the work and inter-
ests of us all.
This statement, from a man who on November 13 had. told the
Executive Committee "the administration of the School needs a formalized
structure," is a dramatic illustration of the conflict between the planned
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and organic approaches to organization-building which had plagued both
the Executive Oc^ittee and the Dean during the first four months of the
planning-and which was a major hindrance to the development of appro-
priate governing prooeduree.
Constitution Development
January - November I969
The governance section of the package and the Interim Constitu-
26tion proposed in it was prepared by three members of the Writing Com-
mittee who had worked with the Executive Committee in its futile efforts
to develop an acceptable charter during the fall. The initial version
of the Interim Constitution and the governance section of the package
thus reflected much of the work done by the Executive Committee.
The proposed Interim Constitution, a mere one and three-quarter
pages in length, devotee a relatively large proportion of its focus to
dealing with the powers of the Dean vis-a-vis those of the community and
the other administrators—seemingly an indication of the concern of the
group with the level of power which the Dean had accumulated during the
planning year.
The document begins with a delineation of the relationship be-
tween the Dean's powers and those of the community as follows:
Although final responsibility in the School of Education resides
in the Dean, under the rules of the University of Massachusetts,
the general philosophy of the School of EJducation is that deci-
sions about policy, curriculum, procedures, programs, and personnel
26
°The document was labeled "interim" in acknowledgment of the fact
that the work of the fall had not produced an acceptable document—and
that task would have to be completed the following year.
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Assembly of the School of Education. If theDean disagrees and adopts contrary nolirv Vio ov i
writing and to the entire AeeemMyJ?
The document then goes on to a general definition of the member-
ship and powers of the Education Assembly and the Executive Committee,
then to a surprisingly specific (in view of the level of generality of
the rest of the document) descripticn of the duties of the Dean and each
of the assistant deans, and concludes with the proposal that a moderator
and parliamentarian be elected to preside over Assembly meetings, and an
ombudsman and Mediating Committee be elected to explore and arbitrate
disputes.
As I have previously described, the first order of business lead-
ing to approval of the package was the approval, by the faculty, of the
Interim Constitution since otherwise the planning doctoral students would
have been excluded from voting on the results of the process in which
they had played such a large part.
The approval of the Interim Constitution proved to be a prolonged,
conflict—laden, chaotic and often bizarre process which led to the revi-
sion and final adoption of an Interim Constitution on April 11—and also
to another grievance, eventually denied, against the Dean.^® The pro-
longation of this process also had the effect of substantially reducing
the time available for consideration of the academic portions of the
package
•
27
'"A Proposed Interim Constitution for the School of Education,"
Tabula Rasa
,
April 4» 19^9? n.pag.
^®Grievance Submission 01-70 t Before the Tenure and Grievance Com-
mittee, University of Massachusetts, Amherst (submitted Dec. 12, 1969)*
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The vote on the Interim Constitution was initially soheduled to
take plaoe at a Paoulty meeting on Monday, Maroh I7. However, Assistant
Dean for Academic Affairs Seidman, responding to ooncem about the pro-
posal expressed to him by various faculty members, postponed the decision
meeting until Thursday, March 20_and proposed that the March meeting
time be used for further discussion of the proposed Interim Constitu-
tion.29 It is my recollection that that meeting was not well attended
and produced no amendments to the proposal.
When the March 20 meeting was convened by Dean Allen it was dis-
covered that, according to the minutes,
-Approximately two-thirds of the
faculty were absent"—a very surprising situation in view of the impor-
tance of the vote to the success of the planning year and one which can
probably be ascribed to a combination of the previously described disin-
I
terest in the governance discussion; feelings of impotence about changing
the Constitution; and perhaps a protest, by abstention, by some over the
manner in which the faculty had been excluded from the deliberations
which led to the constitution. The group, therefore, voted to defer a
vote on the Constitution.
I However, as the meeting progressed, a number of other faculty
I
' members drifted in, and later it was decided that a vote could be taken,
(in the Faculty Meeting of October 7i Dsan Allen had announced a
ground rule for faculty meetings that members present at any meeting would
I
I
29Earl Seidman, "Memorandum to Faculty and Doctoral Students, Sub-
ject: Proposed Constitution," March 13| I969 (School files).
I
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onetitute a quorum. )30
meeting, with something less
than half the faculty present and voting, 31 30
tenm Constitution, 3 against, and 2 abstaining.
However, prior to the vote at that meeting which, as previously
noted, did constitute a lawful vote of the faculty under the groundrules
established by the Dean, the Dean suggested that in view of the rela-
tively small faculty attendance at the meeting a written vote confiiming
the oral vote should also be taken among the total faculty. Therefore a
two-day balloting procedure in which faculty members voted by means of
Siaied ballots was instituted.32 Before the announcement of the outoome
of this vote, it was protested by a faculty member, and to my knowledge,
the outoome was never published. According to a grievance filed later
the vote was 40-26 in favor33 <,f the Constitution and aooording to Allen's
notes in preparation for defense of the grievance the vote was 36-27.34
However, at the April 2, I 969
,
Faculty Meeting a member of the old
faculty objected to the signed ballot procedure on the grounds that since
^°"Minutes of the Faculty Meeting," Phillip L. Edgeoomb, Recorder,
Tabula Rasa
. Oct. 10, I 968
,
n.pag.
the result of an agreement made at the initial faculty meeting,
some 15 faculty members at Mark's Meadow, the School's observation school,
were considered faculty members of the School of Education and thus were
eligible to vote on these ballots.
32Three previous paragraphs derived from "Faculty Meeting, March 20,
19691 " Phillip L. Edgecomb, Recorder, Tabula Rasa
, April 4i I 969 .
^^Grievance Submission 01—70 [^submitted to Faculty Senate Tenure
and Grievance Committee], Grievances #1, d) occurrence, Dec. 12, 196Ti
n.pag.
^^wight W. Allen, "Response to [Constitution] Grievance," p. 6
(School files).
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the administration could see how faculty memhere had voted. e«e faculty
had felt coerced into voting for the Constitution (which was ass^ed to
be what the Dean favored). It was moved that a new ballot be taken on
the Constitution, this time by secret ballot. The members present passed
the motion and Dean Allen agreed to it. 35 on the secret ballot, the re-
Bults of which were announced on Tuesday, April 7 , the Interim Constitu-
tion was defeated by a vote of 36-33.36 ^ result which sent shock waves
through the School, especially the administration and Writing Committee.
This vote galvanized the Dean into action. Not wishing to ex-
clude the doctoral students from voting on the package and anxious to end
the year with the formal approval of the generally accepted innovations
in governance embodied in the proposed Interim Constitution, Dean Allen,
with the advice of a few close associates, sat down to personally revise
the Constitution. His major focus in this effort was on alleviating the
objections to the original proposals which had been voiced by new and
old faculty in previous meetings. These objections centered on the fact
that the faculty as a distinct group with distinct interests had been
merged into the Educational Assembly, in which students were a majority,
thus leaving no vehicle for the expression of distinctly faculty con-
cerns. Other criticisms included the fact that the document did not give
sufficient power to the community vis-k-vis the Dean, that the document
was not sufficiently clear and specific on many important issues, and
^^"Education Assembly, April 2, I 969 ," Phillip L. Edgecomb, Re-
corder, Tabula Rasa
, April 11, I 969
,
n.pag.
^^Earl Seidman, Memorandum to Faculty and Doctoral Students, Sub-
ject: "Report of the Vote on the Constitution" (mimeo, April 7t 19^9f
School files).
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that there was no termination date proposed in it. (Thus, the Sohool
could have continued operating indefinitely under its interim rules.)
The Dean's effort resulted in two separate proposals, A and B.
Both inoorporated the addition of a Graduate Faculty Assembly, made up
of a majority of faculty members, to represent faculty interests; and
both included a more specific description of Assembly membership and
responsibilities, a process for the creation of a Constitutional Commit-
tee to design a permanent constitution, and a redefinition of the rela-
tionship of the Dean and the Assembly which appeared to increase the
relative power of the Assembly—as follows:
Governance of the School of Education is the responsibility
of the Dean of the School of Education with the advice of two
faculty bodies, the Education Assembly and the Graduate Pac-
The Dean will override faculty recommendations only
rarely and for compelling reasons which must be stated in
writing
.
[Italics mine.J '
Proposal B was more comprehensive than A, including a termination
date, a specific description of the membership and responsibilities of
the Executive Council, a delineation of the powers and responsibilities
of the Dean and Assistant Deans, and the creation of moderator, parlia-
mentarian, omb\idsman, and mediating committee as described in the original
document.
The Dean presented his proposals to the faculty on April 8, and
again a vote was taken by secret ballot with the result that proposal A
was passed by a vote of 35-32 and proposal B passed 40-27.^® Proposal B
^^Proposal A and Proposal B
,
Proposal for the Governance of the
School of Education, University of Massachusetts
,
in Tabula Rasa
,
April 18,
1969
,
n.pag.
^®Minutes of "Education Assembly, April 11, 1969i" Phillip L. Edge-
comb, Redorcer, Tabula Rasa, April 18, 1969 *
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thus became the official Interim Constitution of the School with the ap-
proval of the ballots by the faculty at the beginning of the April 11
meeting at which the Interim Catalogue as a whole was discussed, amended,
and finally approved. -^9
Two aspects of this process of developing a Constitution are sig-
nificant to the analytical portions of this dissertation.
First, the pattern of the shifting of leadership from the Ereou-
tive Committee to the Dean pointed out in the section on development of
the academic policies of the School is equally evident in the creation of
the governance policies of the Constitution. In fact the continuum moves
from the earliest work done almost exclusively by the Executive Committee
to the final work done entirely by the Dean, who wrote the document which
was finally accepted. Also, it was the Dean rather than the Executive
Committee who shepherded the interim constitution proposals through the
faculty meetings to final approval.
Secondly, again as with academic policies, apathy appeared to pre-
vail. At no point in the process was a significant number of community
members involved in the development of the document. During the fall
when the major principles were being adopted, the Executive Committee
worked almost entirely on its own, and opportunities for participation
by the community (the hearings and the November I 9 faculty meeting, for
example) were generally greeted by apathy and disinterest. At the time
the Interim Constitution appeared, some hearings were held but were sparse-
ly attended. Perhaps the most dramatic example of the faculty apathy
about the constitution was the fact that less than half of them attended
^^Ibid.
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the meeting at which the conetitution was to be voted-although thie vote
did set off the prolonged voting series by which the group did shake off
some of its apathy to make a successful challenge of the original proposal,
As specified in the approved Interim Constitution, a Constitution
Committee was named in early May to develop a permanent constitution.
This committee did its job in a careful, well-researched, well-organized
manner (partially the result of the fact that it was not operating under
the time pressures of the planning year) making unprecedented efforts,
even though much of its work was done during the summer, to keep the oom-
munity abreast of its progress^O and to involve as many as possible in
the development of the document.
This permanent governing constitution maintained the major aspects
of the interim document including student participation, power shared be-
tween the comm\inity and the Dean, the Graduate Assembly, and the ombuds-
man. And there were some significant additions. In anticipation of the
increasing size of the School the Education Assembly (which included all
members of the School) was replaced as primary policy-making body of the
School with a representative body of about 30 (the School Council) elected
by the Centers and at large. The Executive Committee, to be elected by
the School Council from its own membership, was to be the primary coordi-
nating body. In addition the Centers were formally recognized as the pri-
mary programmatic vehicles of the School. Finally provisions for conflict
resolution, amendment of the Conetitution, and referendum procedures by
4^or example, in August, 1969i the "Interim Report on the Consti-
tution" (School of Education Profile ), containing extensive notes on the
draft constitution was sent to all comm\mity members for comment, and
additional drafts were distributed on October 10 and November 13 (School
files).
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which the entire oo^unity could overturn a decision of the Dean or School
Council were incorporated.^^
on November 26, I 969
,
it was announced that the faculty had for-
mally approved the new Constitution by a vote of 56-I 3 (95 per cent of
the total faculty voting).42
for a formal governing document was begun, the task was accomplished.
The Role of the Dean
As I have previously observed, it is clear in retrospect that
while the Executive Committee was busy theorizing about appropriate gov-
erning structures, the Dean by his actions was establishing such mechan-
isms in the School; that by the time the task of conceptualization had
been completed, the actual system of governance had in fact become firmly
established; and that while the theoretical model of governance was pri-
marily participative, the actual operating model of governance was pri-
marily leader-dominated.
In this section I shall focus on the role of the Dean in the
creation of this situation.
First, there is every reason to believe that from the beginning
of the planning year and throughout it, the Dean was committed to the idea
of participatory governance. It is the writer’s recollection that from
the beginning of the year Allen's talks and speeches had been highly
4‘li»The Constitution and Interim Report on the Proposed Constitution,”
in School of Education Profile
,
May 1971, pp. 3-14«
^^Dwight W. Allen, "Memorandum to Education Commvinity," Nov. 26,
1969 (School files).
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supportive of participation in governance, althcugh I have been able to
find no written or verbal record of such statements from early year reo.
ords. There is considerable evidence, however, to support my recollec-
tion. For example, one can see indications of his support of participation
his willingness to hand over control of the activities of the
Retreat to the community
^his strong support of the idea of an executive committee to
represent the commiinity in the governance of the School
^his strong support of the inclusion of students in the govern-
ing mechanisms of the School
^his agreement, in late October I 968
,
to bring his disagreements
with the Personnel Committee (if any) to the faculty as a whole for deci-
sion^^
—^his acceptance and personal strengthening of the wording of the
Interim Constitution which delineated a sharing of power between the Dean
and the community
—and finally in his strong support of the proposed constitution
—
to the extent that dissident community members accused him of coercing
faculty members into accepting it.^^
There are some later written statements which are strongly indica-
tive of the fact that the Dean did, and had throughout the year, espoused
^^Minutes of "Faculty Meeting, Oct, 29
,
I 968 ," Phillip L, Edgecomb,
Recorder, Tabula Rasa
,
Nov. 7i 19^8, n.pag.
^Grievance Submission Q1-7Q| Grievance #1, No. 2, Dec, 12, 1969i
n.pag.
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the goal of partioipative governanoe. The Interim Catalo^e
. prepared,
as has been desoribed, under the Dean's leadership in Maroh I969, oarries
the statement (previously quoted)
.'The guiding prinoiple of the struoture
we are seeking is that our organization must be genuinely demooratic and
'human' with 3 minimum of oontrols and a maximum of support for personal
k taking. The same statement appears in the Dean's I968-69 Annual
Report to the University ,46
(prepared
in summer I97O following the fall I969 approval of the Constitution) Dean
Allen states "Our primary efforts thus far have been directed toward
.
creating a viable model of participatory governance within the School"^?
and "In the area of governance we have moved to decentralize much of the
power vested in the School's administration, and recentralize it within
the larger School oommunity"48 ^nd, considerably earlier, in his testimony
before the Tenure and Grievance Committee, he had stated "I want to find
and build the mechanisms whereby the faculty can have a greater share.
In view of the fact that Dean Allen's behavior during the year was
such as to build an organization of a different type, one that he con-
trolled and dominated, one must ask whether he was consciously building
an authoritarian system under the smoke-screen of democratic rhetoric or
^^Interim Catalogue
,
p. 63 .
^^ 1968-69 Annual Report
,
p. 12 (School files).
^^ 1970 Annual Report , p. 3 (School files).
^^Ibid
.
, p. 5.
^^Transcript
,
Dwight W. Allen, "First Dean Dwight W. Allen Testi-
mony" [before the Faculty Senate Tenure and Grievance Committee] [May
1968], p. 28.
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whether, in fact, he was not himself aware of what was taking place. i
believe that the latter was the fact for two reasons.
The first can be found in the Dean's side of the paradox of fac-
ulty autonomy described in an earlier section of this chapter. Dean Allen
apparently believed that by giving faculty and doctoral students unprece-
dented autonomy in academic matters he was in fact freeing them rather
than dominating them. The importance of this freedom for faculty and
students is not to be underestimated. It was during the planning year
freely given, real, and an important facilitating mechanism for the plan-
ning work. It was also in a very real sense, granted at the expense of
some of Allen's freedom since he took on the responsibility of finding
the resources to allow community members to "do their own thing." Allen
has stated that no request for financial support for programs was refused
during the planning year.
But, as previously described, this granting of faculty autonomy
also served to defuse the participation issue. Apparently neither Dean
Allen nor many community members saw that faculty and student autonomy
granted by the Dean was not the equivalent of the legitimization of that
autonomy—which could come only through a formal document delineating a
sharing of power and the employment of that power by the community. Thus,
while the Dean thought that he was promoting the goals of participation
he was, unwittingly, I believe, contributing to a situation in which those
goals were not achieved, and one in which he maintained control over the
most important aspects of School governance.
Secondly, and more importantly, I believe that the inconsistency
between the Dean's rhetoric and his behavior stemmed from a conflict of
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his o«n most seriously held values, a conflict between his commitment to
educational change and his commitment to participative decision-making.
Pair and humane treatment of individuals, and the concomitant that people
ought to have a voice in decisions which affect them are
central to Dean Allen's value structure. They are also
teachings which he has stated represent his fundamental
,
in my opinion,
central to Baha'i
beliefs. It be-
came clear, however, from his behavior that he valued educational change
more than he valued organisational participation. Thus, when these two
values came into conflict as they inevitably would in the pressure of a
too short planning year and in the formative stages of the development of
a new governance system, Allen consistently opted for change and took
over the reins himself to achieve change—at the expense of the develop-
ment of participation in organizational decisions. 50
After a time, being disappointed by the Executive Committee's
inability to act, the Dean apparently began to accumulate power to act
in anticipation of the fact that the governance system could not react
as quickly or as decisively as he felt the situation demanded.
This valuing of change over participation becomes even more clear
when one looks closely at Allen's change strategies (to be described in
more detail below [p. 280] and in Chapter VIII ), most of which depend
upon the power of the leader and, in fact, tend to have the consequent
effect of increasing the power of the leader as they are employed.
5^This conflict was strongly implied in a statement made by Allen to
the Tenure and Grievance Committee in May I 968 : "I have not intended to
be autocratic, I don't desire to be autocratic, I do however have a very
fierce desire to build a quality School of Education" (Allen Second Tesi-
mony, p. 33 ).
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It appears that subsequent to the planning year Allen did see
this conflict between change and participation in himself and the incon-
sistency Of his earlier rhetoric. In my interviews with him in the summer
1971 he stated that his ideal for the organization of the School was
"to maximize change, not necessarily freedom" because "there is a regres-
sion line on participation" and went on to say that he saw himself operat-
ing as a "benevolen.'t dicbaiiore*'
In the remainder of this chapter I shall describe the five major
sources of the Dean's success in the domination of the organization and
then summarize the implications of his domination for the outcomes of
the planning year.
The first source of his success in dominating the organization
may be found in his success in achieving control over the major sources
of power, both legislated and unlegislated, in the School. I shall de-
scribe how he went about establishing this control in my discussion of
his leadership style and strategies in the next chapter, but for the pur-
poses of this chapter the implications of this control are relevant. The
major implication was that by his control of the major legislated and
unlegislated power in the organization the Dean established himself as
the single clear focal point of power in the School——a locus of power
backed by the mandate of the trustees and the clear support of the Uni-
versity administration and a majority of the faculty and doctoral stu-
dents, confirmed by an unparalleled (in the School) national stature and
access to outside funding sources, and sustained by a compelling personal
charisma and control of the available financial resources in the School
and its reward system.
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The eeoond means by which the Dean achieved crganizational dcmi-
nance are, as suggested on page 218 , embedded in his approach to and
strategies of organizational change. I shall explore these strategies
in greater detail in the following chapter, but their relevance here is
that all are based cn the implicit assumption that the leader must lead,
and lead strongly, if organizational change is to be achieved. This
assumption is clear in Allen's observaticns tc me quoted above that "There
IS a regression line in participation," that his goal was "to maximize
change, not necessarily freedom" and that he saw himself operating as a
"benevolent dictator."
This assumption comes through equally strongly in the description
of the strategies used to achieve organizational change. They are ^
strategies used to motivate people in ^ organization to bring about
effective educational change. For example, ^ uses the default position
(essentially acting before others) to assure that opportunities for change
are not lost by default (inaction); 1;^ achieves financial flexibility and
controls the flexible money in the organization so that ^ can use it to
reward people or support programs which ^ feels are most promising; he
creates organizational ambiguity (e.g.
,
discontinuing the catalogue) so
that his people can think and act more creatively; ^ maintains ignorance
of University channels and procedures so that the entire organization can
plead ignorance when they are not followed; he hires young faculty to
bring energy and fresh perspective to his organization; ^ gets his or-
ganization off the chart with simultaneous change to protect it from pre-
mature evaluation; and ^ chooses a policy of multiple risking to protect
his organization from premature evaluation.
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Thus, throughout the year as Dean Alien pursued those strategies
which he felt would bring about the greatest organisational change he was
also, by the very use of those strategies, accumulating power in the or-
ganisation both because the strategies are, in themselves, leader-centered
Which tends tc lead to the dependence cf the organisation upon him, but
also because many of these strategies were power accumulation as well as
change strategies. For example, financial flexibility and control both
lead to increasing personal power; organisational ambiguity and hiring
young faculty tend to increase the dependence of those in the organisa-
tion on the leader; and use of the default position tends to center the
responsibility on the decision-maker since he can always act faster than
a group.
I
A third means of achieving organizational dominance was his
neutralization of the power of the Executive Committee, which was elected
to represent the community and which represented the major potential
power source inside the School outside of the Dean's office. He achieved
this neutralization primarily by omission rather than commission (as was
the case with his use of change strategies).
Dean Allen, as previously described, began the year in a position
of enormous power
. In addition to those formal powers legislated to all
Deans by the Trustees which gave him responsibility for all aspects of
the School, he also had developed enormous personal power as a result of
the fact that most of the 120 new School members had come chiefly in re-
sponse to himself and his vision for the School, because of his personal
charisma, and because of the solidification of his power vis—a—vis the
faculty the year previous. Clearly, if he was committed to participatory
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governance he would have seen that his major task was to transfer much
of his power to the community through the Executive Committee.
He did not effectively do this, although he made some attempts
to do so. Had he been really serious about transferring power he might
have, for instance, worked more closely with the Committee, shared knowl-
edge of and power over financial aspects of the School with them, con-
sulted with them on appointments, permitted them to run meetings, and
consulted them on faculty proposals for new programs and activities.
And in addition to these major steps he could have in more minor ways
made it clear that the Executive Committee held power for the School
and the community. He might have made sure that more important memos
came out under their name, that they had sufficient support help, and
even that they were aware of his travel schedule.
In fact he did none of these. He chaired and dominated the
early meetings of the School; filled certain positions (Director of the
Center for the Study of Educational Innovations, Director of the Plan-
ning Year, and the initial School committees); and he personally approved
or disapproved of individual faculty plans without consultation with the
Executive Committee.
There were, of course, in meuiy cases good and compelling rea-
sons for his making many of these early decisions. However, had he,
perhaps in consultation with the Executive Committee, made them in such
a way as to help solidify the position of the Executive Committee rather
than his own, he would have done much to put them in a position where
they would have felt more power and more responsibility for leading
the School toward an effective and participatory system of governance.
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In fact the Bean's general attitude toward the Executive Commit-
tee throughout the year could best be characterized as one of benign
neglect. He rarely attended meetings (which could be interpreted as not
Wishing to interfere with their functioning, but the major problem was
not his interference, but rather the task of transferring large parts of
his power to them which required significant amounts of contact with them).
When he did attend meetings it was usually to request specific actions
giving the subtle impression that he viewed the Committee as an agent of
the Bean's office, rather than an independent body with major responsi-
bility for the decision-making in the School.
The nature of his personal interaction with the Executive Council
also tended to undermine its independence. Although he rarely met with
the group as a whole, he did spend considerable time with two members,
the two most influential members of the group. Thus, rather than promot-
ing the power of the group as a whole, he tended to promote the power of
these two individuals based on their access to him—a reaffirmation of
his own power position.
In sum, it seems clear that, whether by design or by neglect,
most of Dean Allen's actions vis-a-vis the Executive Committee during the
crucial period of the establishment of their power position tended to
erode rather than promote their power. It should be reiterated here that
this undermining of the power of the Executive Committee cannot be ascribed
solely to the behavior of Dean Allen—since, as I have previously pointed
out, members of the Committee seemed to have willingly acquiesced to the
diminution of their power position.
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A fourth source of the Dean's power over the
.ajor deoisions of
the planning year was the overwhelming emphasis of the community on
specific program and content areas (the Planning Committees) and the
autonomy granted community members which, as previously described, left
most community members with little interest in, or any decisionmaking
process for, the overall decisions about academic and organizational poli-
cies which were to characterize the School in the future. With the fail-
ure of the Executive Committee and abdication of the community, these
decisions were left to the Dean who, uniquely in the School, had the
breadth of perspective, knowledge of the School as a whole, and knowledge
of the probable parameters of the University's acceptance of new programs
to make informed deoisions on overall policy deoisions. The fact that
the Dean did make such decisions was a strong confirmation of his present
and future power in the School—both because of the precedent for decision-
making by the Dean which was established and because hie making of those
decisions left the community with no process for community decision-
making—leaving them dependent upon the Dean for such decisions.
A final source of the development of Dean Allen's domination of
the School can be traced to some of the goals which he attempted, with
considerable success, to inculcate into the organization. Some of the
more important of these were "the freedom to fail," "risk-taking, ex-
ploration and experimentation," "diversity and creativity," "social change
through education," "alternative routes to educational goals" and "rapid
and thoroughgoing change. "5^ These goals were foreign to most of the
51 See "Portfolio of School Commitments," School of Education Profile .
285
academic organizationa fro. which School
.e.bera had come, and therefore
there were no accepted ground rulea about what apeciflc behaviors were
appropriate in fulfilment of such goals or how such behavior might be
evaluated (i.e., how many times may one fail? how radical social change?
or how much time can one devote to creative work?). This uncertainty
surrounding these new goals had the effect of forcing community members
to look to the Dean, the chief exponent of the goals, as major source of
approval or disapproval of behavior according to them. A major outcome of
this situation was, inevitably, an expansion of Dean Allen's power and
domination of the organization.
Summary and Implications
The Dean's ultimate domination of the organization is dramatically
demonstrated in the inability of the Executive Committee and community to
prepare the Package without his leadership and participation. As I have
described (pp. 225-226 ), the Package preparation process had seriously
bogged down in late February, when members of the writing committee asked
him to cancel his travel plans and, in effect, take over leadership of
the process. He did so, and during the week that followed most of the
decisions on the Package were made. Thereafter Dean Allen managed nearly
all aspects of the Package including the writing of it and steering it
through the various School and University approval mechanisms.
What were the implications of the Dean's domination of the organi-
zation during the planning year?
First—^Dean Allen's domination of the organization was, unques-
tionably, the major factor in the achievement of the radical changes which
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occurred during the planning year. It allowed the School to realize hie
unique and powerful vision for academic reform. It permitted the quick
and decisive decision-making needed under the time pressures of the plan-
ning year and allowed the School to operate on a cutting edge of innova-
tion, which might have been fuzzed by compromise. His domination of the
organization also allowed him to pursue his various change strategies—
so crucial to the success of the effort at thoroughgoing change.
In sum, without the Dean's domination it would not have been
possible to achieve the academic change of the planning year. Time alone
would have been prohibitively short to develop and follow participative
mechanisms to make decisions in the year of planning.
Second——The advantages of speed and decisiveness of the Dean's
domination carried with them the corresponding disadvantages of relatively
low participation in the process of developing overall governance and aca-
demic policies—as seen in the almost unbelievably low participation of
the faculty in the crucial decision-making meetings of March and April.
Thus, while the package clearly benefited from the imagination and vision
of the Dean, it had the disadvantage of being limited primarily to his
vision—when the School theoretically had at its disposal the imagination
and vision of I50 diverse people of high competence.
Third—One cannot help but lament the inestimable waste of time,
energy, and focus expended by the leadership of the comm\anity on the de-
velopment of mechanisms for participative governance which proved to be
of little or no value to the organization, and were perhaps even dysfunc-
tional to the progress of the School as a whole. It is sheer speculation,
but this writer believes that haid the School from the beginning agreed
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upon a leader^ominated organization the aoaden.io reforms would have
been better oonoeived, better organized, and better implemented-and,
even further in the realm of speoulation, it is oonoeivable that
mechanisms might have grown out of an initially leader-dominated sys-
tem to allow members whatever voice they desired in decisions which
might affect them.
Fourth-^nother implication of the Dean's domination of the
organization, especially in view of the increasingly perceived di-
chotomy between his verbal support of participation and his authori-
tarian behavior, was a growing sense of distrust, frustration, and
paranoia among many members of the organization who, although they
had eschewed involvement in the process, remained committed to partici-
pation as an ideal of governance. These highly unhealthy organizational
conditions were most prevalent aunong old faculty and those new faculty
and doctoral students most committed to democratic organization, but
also many others were affected by contact with the Dean's authoritarian
methods when they had expected participation.
One might also with considerable confidence make two predic-
tions about the future co\irse of governance at the School on the basis
of the above analysis of events.
First—That the model of leader domination had become the
established model of the governance of the School and would not be
significantly changed by the adoption of the Constitution
288
and Seoond-That the inherent oonfliot between the participative
model propoeed in the Conetitution and the leaderMicn.inated
.cdel actu-
ally in operation would be a source of serious conflict until that incon
sistency somehow fo\ind a satisfactory resolution.
SECTION III
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
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CHAPTER VIII
ON LEADER-DOMINATED CHANGE
Introduction
This chapter will be devoted to an examination of the single most
important determinant of the success of the change effort at the School
of Education—the change strategies employed by Dean Allen, the effective-
ness of which depended both on his position of dominance in the organiza-
tion and on factors unique to the strategies themselves.
This chapter will have four sections.
In the first section I shall support my contention that the Dean's
strategies were the most important factor in the success of the change
effort by means of a retrospective force field analysis of the forces
affecting change at the School during the period under review.
In the second I shall describe the means by which the Dean
achieved dominance over the organization.
In the third section I shall describe the major change strategies
used with specific reference to the case material.
And in the final section I shall delineate some principles derived
from the aggregate of change strategies which may provide guides to the
development of other change strategies by other leaders in other organiza-
tional settings
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How Change Occurred/Force Field Analysis
Introduction
The powerful and profound effect of the change strategies pur-
sued by the Dean on the change process becomes clear when the forces tend-
ing toward change and those resisting change are viewed through the medium
of retrospective force field analysis. It would be by no means an under-
statement to summarize the results of such analysis as indicating that
the forces toward and away from innovation were generally in equilibrium
at a low level of innovation—until the introduction of the forces in-
herent in the Dean's change strategies, which had the effect of moving
the entire organization toward a high level of innovation.
Force field analysis was developed by Kurt Lewin as an analytical
tool for guiding interventions designed to stimulate organizational
change. The theory on which force field analysis is based views organi-
zational change in terms of driving forces which tend to produce and
maintain change, and restraining forces, which tend to inhibit change.
Each of these forces is assigned a strength. Under this theory when the
total strength (the sum of) the driving forces is equal to the total
strength (the sum of) the restraining forces the system is said to be in
equilibrium—^no change is occurring.
In order to produce change in an organization which is in equi-
librium the sum of the driving forces must be increased relative to the
sum of the restraining forces. This disequilibrium can be achieved in
a number of ways—by increasing the strength of the driving forces, by
reducing the strength of the restraining forces, or by altering the
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Btren^h or direction of any one or more forces. In fact meet change
occurs as a result of some combination of these factors. A correlate of
the theory is that changes tend to be more permanent if they result from
a decrease in restraining forces, since an increase of the driving foroes,
although producing change, also tends to produoe tension and consequent
volatility within the organization.
According to the theory the change cycle has three components:
the initial level of equilibrium at which the organization is frozen, an
unfreezing brought about by manipulation of the forces, and a subsequent
refreezing at a new level of equilibrium.^
I shall view the forces at work at the School of Education at
three separate times.
Pirst—At September, I967, prior to the arrival of the new Dean
when the driving and restraining forces were in equilibrium at a rela-
tively low level of innovation.
Second—In the period January through August, I968, when the
Dean's critical mass strategy was increasing the driving forces to build
an innovation—oriented organization.
Third—During the planning year September I968 through May I969
when the Dean's change strategies had provided driving forces to swing
the balance toward chauge and academic innovation.
During the period under review the organization had not reached
the refreezing point postulated by the theory.
^See Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard, Mane^gement of Organiza-
tional Behavior
,
second edition (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1972 ), pp«
100 & 101, for a more complete summary of this analytical tool.
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Force Field Analyses
Introduction
There ie one general net of restraining forces which was operat-
ing in all three periods which will be noted specifically here and re-
ferred to in the three separate analyses. This is the set of restraining
forces described by J. B. Lon Hefferlin as applying to institutions in
general and then those unique to academic organisations. These were de-
scribed in Chapter II, p. 45 of this study, and are reviewed below.
Resistances to change;
AS AN institution/organization
Organizations are inherently passive—they exist for
routinizat ion of behavior
Voluntary organizations attract members who agree with
their activities
Organizations tend toward institutionalization and ritualism
Organizations that are livelihoods for people tend to come
to exist only as livelihoods for those people
The maintenance of institutional effectiveness or achieve-
ment (such as students* learning) is only one problem
that organizations must face in order to survive. Other
problems must take precedence over it.
AS AN ACADEMIC ORGANIZATION
Their purposes and support are basically conservative
The educational system is vertically fragmented
Within higher education institutional reputation is not
based on innovation
Faculty members have observed their vocation for years
as students before joining it
The ideology of the aceuiemic profession treats professors
as independent professionals
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Academics are skeptical about the
acad.emic life
idea of efficiency in
Academic institutions are
resist precipitant change
deliberately structured to
A second preliminary observation on the force field analyses con-
cerns the problem of assigning relative strengths to the forces involved.
The estimation of the strength of a given force must be either clearly
subjective, or an attempt at objectivity can be made by the creation of
"sophisticated” measuring indices. Since the intent of these analyses is
primarily to demonstrate the critical importance of Dean Allen's change
strategies to altering the balance of forces in the direction of innova-
tion, and since the case study provides ample evidence of the general
magnitude of the importance of these strategies, there appears no need
to attempt to devise more sophisticated measuring techniques. Thus, the
force number used in the charts are intended more to outline orders of
magnitude than as an attempt at an exact rendering of the strength of the
driving and restraining forces.
The following pages include charts of forces operating during each
of the periods, followed by a verbal summary of each.
In the September prior to Dean Allen's arrival the School can be
considered to have been in a state of equilibrium at a relatively low
level of innovation, as described in Chart I.
The primary forces tending to restrain change at this time were:
—The high emphasis on smooth bureaucratic functioning of the
organization brought with it an emphasis on maintenance of the status quo
and consequent low rewards for innovation, a substantial restraint on
change
.
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Chart I Time I
Ch
Driving Porces/22
Prior to Dean Allen’s Arrival/September I967
Quo
Desire for parity with
other schools of education
Individual desire for per-
sonal competency
Emphasis on bureaucratic order/
stability
Emphasis on status quo/low re-
^ wards for innovation
Interest in problems of iirban
education
(11
,
Restraining Porces/22
CJ,.
^OV,ati
Oft
SI Other Hefferlin resistances
enchantment with School
41)
^ versity approval of innovation
^(1) De-emphasis on outside funding
1 ) Student passivity
^(1) Geographical isolation
—Those other forces tending to restrain change in organizations
in general and academic organizations in particular described by Hefferlin
were similarly operating.
—
^The fact that the University ewiministration was disenchanted
with the School combined with the fact that there was an interim Dean
made it difficult for faculty members to get support for, and assurance
of continuation of, innovative programs.
—The perceived difficulty of attaining approval of innovative
courses and programs by University channels tended to discourage attempts
at innovation, as did the de-emphasis on pursuing outside funding.
—Student passivity provided no incentive for curriculum changes.
—The geographical isolation of the University tended to insulate
it from the ferment and change taking place elsewhere.
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Balancing these considerable forces against innovation, one aust
assume was primarily the pressure to innovate enough to stay current with
other schools in the field-for example to adopt new programs or approaches
which had become a part of the curriculum of most other schools of educa-
tion. Another relatively strong force, it can be assumed, was the desire
of individual faculty members to maintain their level of competency in
their own special field. And finally, a number of faculty members were
becoming interested in the problems of urban education in which the
School had previously had no interest.
Chart II shows the restraining and driving forces at work during
the period in which Dean Allen was attempting to build a critical mass
of change-oriented educators in preparation for the planning year. At
this point the system was moving from equilibrium, with the balance of
forces shifting toward change in response to the critical mass strategy.
The major restraining forces at this time were:
—The general organizational resistances described by Hefferlin
were working against change.
—The fact that the "new school" existed only as Dean Allen's
vision for it and that the existing school was contrary to this vision,
both were major problems in attracting new faculty.
—The fact that the new faculty positions granted, although
doubling the faculty size, were not sufficient to assure the establish-
ment of a critical mass of chainge-oriented faculty was a limitation on
the building of a change-oriented organization.
—The fact that there was insufficient money available for fac-
ulty support services, recruiting, and student stipends for the School
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Chart II Time II
Driving Porces/47
Change/statuB
Qu^
Building the Critical Mass/january-August 1968
Restraining Porces/29
ion
(d TT
u ^Unique growth position of
a University
o
g
Stockpiling of faculty
>aH positions
+»+»
M^j^^upport of "good men" hir-
Q>tQT-ing philosophy
^ *1 f'—"'
Support of change at the
-3 School
<
Planning Doctoral Program
(0m©w
•H
© © Allen vision, energy, com-
as i mitment to recruiting
M
© oS Fund raising success and
ts H financial risk taking
c-p
Allen reputation & contacts
© o
0 bo Personal recruiting
1
^
OTi Other recruiting strategies
” h ( 1 st class recruiting, fac-
©;Q ulty recruit selves, high
rH salaries)
Ignoring dissent
Ml
iiL
Ml
144
Ml
144
M>
\M'>
,0)
,(i)
144
,(i)
144
144
144
__
Hefferlin General Resistance
Pact that "new school" was only
vision
Insufficient faculty slots to
assure critical mass
Insufficient support, recruit-
ing, and student stipend money
Limited and late reciniiting time
Resistance of existing faculty
(pressure for "slot hiring" and
"appropriate procedures")
Conventional academic hiring
criteria
Low status of University
Inappropriateness of existing
School to vision
Isolated geographical location
envisioned by the Dean was a major hindrance to the achievement of that
vision.
—The limited recruiting time available and the lateness in the
recruiting year of the effort was a potential constraint on both the num-
bers and the quality of faculty recruited.
^The resistance of the old faculty as evidenced by their pressure
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for "slot hiring" and for "appropriate recruiting procedures," and also
by the grievance brought by the tenured faculty was a potential limita-
tion on the recruiting effort.
—The relatively low status of the University and its geographi-
cal isolation made it difficult to hire upwardly mobile faculty and those
interested in racial and urban problems, both central to Dean Allen's
vision for the School.
However, the driving forces, particularly the strategies pursued
by the Been, were more than sufficient to overcome these restraining
forces, and as a result during the period the Dean was able to recruit
change-oriented educators for the planning year to outnixmber conservative
educators in a ratio of about four to one. The major driving forces in
the accomplishment of this critical mass were;
—^The availability of new positions at the University, the result
of a imique growth situation arising out of the state's previous neglect
of its higher education system, made it possible for the School to double
its faculty size in one year.
—^The fact that the University heid, for the three years previ-
ous, been stockpiling faculty positions for the School of Education also
contributed to the doubling of the faculty at the School in the first
year.
—The fact that the University administration clearly supported
change at the School and specifically the Dean's "good men" hiring
philosophy helped the Dean overcome the resistance of the existing fac-
ulty to his hiring practices and the changes which he was bringing about
at the School
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—Dean Allen's recruiting strategies (Chapt. IV, pp. 133-I40),
were crucial to the building of a change-oriented faculty, chief among
them
1) His powerfully communicated vision for the School and the
energy with which he criss-crossed the country seeking and interviewing
potential faculty members
2) His development of the Planning Doctoral Program which, by
that 85 doctoral students joined the School, unequivocally
swung the balance of the School toward change and innovation 6uid which
also provided an additional incentive for faculty to join the School
3) His fund-raising success and financial risk-taking which pro-
vided money for the recruitment of faculty, stipends for most doctoral
students, and an additional level of support services for faculty members
4) His own reputation and contacts which put him in touch with,
and made him attractive to, competent and innovative people who shared
his vision for a new school of education
5) His personal recruiting approach, by which he focused on peo-
ple whom he personally knew and had worked with, and in turn relied on
their personal contacts to build a faculty which met his requirements
for both quantity and quality
6) His other recruiting strategies, particularly the payment of
high salaries to young educators, his first-class recruiting policy, and
his strategy of letting potential faculty recruit each other were all
central to overcoming the problem of recruiting for a relatively low-
status university in a geographically isolated location
7) His unwillingness to allow existing faculty objections to
impede the recruiting effort
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The euooesB of the critical mass strategy provided the foundation
of a strong driving force toward innovation for the planning year. As
Chart III ™akes dramatically clear, during the planning year the sum of
the driving forces toward innovation far outweighed the restraining
forces-and the major components of those driving forces were the change
strategies emplcyed by the Dean working from the basis of the critical
mass achieved and his unchallenged power position in the School.
There were, however, a number of substantial restraining forces
operating during this period, particularly:
—Again, the general restraining forces described by Hefferlin
slowed the change process*
—The conservative orientation of most old faculty and some new
faculty and doctoral students tended to slow the pace of change.
—The time constraints, combined with the high expectations for
the year, tended to limit, and at times prevent, attempts at well-planned,
solidly-based, innovation.
—The insufficient financial resources, particularly in the area
travel and secretarial support, tended to reduce opportunities
or time available for the development of innovative programs.
—The fact that many in the School believed that the University
Faculty Senate would resist more radical forms of experimentation and
was, as a body, hostile to the School of Education potentially depressed
the level of innovation.
—The fact that historically University approval mechanisms for
new progreuns and courses had been careful, cumbersome, and slow, a fac-
tor which tended to inhibit innovation University-wide, was a potential
302
inhibition to the School of Education's attempts at innovation, partxcu-
larly beoause there was no way in which changes of the magnitude contem-
plated by the School could be approved in the normal way by normal
channels for the following year.
—The low participation of faculty in overall academic policy
decisions and problems of morale also adversely affected attempts at
innovation.
—dnd finally, many among both the new and old faoulty found the
ambiguities of the planning year difficult to deal with, causing in some
an ineffioient use of energies and in others a tendency to retreat to
safer, more conservative approaches.
On the driving force side of the equation were a few general,
University administration, and school-centered forces, with the vast ma-
jority of driving forces arising out of Dean Allen's change strategies.
The chief forces, exclusive of the Dean's strategies, can be summarized
as follows:
—The fact that the School received considerable publicity, most
of it favorable, in national, regional, and local media. Chief among
the publicity was an article on the School in the January 18, I969,
Saturday Review
, and articles chiefly in Massachusetts and Amherst/
Springfield papers, but also other cities nationwide, usually reporting
speeches made by Dean Allen under headlines such as "Teaching Pattern
Uprooted at UM," "Change Highest Education Priority," "Break with Tradi-
tion," "Creative Education," and "Priority: Change Society."
—The fact that throughout the year the School received strong
support of its efforts at innovation from the University administration.
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—The general euooess of most planning ooraitteea in developing
new programs, course content, and methods.
—The highly positive outcomes of the Retreat which gave the
School a fast start on the planning process and provided many of the
structures and processes, and considerable momentum for successful in-
novation during the planning year.
^The involvement of students in the planning which provided new
perspectives, important manpower, and a high level of commitment to the
success of the planning process.
These forces, although substantial, were, as Chart III makes
clear, in total far less significant than those change strategies em-
ployed by the Dean in providing driving forces for innovation at the
School. The second half of this chapter deals in detail with these
strategies and the way in which the power central to the success of
these strategies was achieved by the Dean.
The specific strategies delineated on Chart III and their effect
on the level of innovation at the School are described in pages 309
through 333 below.
On Achieving Organizational Dominance
The philosophical basis of Dean Allen's change strategies appears
to be that change is superior to stability and that it is the responsi-
bility of the leader to create an environment conducive to chauige within
his organization and to protect that organization from premature re-
straint from outside.^ Educationally, Dean Allen seems to view change
^A philosophy consistent with that proposed by Ladd (Change in
Educational Policy
, p. 206) as a result of his study of change in higher
education.
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in terms of the creation of a wide number and variety of promising al-
ternative educational paths. Thus, although the leader is responsible
for creating a change environment, he does not necessarily dictate or
control the specific changes adopted by the organisation. For example,
as previously described, Dean Allen was willing to permit a lower empha-
sis on teacher education in the School than would have been his prefer-
ence and greater emphasis on humanistic education, human relations, and
student-centered teaching, areas not so high on his level of interest
and priority*
Since the leader is responsible for the achievement and protec-
tion of change in his organization, he must, according to Dean Allen's
approach, also have the power to create and maintain the necessary change
environment. Thus, the formula for a successful leader-dominated change
effort can be succinctly stated as
1 ) Get the power
2) Use it right
with a corollary that power "used right" tends to create more power. In
practice, neither is easily achieved* Bean Allen was extraordinarily
successful both in accumulating power in the School and in using it in
highly imaginative, highly effective ways. The two are mutually inter-
dependent in this view of change. Without the power, the change strate-
gies would be ineffective. Without effective change strategies, the
power would be useless.
Dean Allen, in common with all deans at the University, had been
delegated formal power over all aspects of the operation of his School
by the Board of Trustees—subject, of course, to conformity with University
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policy. One can thus reasonably ask two questions:
-Why do not other deans, some of whom are oommitted to change
as thoroughly as Dean Allen, use their power to bring about change in
the same way he did?
-Why, if Allen had absolute power in the beginning, did he need
to accumulate more power to carry out his strategies?
The answer to these two questions comes primarily from the same
source. The success of change and innovation in a school depends pri-
marily on the cooperation and participation of the faculty who are re-
sponsible for the actual implementation of new programs. A dean who
tries to force change on a faculty will probably (a) get more resistance
than change, (b) alienate his faculty, and therefore (c) not stay dean
very long. Most deans, I would speculate, address this problem by at-
tempting to work closely with the faculty, one aspect of this approach
being the delegation of power (in fact, if not formally) to the faculty.
Such an approach tends to slow the pace of innovation, primarily because
the tenure system combined with traditional academic values tends to re-
sult in a powerful conservative force in faculties and also because of
the inevitable difficulties of getting agreement cunong large groups of
people on a new course of action.
3
Dean Allen did not attempt to work closely with the faculty he
fo\ind at the School. Rather his strategy was first to build a critical
mass of change-oriented faculty to assure general acceptance of the
change thrust, and then to direct and maintain that change thrust by
^See the conclusions of Hefferlin, Ladd, and Fasching and Deutsch
on "the limits of collegiality" (Chapt. II ).
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systematically achieving control of all the sources of power in the
School so that his change strategies were backed by a total power, both
legislated and uniegislated.
I have already described the legislated sources of power. Un-
legislated power came primarily from five sources.
First—and foremost, unlegislated power was derived from control
of the flexible (imcommitted) financial resources in the School, most
particularly the flexible portion of outside funding which could be used
for student stipends, secretaries, travel, telephone, office equipment,
consultants, and often faculty members, but also the flexible portion of
state money which went for salaries, promotions, and merit increases.
Dean Allen achieved this control over flexible money primarily
by his personal success as a fund raiser and consequent control over the
flexible portion of funds he had raised. As I have previously described,
he brought one large grant, the CAM grant, to the School with him. In
addition, his contacts and efforts were primarily responsible for the
METEIP and EPDA grants, for both of which he was codirector. Beyond
these grants, he expanded his sources of flexible money in the first year
by inducing the University to provide a total of 20 supervisory assist-
antships to be used for stipend money for his new students;^ by donation
of his innovation films series to the University on the condition that
income from them could be used by the School as desired; 5 and by arrang-
ing for the proceeds of summer workshops given by the School to be
^Videotape, "What Makes Dwight Tick," Florissant, Colorado, Sept.
19i 1968 (School of Education Media Center under title "I Have a Dream"
speech)
.
^Interview with new faculty member, April 1972.
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returned to the School .6 (These latter two souroes, together with two
small foundation grants, oomprised the funding for the Retreat. )? His
control of the state's discretionary money came primarily from his will-
ingness to use his legislated power and was confirmed by his success in
influencing merit pay and promotions during the first year.
During the planning year he was able to significantly increase
his supply of flexible money by negotiating a return to the School of
part of the overhead from outside grants, all of which had previously
gone to the University.®
Second—^Unlegislated power also came from control of the non-
^^^^-acial rewards intrinsic to the system—
—tenure
,
office assignments,
status positions, faculty hiring and student selection.
Part of his control of the non—financial rewards was derived from
his willingness to use legislated power. Thus he granted tenure in the
first year to a faculty member not recommended by the Personnel Commit-
tee and denied it to two others who had been recommended. He also suc-
cessfully decreed that faculty offices would be reassigned with the
arrival of the new faculty. ^ In addition to his willingness to use
legislated power, he drew from his control of flexible money to name
^Ibid .
^Interviews with Dwight W. Allen, July 1971 - May 1972.
®Ibid .
9some Tenured Faculty Members, "Grievance Against Dean Dwight
Allen, "Submitted to the University Tenure eind Grievance Committee
(April 10, 1968 ), p. 6 , and transcript of "Testimony of the Tenured
Faculty," pp. 34 & 35*
308
project directors and grant student stipends, and from his support from
the University administration to recruit most faculty and doctoral stu-
dents for the planning year and in subsequent years to negotiate "wild
card- positions for faculty and students which he alone controlled.
Third-^llen came to the School with considerable personal
power. He had a national reputation as an innovator, connections with
prominent educators throughout the country, and established relation-
ships with major funding sources. In addition, as previously described,
he expanded these sources of personal power in the School through his
critical mass strategy, most of the new people coming to the School pri-
marily because of him, and during the Retreat he continued to widen the
range of his personal power by establishing close personal contacts with
many of those present, by assuming strong leadership in the decisions of
the Retreat, and by impressing his powerful personality and unique style
upon the group.
This charisma is clearly a major component of Allen's personal
power. Speculation as to the how's and why's of his compelling person—
9'li'ty are outside the purview of this study, and only their outcomes are
being dealt with here. The principal outcome was that every speech,
every appearance before the group, and all his interactions with the
group or members of the group tended to result in the expansion of his
personal power.
Fourth—Support of the faculty, a result of his critical mass
strategy, was a major source of unlegislated power. This support, as
previously described, came primarily from the fact that he had recruited
most of them, they shared his vision for the School, and they looked to
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him for leadership, from the fact that he controlled the major power
sources in the School (as presently being described); and from the fact
that many cf the new faculty were young, and having no independent base
of aohievement tended to lock to the Dean for personal support, oonfima.
tion, and rewards.
Pifth~-nie full support of the University administration was an
important source of power on innumerable occasions and Dean Allen used
It. It was available because Allen was specifically hired to bring
about change, had put the Administration and Trustees on notice that he
intended radical change, and had by his actions from the beginning es-
tablished the precedent, and expectation on the part of the administra-
tion, that thoroughgoing change would be the norm of the School. He was
thus able to garner the consistent support of the administration for his
efforts; as Dr. Tippo observed, "We brought him here to change the place
and naturally we supported his attempts to do so."'*0
On Leader-Dominated Change Strategies
Dean Allen had thus, from the beginning, acted in such a way as
to accumulate power in the School for use in the change effort. It was
this power which provided the leverage for his change strategies which
in themselves were, as will be described, unique, imaginative, decisive,
often high in risk, and often counter to generally accepted practices of
bureaucratic manaigement.
^^Interview with Oswald Tippo, May 31 | 1972.
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My description of Allen's change strategies is based, in large
part, on a series of discussions of his leadership style with him. I
am most grateful to him for the enthusiasm and frankness with which he
pursued those discussions. At the same time it should be made clear
that the analysis and descriptions which follow are my own construction
and interpretation of his change strategies—^views which are derived
from my own observation and interpretation of his actions during the
period under review, from the record of his actions which emerges from
the documentary records of the time, as well as from my discussions with
him.
In preface, also, the potential replicability of Allen's leader-
ship strategies should be considered. It has been observed by many that
Allen is a highly unusual individual, particularly in his capacity for
risk-taking, the persuasiveness of his rhetoric, his commitment to change,
his high energy level, his high tolerance for ambiguity, and his clear
charismatic qualities—and for these reasons his leadership style and
strategies are not generally replicable. I concur in part with this ob-
servation, but believe a close examination of his strategies useful for
these reasons.
First—^While all the strategies pursued by Dean Allen at the
School of Education are probably not transferable to a given person or
situation, some surely are and would be useful to a given person or or-
ganization working for change in a given University.
Second—By looking closely at the strategies it is possible to
delineate some general principles behind such strategies. Such princi-
ples can be helpful to those interested in deriving their own change
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strategies based en their own personality, styles, strengths and the
nature of the specific environment in which they are working.
Third-The delineation of these principles can also lead to some
generalizations about the points at which academic organizations are
most susceptible to change efforts—which can also lead to the develop-
Sient of new strategies specific to the people and situations involved.
For descriptive purposes, the change strategies employed by the
Dean can be divided into three categories:
1) Those strategies used primarily to motivate and support
innovation within the organization
2) Those strategies used primarily to protect the organization
from outside intervention
3) Those strategies useful for both purposes*
As will become evident, most strategies could be used for both
purposes and my distinctions are based primarily on Allen's use of them
during the planning year.
To motivate and support innovation
within the organization
The creation of ambiguity
The emphasis on order, stability, and predictability common to
most organizationstends to narrow perspectives, limit imaginative hori-
zons, and restrict opportunities for innovation. To counter these or-
ganizational tendencies. Dean Allen deliberately set out to create
ambiguity in formal expectations, working relationships, and power and
status relations in the organization. He discontinued the entire
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curriculum for the School; he dismantled the existing organizational
structures of the School; he disoriented the traditional status rela-
tionships of the School; he generally supported the ambiguities inherent
in the "organic growth" model of planning organization; and he suspended
evaluation for most of the year—all of these having the effect of
plunging School members into an environment extremely high in ambiguity
where they were, at the same time both forced and permitted to develop
new perspectives, new expectations, new forms of organization, new work-
ing relationships, and new status relationships based more on present
resources and needs than on unquestioning acceptance of structures
created in the past.
Changing structures
But Allen did not allow the organization to exist entirely in
ambiguity. Where he believed that structures were useful in changing
behavior and encouraging innovation, he did not hesitate to introduce or
support them. The Retreat, for example, represented a structure designed
to facilitate creative planning and the center concept appeared an appro-
priate restructuring of the School for the development of innovative
progreuns. The modular credit system, which forced teachers to ask them-
selves how their material might be presented in other than a semester-
long, classroom experience is another example of how changed structures
were used to stimulate new behaviors.
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Critical mass
The metaphor implicit in thie strategy ie derived from atomic
physics in which the critical mass represents an amount of fissionable
material just large enough to set off a ohain reaction. As used by Dean
Allen, the oritioal mass strategy suggests that a ohain reaction of in-
novation or any other kind of change is best produced by building a
oritioal mass of change-oriented people. Allen used this approach most
Significantly, as has been described, when he recruited a sufficient
number of innovation-oriented faculty and doctoral students to overcome
the resistance of the existing faculty and thus get the School started
in the direction of innovation. The simple critical mass concept also
includes the more complex concept of variable critical mass—that the
necessary critical mass for innovation varies according to the specific
situation. Thus, for example, the Marathons, which grew to encompass
most of the School, were instituted by a handful of people as was the
emphasis on the elimination of institutional racism.
Sensitivity of the leader to the critical mass necessary for any
significant move on the part of the organization is a critical aspect of
the leader—dominated leaxiership style as it is the principal means by
which the leader keeps in touch with the needs and desires of those in
the organization and thus avoids one of the major pitfalls of leader
domination—a loss of touch with the organization, and its consequences,
the making of decisions inconsistent with the needs ajid desires of the
organization which will tend not to be supported by the organization.
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Allow the freedom to fail
Pear of failure can paralyze one's capacity for significant in-
novation. Although Allen clearly valued successful innovation most
highly, he also continually reiterated that he recognized that true ex-
perimentation carried with it the strong possibility of failure.
"... if all our experiments succeed, or if we can assure the success
of experiments before they are tried, we are not really experimenting—
or, at best, we are operating somewhere short of the outer limits where
experimentation is most needed."^
^
During the planning year Dean Allen behaviorally reinforced this
policy by refusing to dwell on a faculty or student's lack of success at
a given effort, but encouraging him to take on a new project, and subse-
quently has shown, on a number of occasions, his willingness to give
people a second chance or even a third—most notably, a person whom he
deposed as center head in I970 was promoted in I972.
Leader behavior as model for
organizational behavior
An importeint subcomponent of the use of precedents (p. 323) is
the setting of precedents by the behavior of the leader. A leader who
dominates his organization to the extent Dean Allen did inevitably be-
comes a model for many in his organization. Allen appeared highly sen-
sitive to this fact and used it to influence the behavior and attitudes
of those in his organization. For example, the Dean's informal behavior
^
^Quoted from Allen in "A View, A Review, A Vision," School of
Education Profile, ed. Lyman B. Brainerd, Jr. (Amherst, 1971 )i P* 17*
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toward those In his organisation and his allowing of similar behavior
toward himself was a significant factor in the breakdown of status dis-
tinctions early in the year. Also, his personal style-flamboyant,
active, and high risk-became an operating style for many in the School
during the year.
Ignore dissent when appropriate
Dean Allen felt that the dissent of the old faculty during the
initial year was based primarily on a blind resistance to change at the
School by a group who did not share the vision of change for which he
had been hired. He therefore saw no productive ends being served by at-
tempting to acknowledge and deal with their dissatisfaction. His strategy
therefore was to build the critical mass which would overwhelm their at-
tempts to change the course he had set for the School to, in effect,
roll over their objections.
He also used this strategy from time to time during the planning
year, particularly in response to criticism implying that the emerging
program was not sufficiently rigorous and to accusations of the neglect
of the \mdergraduate program—sit\iations where he felt that to focus on
such criticisms would be divisive and unproductive, and a threat to the
momentum of the change effort.
Juxtaposit ion/unity and diversity
An important component of the strategies of structure changing
and creating ambiguity is the principle of juxtaposition which postulates
that a particularly productive route to creative innovation is the
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development of new task groups based on differences in backgrounds and
special fields of interest rather than on similarities. Such differ-
ences tend to eliminate possibly unproductive initial assumptions and
to bring fresh perspectives to bear on educational problems. Dean Allen
strongly encouraged the development of such groups. Thus, for example,
the aesthetics core group included a psychologist, a secondary school
administrator, a reading specialist, a musician, a sculptor, and a high
school curriculum specialist; and what was to become a successful pro-
posal for funding of a new program in educational administration was
developed by ein American historian, an ex-business administrator, a pri-
vate school administrator, an English teacher, a University administra-
tor, an ex-county administrator, an ex-USOE official, and an ex-assistant
school superintendent.
Welcome and plan organizational peaks
Recognizing the proclivity for stability and oi*der in an organiza-
tion, and realizing that such stability tends to promote a relatively
low level of energy in the organization. Dean Allen adopted a conscious
strategy of using organizational challenges when they occurred to mobilize
the energy of the group, and of planning such challenges when they did
not occur naturally. Examples of planned organizational peaks are the
Retreat, the discontinuation of the curriculum, and marathons subsequent
to the first. Examples of using organizational challenges when they
occurred naturally are the development of the Interim Catalogue and the
use of a University racial crisis to commit the entire School to sponsor-
ing a remediative course open to all University students and employees.
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The Hawthorne effect rides first class
A general principle implicit in the Hawthorne experiment is that
one gets more commitment, activity, responsibility, and even intelligence
out of those in his organisation if he treats them as the uniquely spe-
cial, committed, responsible and intelligent people he wants them to be.
Especially in the early days of the School, Dean Allen worked this fact
to the hilt as seen in his dramatic "first-claso" recruiting of new fac-
ulty members; the high salaries paid new faculty; the giving of "respon-
sibility before their time" to young faculty and doctoral students; the
opening School meetings; the Retreat in a chartered plane to a distant
and beautiful setting; and his constant reinforcement in his speeches
of the idea that those in the School constituted the most outstanding
group of faculty and doctoral students anywhere in the country.
Reward innovative behavior
The rewarding of appropriate behavior with money, promotion,
status or the like is perhaps the most common of administrative strate-
gies, although many cannot use it to its potential because they do not
have sufficient control over the reward system. Dean Allen kept this
control, as 1 have previously described, and used it in the conventional
ways—but he also developed some novel kinds of rewards. The most
prominent of these was access to him. Since he was so busy, he was very
difficult to see, and only those highly in his favor enjoyed easy access
to him. This was both a status reward and of practical benefit because
the more time one spent with the Dean, who was at the oenter of the
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School, the more knowledge of end influence over the School one tended
to have. Another means of access to Dean Allen was to be asked to go
on one of his many trips with him. The Dean consciously used this invi-
tation both to reward people and as a lever to change the behavior of
those who he felt were working unproductive ly.
Another method of reward, often financial and always status, was
to be asked to take the Dean's place for the consulting jobs or speeches
with which he was constantly being deluged*
Another highly effective reward which Dean Allen used often to
good advantage was to unconditionally give away to people in the organi-
zation a part of the power which he had accumulated. For example, he haul
negotiated a substantial number of "wild card" faculty positions and
st\jdent admissions which he alone controlled. At times he "gave" one
of these positions or admissions to a faculty member or doctoral student
to use for his own purposes—a unique and highly valued reward.
Protecting the organization
from outside intervention
Channel clogging
The channel-clogging strategy, which can be defined as giving a
reviewing agency more material and items for decision than they can
possibly deal with in the time allotted, was used with great success in
securing Faculty Senate approval for the package.
Based on their past behavior, it seemed unlikely that this body
would approve a large number of the courses being proposed and many of
the overall academic policies. Had these been proposed singly, the
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Faculty senate would have been able to debate them, table them, amend
them, return them to committees, return them to the School for further
study, or any number of other delaying tactics such bodies oan use for
frustrating innovation. However, by submitting the entire 2,400-page
package at the same time and at year-end, the Faculty Senate's normal
channels of review were hopelessly clogged, and they were put in the
position of either approving the whole thing or rejecting it in total—
and the pressures for approval as a whole, especially since the package
represented a year's work of the whole School, proved insurmountable.
Up and out through creative
hole digging
Most administrators have a great fear of "getting into a hole,"
Dean Allen did not fear it, and in fact welcomed it as a means of expand-
ing the potential of his organization. For example, during the planning
year he overspent his budget by some $125,000 and was bailed out by the
Provost's Office. Rather than feeling abashed and indebted to the
Provost, Bean Allen used this situation as a means of establishing a
new level of funding for the following year.
Expanding credit by consuming it
Benjamin Franklin once observed that the best way to make a
friend was to consciously become indebted to him, for instance to borrow
something from him. Allen used a similar strategy, which might be called
expanding credit by consuming it, in his relationships with many at the
School, but especially with the University axiministration during the
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first two years of the School. His approach, which runs counter to that
of many who feel that noredif (good will) with others is finite and
Should be conserved, is to draw freely on good will in the belief that
more, rather than less, will be forthcoming. This strategy proved very
effeotive in the Dean's dealings with the Provost's Office, which granted
him increasing financial and personal support culminating in the financial
bail-out described above and their support of the package during the re-
view process.
Trumpet your weakness when appropriate
It is likely that any attempt at radical change will produce
some weak points at various stages in the change process. Rather than
inviting attack by offering a weak defense of these vulnerable areas,
It IS often useful to freely acknowledge the weakness and outline plans
for rectification of it. Dean Allen used this strategy very effectively
during the planning year to blunt criticism of the undergraduate program
and of the insensitivity of the School to cross-campus relationships.
Indeed, in any situation in which these were potentially issues, he
could be coimted upon to raise them first, anticipating and disarming
his critics.
Many risks are safer than a few;
Getting off the chart with simultaneous
change; Becoming a moving target
—
multiplying everything
These three closely interrelated strategies were the major rea-
son that conservative forces were not able to nail the School at its
more vulnerable point—at the early staiges of innovation when the chaos
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and disorientation were at their high and results were at their low.
"Many risks are safer than a few" in the san,e way that a diver-
sified investment polioy is safer than investing all one's money in a
single company. With many risks, those that fail can be covered by
those that win. Thus in the planning year, the failure of the School
to serve undergraduates effectively was mitigated by the other suooesses
of the planning process.
"Getting off the chart with simultaneous change" is a way of
frustrating attempts to prematurely judge innovative programs. One gets
off the chart by changing so many things that it is impossible to iso-
late a single element for criticism. Thus any attempts to zero in on
the pass-fail system during the planning year would have been vastly
complicated because along with the pass-fail came new educational goals,
modular credit, new course content, innovative teaching methods, doc-
toral student teachers, and more experiential approaches.
"Becoming a moving target" has a similar goal. This strategy
includes expanding the options available for a given educational goal,
thus making the judgment of one option relatively useless; and also in-
volves changing at such a rate that judgment of an existing practice is
frustrated by the fact that that practice is to be replaced in the near
future. Thus, attempts to judge the School's course offerings were
frustrated by the School's announced intention to move to a completely
modular curriculum.
It should be pointed out that these strategies are not intended
to frustrate internal evaluation of new progreuns, although they unques-
tionably do make it more difficult, but rather they are designed to
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impede premature jtidgments by those
generally safe to assume that those
outside the organization—and it is
judgments in an existing university
can be counted upon to be predominantly conservative.
Dual strategies which both motivate
the organization and protect it
from outside intervent ion
Go for radical change
Dean Allen has often been quoted as observing, »A little change
hurts. A lot of change hurts only a little more«~and his approach to
change during the first two years of the School clearly reflects, and
to a large extent supports, this contention. For example, one might
speculate that if any one or two of the reforms of the year, such as
pass-fail grading and modular credit, had been proposed as the only re-
forms of the year they would have been met with much the same resistance
from, and proved just as painful to, people both within and without the
School as was the entire range of reforms proposed in the package. It
is further a reasonable speculation that if only a few reforms had been
proposed, it would have been easier to defeat them than it was to at-
tempt to address the wide range of reforms actually proposed.
In sum, one can speculate on the basis of the evidence in the
period under review that a highly effective route to change is to go
for radical change on the grounds that radical change has a better
chance of succeeding than slow change and that resistance to, reaction
to, and indeed the pain from radical change is not significantly greater
than that to less thoroughgoing change. ^2
Use precedents
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Precedents are powerful motivators, for better or for worse.
Dean Allen made sure that they were for the better. Where he found a
useful precedent he used it; where he found a hannful one, he eliminated
it; where he needed a precedent, he made one.
This strategy proved useful both within and without the organi-
zation.
Within, the stage for his ability to manipulate precedent in
this way was set from the beginning, when he so flaunted and violated
precedents (such as the precedent of faculty control over new appoint-
ments) that the entire set of precedents affecting the School was thrown
into chaos, thus leaving him free to rewrite tradition himself. He used
some of the old precedents that were useful to him, chiefly the approval
of the faculty Personnel Committee to legitimize new appointments and
the precedent of a strong dean established by Dean Purvis. He eliminated
some traditions, chiefly the formality of relationships among faculty
and between the faculty and the students, the traditional definition of
behavior representative of faculty achievement, and the traditional
power of the faculty over certain academic areas. And he created new
traditions, "retreats” as a legitimate means of focusing energy around
a given problem, reduced status distinctions eunong faculty and between
12Bennie, however, reaches an opposite conclusion on the basis of
his experience at Buffalo. (See Chapt. II, pp. 59“60.)
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faculty and studenta. and action and change over contemplation and
stability.
He used this strategy of precedent-setting in dealings outside
the organization with particular success in the establishment of new
limits for his own behavior by the administration. For example, by his
initial conditions for employment whioh included considerable autonomy
in staff selection, and by his statement to the Trustee selection com-
mittee that he would be neither a cheap Dean nor a safe Dean, he estab-
lished new precedents for his own behavior. This autonomy and flexibility,
beyond that enjoyed by most Deans, contributed substantially to his oa-
pacity to bring about change at the School of Education.
The creative use of ignorance
Academic bureaucracies have the effect of stifling innovation
under a blanket of "appropriate channels and procedures," In the early
days Dean Allen chose not to learn about these and thus, in pursuing
his change goals, was able to make immediate commitments to people,
when bureaucratically he should not have been able to; was able to an-
nounce the discontinuance of all degrees, certification, requirements,
etc, when he did not technically have the power to do so; to make ex-
penditures technically illegal under University policy; and to send a
"package" to the Faculty Senate with which they could not possibly deal
in the time available.
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Develop an independent power baap
Allen's national reputation served him in two vei^ significant
ways. First, it assured him of mobility_a good job elsewhere, which
gave him the freedom to take greater risks at UMaes than he might have
had his entire reputation been based on his success at UMass. And
secondly, this reputation gave his ideas and actions greater credibility
in the School and University than they would have had, had he not been
nationally known as a leader of educational reform.
Serendipity
The concept of the use of serendipity as a strategy is difficult
to explain, since it consists primarily of actions resulting from a way
of looking at things. The approach is somewhat akin to that advocated
by some in the human potential movement—to look at things as they
really are (not what one wants them to be) and trust one's intuition.
Translated to Allen's strategy, this approach might be described as
"Don't try to plan and structure everything. As long as good people
are working together good things will emerge, although what will emerge
cannot be predicted—and when good things do emerge
,
nurture and support
them." Some examples of the serendipity strategy at work in the School
include: the emergence of the Aesthetics and Humanistic Centers and
integrated day program, the genesis of racial awareness at the Retreat,
the development of the marathon as a major educational format, the re-
cruiting strategy by which candidates recruited each other, and the
emergence of the Planning Doctoral Program as a major component of the
planning year.
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Emphasis on post hoc evaluation
Allen made it clear from the beginning that he preferred people
to implement programs based on their best estimates of what would be
most effective, and then to evaluate the program while in progress,
using the evaluative material to make appropriate changes, or if the
data were sufficiently negative, to discontinue the program. This
strategy, which prevented programs from a premature death, became in-
stitutionalized in the Interim Catalogue and was a significant facili-
tator of innovation. In most institutions, proposed new programs must
be approved by some group before they can be offered. This pre-hoc
evaluation tends to stifle attempts at innovation since it is both
threatening and time-consuming—and because it is a test of the theoreti-
cal base (and thus subject to theoretical biases of the reviewing group)
of the program, rather than its practical outcomes.
This emphasis on post—hoc evaluation also appeared in the evalua-
tion proposal in the Interim Catalogue
, by which the success of the
School was to be judged on a continuing basis over a two-year period
a proposal which, as I have previously described, was a major factor
in the acceptance of the package by University agencies.
Valuing ends over means
As described by Dean Allen, "My goals are absolute, but my means
flexible." This distinction is a highly useful one for change-oriented
administrators who can expect resistance to their efforts and must
therefore be prepared to adopt alternative means to their original ends.
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Dean Alien showed this flexibility a nun.ber of times during the period
under review, for example, in proposing that the reforms of the package
be temporary and conditional, rather than final as he would have pre-
ferred; by creating new funding from sources both within and without
the University when it became clear that the School budget would not
support a change effort of the magnitude he desired; and by using the
Planning Doctoral Program to establish a critical mass of change-
oriented people when insufficient faculty positions were available for
that purpose.
Appearance can create reality
Dean Allen has observed to me;
If you are great and people think you are great, that's ideal.
If you are not great, and people think you aren't great, that's
hopeless. But if you are not great, but on the road there, and
people think you are great, then they will help make you great.
In other words, to say you are something can be an aid to getting you
there. Dean Allen used this strategy both as a motivator for those in
the organization and as a magnet to draw new people to the organization.
As a motivator, it was in many ways akin to the Hawthorne ef-
fect strategy, and was achieved primarily through the Dean's persuasive
rhetoric. It began in the initial recruiting, when Allen was able to
convey an image of what the School could be sufficiently powerful to
draw the people who could make it that way. In this effort he concen-
trated not on present realities and problems, but future possibilities.
In the same way, in his talks to the School during the planning year he
was inevitably highly optimistic and highly positive, refusing often to
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acknowledge, and always to dwell on, real problems that existed in the
organization—but rather choosing to emphasize the progress that had
been made and the possibilities for the future. Such speeches, for
example the "internal combustion engine" speech given at the low point
in the package preparation process, more often than not had the effect
of recharging the energies of those in the organization and refocusing
them on the realization of the Dean's vision for the School. In the
writer's opinion, the Dean's skillful use of rhetoric in support of
this strategy was a central reason for the maintenance of focus and
energy on the planning in spite of many very real difficulties and
frustrations.
The Dean also used this strategy in speeches throughout the
coiintry and in national publicity to recruit new people to the organi-
zation. The "image" of the School as the most creative, innovative, and
exciting school in the country which he portrayed would have been criti-
cized by many at the School as unreal and misleading as it did not re-
flect the problems and shortcomings of the School. However, whatever
the reality, the "image" of the School presented by the Dean did draw
a large number of creative, competent, and enthusiastic people to the
School for the I969-7O year (and thereafter), people who made major
contributions to the quality, creativity, range and excitement of the
School's program.
It should be pointed out here that this can be a dangerous
strategy when the image becomes too far out of joint with the reality.
Under such conditions the effect of positive rhetoric tends to lead to
frustration and alienation on the part of members of the organization
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who see the leader as unwilling to deal with real problems which are
affecting them, and to disenchantment and disaffection on the part of
those who have joined the organization on the basis of what they came
to see as false and inflated expectations. 1 3 jn fact, during the period
under review, some did become alienated and disaffected for these rea-
sons, but overall the strategy was successful in maintaining the focus
of organizational energy on innovation and attracting highly competent
people to the organization.
Conservation of organizational energy
One of Dean Allen's fundamental principles of leadership is the
conservation of organizational energy for focus on innovation. Perhaps
the clearest example of this principle is Dean Allen's approach to
"flank—protecting"—a major occupation of most administrators.
Dean Allen, quite simply, doesn't do it—doesn't waste organi-
zational energy on preparing for contingencies that might or might not
occur. Such flank-protecting is costly both in its use of organizational
time and in the fact that it tends to focus the organization on protec-
tive, defensive postures rather than on maintaining the momentum of the
change effort. Thus, Dean Allen preferred to act, to see what the real
outcomes of his actions were, and then to address those real outcomes.
As he describes it, "Good people are the best contingency plan"—in the
sense that he trusted people in his organization to be able to deal
with whatever contingencies arose.
p. 59).
^^Bennis encountered this problem at Buffalo (see Chapt. II,
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Thus, during the period under review, Alien spent little time
preparing for ..«hat if •s.'_..what if the faoulty bring a grievanoe against
him?" "What if the community does not approve the Constitution?"
"What
If we overspend the budget?" but successfully overcame these problems
when "they actually occurred.#
Being a leader-learner
A second major pitfall to the leader-dominated form of organi-
zation^5 is the organization's inability to be much better than its
leader, who, having achieved hie position on the basis of his knowledge
and ability
,
more often than not tends to stop learning in the press of
maintaining his organization.''^ Thus, a leader must change and grow
in order to enable his organization to do the same.
The evidence of the first 26 months indicates that Dean Allen
did indeed grow and change while maintaining his position as unques-
tioned leader of the School. The fact that the School became far more
and quite different than he had anticipated is the strongest indicator
of his ability to learn and grow. Other indications observed by the
writer over the period include changes in racial attitudes and opinions;
increased sensitivity to the needs of his subordinates, especially his
A Jk
^Perhaps the most impressive example of this strategy occurred
during the third year when the School of Education Evaluation Committee
issued a highly critical report on the School—^which was rebutted with
devastating effectiveness in a formal reply prepared by three faculty
members in two months' time.
1 'S
^The first, previously mentioned, being loss of contact with the
organization.
1
6
°Dean Purvis' administration appears an example of such a situa-
tion.
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Assistant Deans; increasing ability to listen to and support ideas not
necessarily consistent with his own, and growing interests in areas with
which he had previously not been particularly personally concerned, par-
ticularly urban education, futuristics, and creativity.
Using the default position
A basic principle of Dean Allen's strategy is to make sure that
what he calls the "default position" works to his advantage. As de-
scribed by the Dean, the Default Position appears to have three inter-
related components.
First, the Dean is very aware of a fact often ignored by those
in decision—making positions—
—that not to make a decision is in effect
a decision in itself, usually "by default" a conservative one. Allen
was thus during the planning year highly sensitive to decision points
and quick to step in to make decisions (as has been described in
Chapters VI and VII ) when no one else, particularly the Executive Com-
mittee, seemed willing or able to do so. During this year Dean Allen
made most decisions, and took action upon the crucial issues confront-
ing the School including faculty recruitment, student admissions, and
the establishment of School priorities and policies so that the oppor-
tunity for innovative approaches to these issues would not be lost "by
default."
A second aspect of the use of the default position is to put
someone else in the default position—to make a decision or take an
action before they do so that they are faced with a fait-accompli
,
mak-
ing it considerably more difficult to impose a different action or
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decision—since not only must the new action be conceptualized and ar-
gued, but the existing action must be somehow proven inappropriate.
Dean Allen's decisiveness during the planning year resulted in a large
number of situations in which potential opponents were placed in the
default position. Some of the more significant of these were the de-
cision to discontinue the catalogue, the decision to take on the METEP
and EPDA grants, the decision to recruit by the "good man" approach
rather than by slot, the decision to create a Planning Personnel Com-
mittee to make personnel decisions about new faculty members, and the
decision to take on the race relations course.
One can get a sense of the effectiveness of this kind of
strategy if he imagines himself, for example, an opponent of the METEP
grant on the grounds that it would force the School to adopt a behav-
ioral model of teacher training when he feels a more informal, human-
istic, and student—centered approach is a superior approach. How much
easier it is to argue against applying for the grant in the first place
than to attempt to repudiate the grant once it has been won by the
School.
A third aspect of the use of the default position is closely
related to the second—and both might be summed up as "It's far easier
to s t o p a proposed program than one that is in operation." In its
third application this facet of the default position implies consider-
able benefit to taking action, to getting things tinder way no matter
what the difficulties or expected opposition. In this sense the ap-
proval of the package with the proviso that it be evaluated over a two-
year period reflects a use of the default position on a grand scale.
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For, with two years of real operation establishing the new policies and
programs of the School and integrating them into the statue quo of the
University, it is difficult to imagine that any University agency would
have been willing or able to stop, or significantly amend, any signifi-
cant policy or program of the School without provoking a major upset of
the School—which University agencies would be loath to do. It would
have been far easier to have changed or stopped the program before it
went into operation.
Change Principles
Summary of Change Leadership Principles
Prom the leader-dominated change strategies enumerated in the
previous pages it is possible to extract a number of principles of suc-
cessful change leadership which appear to underly these specific strate-
gies. These principles are significant in that, from them, those
interested in change leadership can derive other strategies appropriate
to their own personality and leadership style, and to the specific or-
ganization and organizational environment in which they are working.
There appear to be five major principles underlying the change
strategies pursued by Dean Allen. The principles, and the strategies
from which they were derived, are as follows:
1 ) Risk Big—Operate **on the Edge of Viability”—Derived from
"Many Risks are Safer than a Pew/Oetting off the Chart with Simultaneous
Change/Becoming a Moving Target," "Creative Hole Digging," "Expanding
Credit by Consuming It," "Trumpeting Weaknesses," "Channel Clogging,"
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"Ignoring Dinsent," "Creation of Ambiguity," and "Conservation of Organi-
zational Energy,"
2) Dream Big—Derived from "Go for Radical Change,"
"Havrthorne
Effect," and "Image as a Means to Reality."
Right Side of the Default Position
—Derived
from "Using the Default Position," "Changing Structures," "Critical
Mass," "Many Risks are Safer than a Pew/Getting off the Chart with
Simultaneous Change/Becoming a Moving Target," "Radical Change," and
"Use of Precedents,"
4) Conserve organizational energy for, and focus it on. the
change effort—^Derived from "Welcoming and Planning Organizational
Peaks," "Post Hoc Evaluation," "Valuing Ends over Means," "Critical
Mass," "Ignoring Dissent," "Freedom to Pail," "Appearance Can Create
Reality," and "Conservation of Organizational Energy."
5) Don*t Stifle by Overplanning—Derived from "Creation of
Ambiguity," "Welcoming and Planning Organizational Peaks," "Conserva-
tion of Organizational Energy," "Juxtaposition," "Creative Hole Digging,"
"Serendipity," "Valuing Ends over Means."
Summary of Institution Susceptibility
to Change Points
As Hefferlin and many others have effectively described, large
academic organizations appear to be uniquely resistant to change. The
success of Dean Allen's strategies in bringing about change at the Uni-
versity of Massachusetts does indicate, however, that there are some
points at which at least that University was susceptible to change.
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Looking at such points may be of help to others attempting to bring
about change in large educational organizations.
/
Speoifioally, it appears that the existing faculty at the School
of Education were susceptible to:
critical mas s strategy—^which had the effect of chang-
ing the character of the original organization in the direction of
change and innovation.
The influence of a leader from outside with relatively hi^h
national status—^which may have intimidated potential resistance.
^ ) The influence of a leader with the clear support of the
University administration—which removed an important element of support
from potential opposition.
4) Anti-bureaucratic behavior—Since the Dean did not use the
customary channels of decision-making or honor precedents he did not
like, those opposed to him, initially at least, had no "regular" way
to resist his decisions.
5 ) Confrontation—^The Dean's "risk big" style, his boldness
and brashness, and use of the default position tended to create poten-
tial confrontation situations—from which, at least initially, the
existing faculty backed away.
The affected decision-making bodies of the University as a whole
appear to have been susceptible to:
1 ) The influence of a leader from outside with a relatively
high national status
2 ) The influence of a leeuier with the clear support of the
University administration
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^^^.^^-^^reaucratic behavior-especial Iv in "unloading" the
Interim Catalo^e at the last minute with no previous attempt to fit
it into the regular bureaucratic machinery
Confrontation—especially the use of the default position
5) Channel clogging—which created a "take it or leave it"
situation, the "leave it" option appearing highly unreasonable
Getting off the chart with simultaneous change—which made
it very difficult, especially in the time available, for these groups
to fully comprehend the nature and implications of the proposed changes.
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CHAPTER IX
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
This final chapter contains two sections. In the first I shall
review the data of the case studies in the perspective of some of the
literature of change in higher education and organizational change de-
scribed in Chapter II as a means of providing some perspective on and
insight into the change effort at the School of Education. The second
section will include a recapitulation of the major conclusions of the
case analyses together with a series of extensions of those findings
in the form of significant hypotheses, speculations, and questions based
on or arising out of the material presented.
The Reform Effort in the Perspective
of the Literature
In this initial section I shall attempt to provide some insights
into and perspectives on the change process at the School of Education
and on the achievement of the School by looking at the data in the case
analyses in the perspective of the literature stunmarized in Chapter II.
Because of the relative shortness of the time period involved in this
study and the unsystematic form of the data available no attempt will
be made to reach definitive or comprehensive conclusions. Rather the
data from the summary of the literature will be selectively used to pro-
vide some insights into and tentative conclusions about certain aspects
338
of the change effort and ite leadership at the School of Education.
On "the Change Process
Levels of Chane^e Model
Looking at the data in terms of Hersey and Blanchard's Levels
of Change Model, it appears that the changes at the School were brought
about by a combination of the participative and coerced change cycles,
probably more heavily weighted toward the coerced end of the continuum.
Coerced change, according to the model, occurs when changes in group
and individual behavior are imposed prior to changes in individual atti-
tudes and knowledge. Clearly most of Dean Allen's change strategies were
aimed more at changing individual and group behavior than individual
attitudes and knowledge. For instance, the strategies of structure
changing, the creation of ambiguity, the creation of precedents, the
use of the default position, the use of the Hawthorne principle, the
rewarding of innovative behavior, and most other of the Dean's strate-
gies tend to be behavior change strategies as opposed to means of intro-
ducing new knowledge or changing attitudes.
There were, however, also substantial elements of the partici-
pative change cycle integral to the planning year, chiefly in the form
of the introduction of new knowledge through the diversity of field,
philosophy, background and experience of the 120 new members who joined
the School in September I 968 . In a very real sense most members of the
total group represented new knowledge in themselves, knowledge which
was diffused through the entire group as a result of personal contact
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in the mobile and flexible environment of the Retreat and initial months
of the planning year. This mode of knowledge diffusion is representative
of the participative cycle.
As a generality, though, the change cycle was more coerced than
participative—as was evidenced, among other things, by the swiftness
of the change. As such, one might, on the basis of the Levels of Change
Model, question the permanence of the changes, especially in the ab-
sence of a leader such as Allen, and also question whether the coercive
approach was most appropriate for a group which appeared to be more ma-
ture (independent, active, and responsible) than immature (dependent,
passive, and low in responsibility).
Maslow's need hierarchy
Allen's management of change at the School would appear to
have been generally consistent with management strategies indicated by
Maslow's need hierarchy. In the absence of any test data, one can only
speculate as to the general motivational level upon which most in the
School were operating. However, it seems likely that the majority were
bunched at the affiliation and esteem levels, on the assumption that
most on the basis of prior education and financial success or the po-
tential for it were beyond security fears and that few heid firmly
reached the self-actualization level.
Most of Allen's change strategies appear appropriate to these
two need levels. Esteem needs were addressed through the Dean's use of
the Hawthorne principle, through his granting of academic autonomy and
freedom to fail (indicating his confidence in the competence of the
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group), through rewards (such as personal contact with him) which ap-
pealed to esteem needs, and through his constant reiteration of his con-
viction that the instructional staff were the best and most exciting in
the country. Affiliation needs also appear to have been well-addressed
in the flexible and free-flowing group structure by which the planning
was done, allowing participants far greater freedom in choosing groups
to be related with and permitting greater interaction within and among
groups than would presumably have been possible in a more structured and
pre-planned mode of organization.
To the extent that participants were operating at the self-
actualization level, the Dean's strategies, many of which had a large
manipulative component, were probably neither appropriate nor effective.
In total, though, it appears that most aspects of the organizational
environment created by the Dean during the planning year were, in terms
of Maslow's need hierarchy, highly appropriate to the motivation level
of the group.
The Hersey-Blanchard synthesis
A number of elements of the Hersey-Blanchard synthesis also
offer some insight into aspects of the change process. In order to use
this synthesis, some assumptions must be made as to the phases in the
life-cycle in which the group was operating and the leadership style of
the Dean. As with the use of Maslow's need hierarchy, the absence of
test data requires that some gross assumptions be made on the basis of
evidence in the study.
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It appears that the group was generally operating in the area
of phases two and three as described by the life-oyole model-as indi-
cated by the fact that most came to the School committed to the task of
educational innovation and were able to structure their work toward its
accomplishment, but that good, well-functioning relationships among
people had to be built during the year because of the newness of the
associations between people.
As to Allen's leadership style in life-cycle terms, it is clear
from the data that he is a high-task leader—that his major focus is
on the task and that he is highly willing and able to provide struc-
ture for the achievement of the task. He is also, as a generality, a
low-relationship leader, as evidenced, perhaps most clearly, in his
hectic and busy schedule which, for the most part, leaves him insuffi-
cient time for the development of relationships with those in the group^
or to have much influence on the relationships among people in the
group.
In terms of life cycle theory, Allen's leadership behavior
toward the planning committees must be distinguished from his leader-
ship of the entire group in academic and organizational policy issues.
As previously described, Allen for the most part took a hands-
off posture toward the work of the planning committees—what would be
described as a low-task, low-relationships leadership style. While
^As one indicator, in the midst of the personnel action disputes
during his first year, Allen scheduled interviews with all the exist-
ing faculty at ten-minute intervals. (Albert S. Anthony, Memorandum
Grievances to Provost Oswald Tippo [Copy to Dean Dwight W. Allen],
Peb. 21, 1968, p. 12.)
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such behavior would, according to the theory, have been appropriate
to a phase four group, the fact that most were operating at phases two
and three meant that they were not getting appropriate leadership from
Allen himself, although in some cases appropriate leadership did arise
out of the group. The fact that some groups did not get effective
leadership may account, in part, for the mixed results of the planning
groups
.
Allen's leadership of the group in academic and organizational
policy matters was, as previously described, high task, low relation-
ships, a style which, according to life-cycle theory is appropriate
only to groups in phase one. This observation offers an interesting in-
sight into a significant aspect of Allen's leadership during the plan-
ning year.
It can be convincingly argued in terms of life-cycle theory
that since Allen's leadership style was most appropriate to phase one
in the face of the fact that most of the organization was operating
in phases two and three, it was necessary to push the group back to
phase one for his lesidership to be most effective—and many of his
strategies did have the effect of putting group members in phase one
where task accomplishment was the major focus.
The return to phase one was achieved primarily by the creation
of crisis situations in the organization—situations where participants
were required to focus on the achievement of the task with little time
or energy for relationships. The planning year as a whole can be looked
at as a year of crisis created by the Dean, since it was, as previously
described, clearly too short for the accomplishment of the goals set
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for it. And many of the Dean's change strategies tended to create cri-
sis situations. For instance, his generally unplanned approach to the
work of the planning year tended to produce the crises of tight dead-
lines and organizational decision points (see, for instance, the package
preparation process) and his emphasis on radical change, risking big,
serendipity, organizational ambiguity, encouraging organizational peaks,
not protecting his flanks (when flanks had to be protected it was
usually in a crisis situation) and his use of the default position
(which tended to put others in a crisis situation) were all strategies
which tended to place those in the organization in a crisis situation.
One can speculate on the basis of life—cycle theory that the
group as a whole, operating in phases two and three, may have had some
resistance to this attempt to push them back into one—and that, as a
generality, although Allen's desire to put the group into a phase where
his leadership style was most effective probably had considerable merit,
it would have been preferable if he could have varied his style in the
direction of an increased relationship focus. The low participation of
School members in the interim constitution and catalogue deliberations
may have been a symptom of the group's lack of response to Allen's
high-task, low-relationship style.
One might also speculate on the basis of life-cycle theory
that the group's movement into the fourth and most mature phase will
be difficult unless Allen can reduce, or more appropriately channel,
his high task style of leadership.
Viewing Allen's leadership behavior in the perspective of
Herzberg's Motivation—Hygiene construct is appears that the success of
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the change effort is attributed in part to the fact that Allen found a
generally appropriate balance between task-related motivators (achieve-
ment, recognition for accomplishment, challenging work, increased re-
sponsibility, and growth and development) and non-task related hygiene
factors (policies and administration, supervision, working conditions,
interpersonal relationships, money, status and seciirity), with the pro-
viso that his strategy of leaving hygiene factors (except for money and
security ) to the planning committees tended to result in irregular
satisfaction of these factors depending on the leadership of the plan-
ning committees.
Allen’s approach to management appears to have been centered
primarily in System 3 as described by Rensis Likert ("Management is seen
as having substantial but not complete confidence and trust in subordi-
nates. While broad policy and general decisions are kept at the top,
subordinates are permitted to make more specific decisions at lower
levels. ... Rewards, occasional punishment, and some involvement are
used to motivate workers"). On the basis of the Hersey-Blanchard Syn-
thesis, this system is most appropriate for phase two of the life cycle,
and one can postulate that Allen's leadership would have been more ef-
fective had it consisted more of System 4 components which, according
to the theory, are appropriate for phase three groups. System 4 compo-
nents appear more participative in nature and include:
Mcinagement is seen as having complete confidence and trust in
subordinates. Decision making is widely dispersed throughout
2
Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard, Management of Organiza-
tional Behavior, Second Edition (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall , 1972)t p* 61.
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the organization, although well integrated. Workers are raoti-vated by participation and involvement in developing economic
rewards, setting goals, improving methods, and appraisingprogress toward goals.
3
I have used Force Field Analysis in Chapter VIII to describe the
forces at work in the change effort. As evident from that analysis,
change was achieved principally by an increase in the number of driving
forces. One can speculate on the basis of the theory that this method
of bringing about change brought with it an increase in tension in and
volatility of the organization in the sense that the driving forces would
have to be maintained to maintain the change focus of the organization.
The Greiner change sequence
The change effort at the School of Education followed the first
six steps of the Greiner sequence (pp. 81-83) of successful change quite
closely—as follows:
1) Top management (the University awiministrati on) was under
pressure (the pressure to upgrade the School and University) to improve
the School of Education, and performance and morale at the School were
low.
2) A new man "known for his ability to introduce improvements"
was hired as head of the organization.
3) His initial act was to encourage exaunination, not so much
of past practices at the School, but of appropriate practices for a con-
temporary School of education.
%bid.
,
p. 62.
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4 ) He and hie associates did, for the most part, assume a "direct
and highly involved" role in conducting the examination.
5 ) All levels of the organization were involved in the program
planning phase of the planning year, although participation in overall
policy decisions was considerably more limited.
6) The Dean clearly "provided others with new ideas and methods
for developing solutions to problems."
According to Greiner's findings, the change effort will tend to
fail if it does not follow all eight steps of the sequence, the final
two of which are (7) solutions and decisions are tested on a small scale
before any attempt to integrate them into the organization as a whole
and (8) the change effort is gradually absorbed into the organization's
way of life.
It seems clear from the case analyses that the School's reform
effort did not follow these final two steps. Rather, its approach to
change was to go for fast, radical change rather than gradual and its
reforms went directly from the conceptualization phase to full-scale im-
plementation in the approval of the Interim Catalogue without any sig-
nificant small-scale testing.
Since Greiner's hypothesis offers no alternatives except success
and failure, one can only conclude on the basis of his sequence that the
School's change effort will not be successful—a conclusion not consist-
ent with the evidence that the change effort appears, during the period
under review, to have met with considerable success.
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Planned change
The School, during the planning year, occasionally used outside
consultants to aid in the development of parts of its program. For in-
stance, there was at the Retreat a consultant from Synectics Incorporated
who did creative problem solving with a number of the interest groups.
However, no consultants were used to facilitate the development of the
program and organization as a whole and the entire change effort was
clearly not in the planned change mode. Many of the strategic princi-
ples of planned change (p. 85) were, however, followed, most particularly
the integration of the change into all levels of the organization, the
participation of all levels of the organization in program planning,
the fact that the change thrust came from the top level of the organi-
zation, and the fact that the change effort appeared to be supported by
both the informal and formal structures of the School—all of which
would seem to be indicative of the success of the change effort in the
perspective of the planned change model.
The major strategic principle that the School was unable to
follow was the condition that relevant aspects of the surrounding envi-
ronment also be changed. At the end of the period under review, the
University as a whole was relatively unchanged and the University Fac-
ulty Senate remained generally hostile toward the change attempt at the
School—^both factors which could inhibit the change effort in the future.
Change process model strategies
Many components of the School's change effort appear to have
been described in Schein and Kelman's delineation of strategies commonly
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used in the unfreezing-changing-refreezing process model. It should be
noted, however, that this model does not apply to the School in its con-
ventional usage. Because a large majority of those participating in the
change effort at the School were new to it, one must view the unfreezing
phase not so much as a freeing up from existing organizational patterns,
but as a freeing up from old assumptions about schooling carried from
previous experiences as students and teachers in conventional schools.
Similarly
,
one must loolc at the changing phase not so much as changing
organizational patterns, but creating patterns where none had previously
existed. The change effort at the School compares with the model as
follows:
The unfreezing stage:
Schein has identified four common elements of the unfreezing
process, two of which are
—the physical removal of the individual[s] from accustomed
routines, sources of information, and social relationships
—the undermining and destruction of all social supports.^
In a very real sense these two components were intrinsic to the
situation of most in the School in the initial months of the planning
year. The 120 new instructional staff had left their accustomed rou-
tines, sources of information, and social relationships and come to a
new environment where there were few established relationships or social
supports for them. And then, to further intensify the removal, shortly
after their arrival in Amherst the entire group was flown to Colorado,
4chapt. II, pp. 83-84
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where participants were removed even from the normal social support of
their families. Additionally, the unstructured approach both to the
Retreat and to the planning deprived participants of the normal organi-
zational structures and routines—further intensifying the unfreezing
pressures.
Schein goes on to describe two further elements which appear to
work in the unfreezing process
—demeaning and humiliating experiences to "help" persons see
their old selves as unworthy and thus be motivated to change
—the constant linkage of reward with willingness to change and
punishment with unwillingness to change. 5
The former component was not particularly in evidence, primarily
because the critical mass strategy had brought people already committed
to change and thus not requiring "motivation" to change. The old faculty,
however, did have to cope with a quickly developed norm that change was
superior to stability and that most of what had been done previously in
the School (ajid by association those who had done it) was not of much
value. Thus those, particularly in the old faculty, who tended to sup-
port the status quo had to undergo the "demeaning and humiliating" ex-
perience of being perceived as reactionary and conservative by most
others in the group—and it is probable that the more conservatively
oriented in the new group took this lesson to heart.
The latter element, the linking of rewards and punishment with
willingness to change was clearly, as described in Chapters IV and VIII,
a part of the gestalt of the School during the period under review.
3lbid.
,
p. 84«
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The changing stage:
The three major elements of the changing stage as described by
Kelman (p. 84) were operative in the School during the planning year.
Identification—was encouraged, especially with the Dean, but
also with many of the new faculty who represented models for new behav-
ior for those who needed such models
Internalization—was promoted by the new environment created for
those in the School, one high in ambiguity and low in conventional aca-
demic structures, which required new behaviors on the part of those in
the School if they were to survive and prosper
Coercion—was evident in the reward system which throughout the
year was geared to success in participation in the change process at the
School.
The refreezing steige:
Because of the shortness of the time period under review, there
is no firm basis for speculation as to the extent to which new behaviors
had become integrated into participants. The refreezing process, how-
ever, is, according to Kersey and Blanchard, accomplished primarily
through continued rewards for new behaviors. On the basis of this study,
it seems clear that as long as Allen remains Dean and maintains his in-
fluence over the organization that reinforcement will be forthcoming
—
indicating a successful refreezing of the change process began during
the period under review.
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On the Achievement of the School
By viewing the accomplishments of the School in the period under
review in the context of some of the literature described in Chapter II,
we can come to some assessment of the achievement of the School during
the period under review and some insights into the means by which change
was brought about.
First, it is clear that the School was able to accomplish sub-
stantial reform in a system which historically has been highly resistant
to change, (pp. 25-29 )
Secondly, the aceidemic reforms accomplished were generally in
the direction of flexibility, diversity, experimentation, individualiza-
tion, student responsibility, increased field experience, and experien-
tial learning—directions consistent with the recommendations of the
major commissions on higher education of the last five years, (pp. 29-32 )
and thirdly, the success of the reform effort can be traced pri-
marily to the Dean's success in avoiding the pitfalls of collegial deci-
sion making, which appear to be the major factor in resistance to reform
in higher education, (pp. 46-47 1 49-51* 53-55)
Comparison of the change process at the School of Education with
that described in the four case studies described in Chapter II yields
additional insight into the School's accomplishments—as described below.
Comparison with Dennis' conclusions
The chcinge effort at Buffalo described by Bennis bears many
similarities with that of the School of Education. Both were instigated
by new leaders with substantial national reputations, considerable
charisma, and a powerfully articulated vision for change and national
prominence. Both began in institutions with undistinguished reputations,
brought in what was intended to be a critical mass of change-oriented
staff, and committed themselves to rapid and thoroughgoing reform. Both
leaders also had to cope with resistance from established faculty mem-
bers.
And there were also some major situational differences. The
Buffalo attempt involved the entire institution and considerably larger
numbers of people. Thus, at Buffalo, Meyerson could not personally man-
age the change effort, as did Allen, but had to rely on layers of manage-
ment with the attendant possibility of inconsistent and diffused goals
and erratic quality of leadership. Also highly significant was the fact
that Meyerson was apparently not able to reach the critical mass of
change-oriented staff that Allen achieved, since despite the fact that
75 per cent of the faculty were Meyerson people, the remaining 25 per
cent were apparently sufficiently strong in numbers and power to success-
fully oppose the change effort. And finally, the environment which af-
fected Buffalo, primarily city and state political forces, was not as
predictable or controllable as was the academic bureaucracy of the Uni-
versity of Massachusetts.
Given these points of similarity and difference the major issue
in comparing the Bennis study with this one is the question of the degree
of parallel between the two institutions. Can one view the School of
Education as near the beginning, perhaps the high point, of the four-
year cycle of high hopes and disintegration described by Bennis or is it
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sufficiently different both in situation and management style so as to
avoid the collapse portended by the Buffalo study?
Looking only at the period under review we can speculate that,
although there are significant differences as described above, there are
enough areas of similarity to make some meaningful comparisons and per-
haps point to some areas of potential difficulty in the future.
Four of Bennis' conclusions stem from problems which arose out
of the gap created when high expectations were not fulfilled. According
to Bennis these expectations ran up against the realities of insufficient
financial resources, inadequate and fragmented space, resistance on the
part of existing faculty, and inability to deal with the inevitable dif-
ficulties which accompany an attempt to create new academic and organi-
zational norms and structures. The result, at Buffalo, was disillusion
and disaffection on the part of new faculty, loss of momentum, euid in-
ability to deal with present problems since participants preferred to
deal with dreams of the future.
Many came to the School of Education with parallel expectations,
and there were, during the period under review, some symptoms of disillu-
sionment (low participation in academic and organizational policy and the
unexpected difficulties over the interim constitution) and inability to
deal with present realities (the neglect of undergreuiuate education and
cross-campus relationships). However, as a generality these problems
appear to have been avoided during the year under review—for three
reasons. First, the fact that the first year was designated a planning
year both fulfilled the hopes of participants for opportunities to design
new programs and largely avoided the necessity of dealing with the reality
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of existing students and implementing real programs. Secondly, the
autonomy granted the new faculty and doctoral students apparently more
than fulfilled their personal expectations, and thirdly the Dean through
his change strategies was successful in continuing the momentum toward
the generally shared vision of this relatively small group.
On the basis of Dennis' observations, however, one must wonder
if the School will be able to continue to avoid the vision-reality gap
in the future as it grows in size and the programs conceived during the
planning year enter the implementation and evaluation stage.
The School also, during the period under review, appears to have
avoided most of the problems implicit in Dennis' second, third, and
fifth recommendations, (pp. 59-6o) Although there were some who might
be defined as "crazies," their activities did not become a significant
lever against the School. Some (although there is no way of knowing if
all "like minded") existing faculty members and doctoral students did
wholeheartedly join the change effort, and those who did not appear to
have been neutralized by the critical mass strategy. And the School, al-
though clearly engaged in some rhetorical change, did also achieve sub-
stcintive change in a niunber of important areas including pass-fail
grading, modular credit, doctoral portfolios, individualized and more
flexible graduate programs, and the center concept of academic organiza-
tion. The one area where change appears to have been primarily rhetori-
cal was in governance, where the rhetoric of participation masked the
reality of leader-domination—a problem which, as previously described,
had the potential for creating significant problems in the future.
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Bennis' admonition not to "allow those who are opposed to change
to appropriate such basic issues as academic standards" appears not to
have been followed—a common criticism of the School by both dissident
faculty and outsiders being based on low academic standards and a loss
of faculty prerogatives, a similar basic issue. 6 But during the period
\inder review these criticisms had not been particularly effective.
The final major group of conclusions reached by Bennie concerns
the means by which change was achieved and the speed of change. His gen-
eral thesis is that change should be incremental and gradual and that
those affected by change should be involved in the planning of it. His
major argument for this thesis is that fast, radical change imposed on a
group tends to invite strong reaction.
The change effort at the School of Education was clearly on the
fast, radical end of the continuum with a relatively large amount of
participation in progreun development and considerably lower participa-
tion in the development of governance and academic policies. During the
period under review, however, no significant reaction to the change effort
had developed.
One can speculate that the absence of reaction resulted from the
I
inclusion of participants in the program planning and from the successful
j
critical mass strategy which, at least during the period under review,
I overwhelmed any potential sources of reaction.
i
i
I
^Criticisms explicit and implicit in the later Final Report of
the School of Education Review Committee , Donald Pairbairn, Chm. (Senate
Doc. 71-021), Feb. 18, I97O, See especially pp. 10 & 11, and 28.
!
I
1
In sum, it appears that during the period under review the School
of Education did, contrary to Bennis' conclusions, accomplish the goal
of achieving radical change in a short period of time. And one might
also hypothesize that it would continue to avoid the problem of reaction
so long as it was successful in recruiting change-oriented staff for the
School and continued to give them relative autonomy in the design of
academic programs.
Comparison with Hefferlin study
J. B. Lon Hefferlin concluded that the three dominant sources of
change in higher education were new resources available for innovation,
new advocates (people committed to bringing about change) and the open-
ness of the system to change. The change effort at the School of Educa-
tion seems to have been derived from these sources, with greatest impetus
for change coming from a single euivocate from outside the system—the
Dean.
Once Allen was hired, he proceeded to create new resources for
change, the $620,000 in incremental funding secured for the planning
year; to fill the School with euivocates of change, the 120 new change-
oriented educators recruited; and to exploit the openness of the system
to change (which was initially evidenced in the understandings of his
employment) considerably beyond, it seems clear, the expectations of
those who had hired him.
Hefferlin also concluded that situational factors, particularly
small size, financial instability, dependence on student tuition, high
faculty turnover, and urban location of the institution were central
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factors in bringing about academic innovation. The University of Massa-
chusetts and School of Education clearly do not fit this pattern. The
University was one of the 507 largest in the country, enjoying at the
time a growing level of support from the state for its operations, hav-
ing a relatively stable and growing faculty, and being located in a
rural setting.
Thus, it appears that the impetus for and success of the change
effort did not come from the situational factors, but rather from the
®f^*orts of one man who, once hired, raised the incremental money, re—
bruited new people, and successfully exploited the opportunities avail-
able within the system to bring about change.
This type of analysis provides a useful insight into the potential
for the continuation of change at the School. Since situational factors
do not appear to be a motivating force toward change, the impetus for
change must continue to come from those within the organization and from
the institutionalization of change in the organization as there appear
to be no penalties intrinsic to the system for unwillingness to change.
Viewing Hefferlin's ten "likely contributors" to continuous
academic change (pp. 44-47) one can be generally optimistic about the
possibility of maintaining change at the School. For instance. Dean
Allen appears, by his support of innovation and rewards for it, to have
created a "market" for innovation within the School; the School appeared
to have been headed in the direction of the inclusion of "marginal mem-
bers," particularly through its off—campus activities; certainly the
^Kenneth A. Simon and W. Vance Grant, Digest of Educational Sta-
tistics (Washington: DHEW, 1971 )i P* ^5*
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reorganization was brought about through the introduction of new members
and the course of growth upon which the School was embarked would seem
to assure the continuous introduction of new members; the circulation
of ideas appeared relatively open as a result of the flexibility of the
center concept and the emphasis on off-campus projects; initiative, par-
ticularly for academic programs, had clearly been decentralized to fac-
ulty and to students; collegiality had been avoided (described below);
and the institution could not be described as patriarchal (which system,
according to Hefferlin, is characterized by a centralization of power
based primarily on seniority). In fact, it appears that many aspects
of the decision-making process which actually existed in the organiza-
tion were very close to those described by Hefferlin as avuncular, in
which "initiative is neither permanently centralized nor dispersed
. . .
and while power is diffused it is occasionally centralized."®
Comparison with Ladd study
Dwight Ladd's review of the general failure of the study and
report approach to academic reform offers some insight into the means by
which change was effected at the School and some perspective on the di-
rection of that change. As to means, the School clearly did not use the
self-study method, which Ladd sees as generally unproductive for significant
change, but rather, having achieved a critical mass of change-oriented
people, chose to undertake the planning of a new school from a tabula
rasa, as if no school had previously existed, rather than focusing on
®Chapt. II, p. 47*
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the analysis and correction of deficiencies in the existing school.
Further, the new school was developed far more in the organic mode, out
of the aggregate of the program planning of individuals and small groups
working in specific fields, than it was out of a comprehensive study and
planning model in which the major part of the energies of those in the
School were devoted to the study, conceptualization, and development of
the academic policies and programs, and organizational structure of the
School as a whole.
It is probable that this approach, which refused to dwell on
the past and allowed the energies of participants to flow into the areas
of greatest interest to them, was instrumental in the avoidance of many
of the problems of the self-study approach
—
particularly the necessity
of evaluating and defending the past, of having to prove that the new is
superior to the entrenched old, of having to deal with those with vested
interests in the status quo, and of the problem of collegial decision-
making on institution-wide issues (to be described below).
As to the direction of the changes, Ladd observed a high degree
of similarity in the recommendations of the eleven committees (p. 49 ) on
the five major components of an academic program. In at least three of
these areas the new program of the School was clearly in line with the
recommendations.
—Gurricultim: (Ladd found little support for requirements in
curriculiun. ) The School's flexible, individualized curricul\im required
only courses necessary for state teacher certification, and provided
many options for the satisfaction of those requirements
.
saw grading as
—Grading: (Ladd found that the committees
••threatening" and not giving students an adequate sense of their strengths
and weaknesses.) The pass-fail and portfolio systems adopted by the
School of Education were designed to alleviate these problems.
—Academic structure: (Most studies saw conventional academic
departments as limiting and constricting.) The School's center concept
was an attempt to create a more flexible, free-flowing, transdisciplinary
academic structure.
The reports, according to Ladd, were agreed on the ''often rou-
tine and sometimes deplorable quality of the teaching done by many col—
lege and university professors." Although there is no objective evidence
on the quality of teaching at the School during the period under review,
the School was clearly committed to improved teaching and there are some
indicators that it may have been taking place. For instance, one can
look to Allen's recruiting criteria by which he sought the best and most
exciting teachers; the atypical backgrounds and experience of many of
the instructional staff; the more experiential approach to teaching and
learning developed by many of the planning committees; and the modular-
ized curriculum all of which seem to lead in the direction of improved
teaching—one indicator of the success of which might be the dramatic
increase of undergraduate and graduate students at the School.
The fifth area of concern of the committees was the failure of
advising systems both as channels of information and as instruments of
contact between faculty and students. During the period under review
very little, save for the increase in contact between faculty and doc-
toral students, was done at the School to implement an effective advising
361
Byetem. Thie neglect, it seeme likely, wes brought about by the preee
of other priorities and the fact that there was no effective organised
pressure from master’s and undergraduate students to meet their advising
needs ^needs not felt by the faculty and doctoral students who were re-
sponsible for the planning.
In his conclusions, Ladd delineates the type of leadership that
he feels is necessary for successful academic reform, ",
. .a primary
task of academic leadership is to try to counter the pressures favoring
the status quo by creating or maintaining an atmosphere of receptivity
to change. ''9 it is clear, on the basis of the analysis in Chapter VIII,
that the major focus of Allen's leadership and his leadership strategies
was to create and maintain such an organizational environment.
Comparison with Fashing and Deutsch study
Fashing and Deutsch attribute the failures of innovation in their
studies primarily to destructive reactionary forces, sometimes political,
sometimes academic, and sometimes community and to the inability of the
collegial structure to deal with those forces and to provide effective
leadership for change. As to the former, the School of Education during
the period under review had not, probably because it was a subcomponent
of a large university, received significant outside pressure and it
seemed to have been able to deal effectively in the academic politics
of gaining approval for its programs—although it had, by its methods
of approval, not gained many friends among the Faculty Senate and would
9lbid.
, p. 51*
probably, for the foreseeable future, have to rely on its other sources
of support and political strategies to maintain the needed approvals
from that body. The School's method of resolving the collegiality di-
lemma will be described immediately below.
Avoiding the tyranny of the collegium
All three studies conclude that the collegial form of decision-
making is inappropriate to the achievement of academic change and point
to the inertia, intrinsic conservatism, and collective lack of perspec-
tive of collegial bodies as the single most important factor in the
failure of reform efforts. In view of these conclusions, the commitment
to the development of participation in governance (which system would
presumably have closely approximated the collegial structure) which, as
described in Chapter VII, was enunciated by both the Dean and most com-
munity members, was in fact a thrust in the wrong direction.
That this thrust did not produce a working system of participa-
tive governance despite continued rhetorical support for it from both
the Dean and the commxmity is attributable, as described in Chapter VII,
to a disinterest on the part of the instructional staff in taking the
steps necessary to formalize participation (as a result of the high
degree of academic autonomy granted them by the Dean) and a strong pro-
clivity on the part of the Dean to make policy decisions for the organi-
zation whenever he felt that participation in decisions would have
hampered the change effort.
It becomes evident that the decision-making model just described
which emerged out of the Dean's domination of the planning process is
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very similar to that described by Hefferlin as avuncular—a system in
which overall policy decisions are centralized and specific program
decisions diffused among the instructional staff, and a system which
Hefferlin sees as most appropriate to academic chemge.
Further, as previously described, the Dean's leadership style,
which focused on the creation of an organizational environment conducive
to change, appears very close to that espoused by Ladd for change leader-
ship.
In sum, it appears that the actual decision-nnaking structure
which emerged during the year of planning was, at least according to
Ladd and Hefferlin, a highly appropriate one for avoiding the tyranny
of the collegium and achieving successful academic change. It is some-
what ironic that this system did not appear to have been sought, at
least in terms of stated commitments, by either the Dean or the commu-
nity, and that what was previously described (Chapter VII ) as a failure
to achieve the goal of participative governance could, in faot, in the
perspective of Hefferlin and Ladd's conclusions, be viewed as the suc-
cessful achievement of an appropriate governing mechanism for change.
It should also be pointed out, however, that at the point in
time at which the study ends the issue of appropriate governance for
the School had by no means been resolved. The final Constitution
adopted appears strongly weighted on the participative end of the con-
tinuum, delineating a sharing of policy-making power between the Dean
and School Council and allowing the entire School community to create
policy that would supercede that of the Dean and School Council. It
also, however I confers a number of powers on the Dean that would seem
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appropriate to an avuncular or leader-dominated organization including
an executive budget of up to 10 per cent of general support fxmds, the
right to appoint up to 20 per cent of new faculty and I 5 per cent of
new doctoral students, the right to approve the budget of all grant
money projects, and the right to make policy decisions in all areas,
subject to the review (but not approval) of the School Council.
Thus, those in the comm\mity still committed to participation
could see this document as a blueprint for participation in governance
and the Dean could view it as a legitimization of the continuation of
his previous style—leaving the conflict between participation and
lecider domination essentially unresolved.
Conclusions and Extensions
In this final portion of the dissertation I shall focus on each
of the five major analytical sections of the study, beginning with a
recapitulation of the major conclusions of each section and, for each
section, continuing with a series of extensions based on the analytical
data. These extensions will be of three kinds:
—^hypotheses: in effect predictions based on my analyses which
might be confirmed by subsequent events
—speculations: opinions which I have formed based on the data
and my own biases which there is no way of confirming
—questions: in areas in which I have no firm opinions, but
which are relevant to the data and which may or may not be susceptible
to confirmation by subsequent events.
365
I have followed my recapitulation of conclusions for each sec-
tion with these hypotheses, speculations, and questions based on my
analyses for three reasons. First, as a test of my analyses. If the
extensions tend to be reflected in subsequent events, that will tend to
confirm the validity of my analyses. '•0 Secondly, in the expectation
that such observations might be useful to others attempting a similar
process of reform in avoiding pitfalls or anticipating problems not
evident in the period under review. And thirdly, because many of the
issues covered in my hypotheses, speculations, and conclusions remain
crucial issues in the School of Education at this writing. It is hoped
that these observations might contribute to the resolution of such
issues.
Establishing a Foundation
for Change (Chapter IV)
Conclusions
1 ) That the "critical mass" strategy successfully moved the
orientation of the School from conservatism to innovation
2) That the success of this strategy, in the face of enormous
difficulties, was due primarily to the imagination and energy of Dean
Allen
^^It can be objected that, since three years have passed since
the period under review, I am engaging in a hindsight kind of exercise
—
for example, hypothesizing the occurrence of events which actually did
occur. This criticism has some validity as far as the testing of my
analyses is concerned. However, I have attempted to avoid this pitfall
by making a determined attempt to limit my hypotheses, speculations, and
questions to those arising only out of the text of my analyses—in ef-
fect, to write as if I had no knowledge of subsequent events.
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3) That the support of the University administration was cru-
cial to the success of the critical mass strategy
4) That the unique growth situation of the University was an
important facilitating condition to the success of the strategy
5) That Dean Allen's fund-raising abilities and his control of
funds raised was crucial to the success of this strategy
6) That the adoption of the planning doctoral program was cru-
cial to the success of this strategy
7) That the concentration on the critical mass strategy by Dean
Allen and his staff had the effect of alienating most of the existing
faculty, a factor which did not significantly blunt the innovative
thrust of the School because of the success of the critical mass strategy.
Speculations
1) That the personal recruiting approach used was uniquely
appropriate to the new school since it tended to assure good informal
working relationships cunong people
2) That the "good man" recruiting philosophy was important
since to have hired by "slot" would have tended to predetermine the
structure and focus of the new school
3) That, without the planning doctoral program, the existing
faculty would have been considerably more powerful and attempts at
radical innovation more difficult, acrimonious, and less successful
4) That the planning doctoral program provided the imagination
and manpower without which the planning year would have been considera-
bly more limited in scope and substance
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5) That the fact that the School was funded approximately 50
per cent hy outside, temporary money will require it to continually
renew such funds just to stay even. Such efforts may be successful,
but are subject to two potentially dysfunctional outcomes: (I) that
such money cannot be raised, resulting in a painful contraction of the
School or (2) that the necessity of obtaining available funds pulls
the School in directions unsuited to its educational goals.
Questions
1) Will the personal recruiting strategy, which leaves the
Dean open to charges of "cronyism," become a significant lever for
criticism of the Dean?
2) Will the financial costs of "first—class recruiting" and
high salaries similarly become a lever for criticism?
3 ) Can and should the School move from personal recruiting of
the Dean to more institutionalized recruiting—and if so, how?
4 ) To what extent will the old faculty become integrated into
the School in the fut\ire?
Conclusions
The Retreat (Chapter V)
1) That the Retreat was crucial to the success of the planning
year in that it provided a sense of identity to an initially inchoate
group and facilitated the development of a planning process and the
mechanisms to support that process in the months to come
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2) That the Retreat provided an important opportunity for the
Dean to expand his informal power in the organization
3 ) That the Retreat provided the breeding ground for the
School's subsequent commitment to the elimination of institutional
racism
4) That the Retreat also gave rise to the "myth of community,"
which was to hamper, to some extent, the School's attempt at academic
and organizational innovation in the months to come.
Speculations
1) That, hewi the Retreat not occurred, the ultimate nature of
the School would have been quite different, probably in the direction of
being more limited, less visible and dramatic, more conventionally struc-
tured, and less humanistically oriented
2) That the Retreat, while crucial to beginning the planning,
was equally important in building the informal structures which were to
form the basis of the organization of the School. Therefore, in future
years it will be necessary to hold a Retreat or find its equivalent, as
a means of integrating new members into the organization if the School
is to retain its informal and flexible structures.
Conclusions
Academic Reform (Chapter VI
)
1 ) That the School successfully achieved its conceptual goal
of developing new programs and academic policies
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2) That these programs and policies generally satisfied the
stated goals of diversity, alternatives, and experimentation
3) That these goals were generally consistent with those advo-
cated by contemporary proponents of educational innovation
4) That the School successfully achieved its political goal
of gaining the approval of all appropriate University agencies for its
packaige
5) That the Dean's domination of the organization and his be-
havior and strategies were the central component of the School's success
in achieving both its conceptual and its political goals
6) That the major strength of the planning process pursued was
in the development of specific programs by the planning committees
7 ) That the major weakness of the planning process pursued was
the relatively low participation of School members in the making of
decisions on the overall academic policies of the School
8) That "action planning" was the most successful approach to
the planning process
9) That the fact that the planning was done primarily by fac-
ulty and doctoral students resulted in programs and policies primarily
devoted to their own interests—to the relative exclusion of the inter-
ests of undergreiduate and master's students
10) That the planning period was too short relative to expec-
tations raised for it
11) That the organizational aunbiguities and time pressures of
the process increased the reliance of the entire organization upon the
decisions of the Dean
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12) That the quality of programa developed, although unjudge-
able in the period under review, was not reflected in the generally low
quality of the verbal deaoriptiona contained in the package
13) That the process which resulted in "take it or leave it"
decisions for the University reviewing agencies was a very successful
one for dealing with the "impeding structures" of the University as a
whole.
Hypotheses
1) That irrespective of the actual quality of the programs at
the time of package consideration, approval of the package provided the
opportunity for conceptualization and implementation of new programs at
a more careful, considered pace—a, fact which would tend to increase
the potential for success of such programs
2) That for hoth internal and external reasons the new programs
must develop appropriate evaluation methodologies if the School is to
fulfill the potential of its strong beginning
3) That the construction of these methodologies will be diffi-
cult for the School since it will involve behavior in many ways inimical
to the values and attitudes of those in the School at November I969
—
particularly since for evaluation specific goals must be explicitly
stated, programs must be carefully documented, and results conscien-
tiously examined. The tenor of this kind of behavior is different from
that of November I969 which, in general, emphasized innovation without
particular reference to explicitly stated goals, and activity as opposed
to documentation and examination of activity
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4) That in subsequent years the School will move from the
period of innovation and entrepreneurial activity to one of implementa-
tion and consolidation—not necessarily an easy transition
5) That, since not all participated in the decisions about
overall academic policies, it is possible that many policies will not
be followed or enforced by the faculty
6) That, for this reason, there may be considerable altera-
tions in academic policies in the future
7) That the ’Hake it or leave it" strategy used so successfully
for approval of the package by the Faculty Senate and other reviewing
agencies also had the effect of creating considerable ill-will, and may
have created a backlash effect which will hamper rational dealings with
these groups in the future.
Speculations
1 ) That in two important areas the School was not as innova-
tive as it might have been. The Center concept, for one, was proposed
as "Structure Alpha" by the Dean in July 1968 ^^ and elaborated by two
faculty members in August of that year.^^ In the entire planning year
no important improvements were made on the concepts of these two docu-
ments. The Doctoral Progreun, for another, which was finally adopted
was almost identical to that established by the Dean in February I 968
^
^Dwight W. Allen, Memorandum "Strategies and Logistics for Plan-
ning" to Faculty and Planning Staff, July 23, 19^8, p. 3.
^
^[Robert L. Woodbury and F. Thomas Clark] "The School of Educa-
tion, University of Massachusetts" [August 19^8], distributed in memo-
randiim from Earl Seidman to Faculty and Special Doctoral Stvidents,
September 10, I 968 .
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as the Planning Doctoral Program. No important changes were made in
that program during the entire year of planning.
2) Had there been more attention paid by the Dean to the work
of the planning committees, perhaps a requirement that they report
their progress more often, more productivity would have resulted.
3) Had the planning groups paid more attention to the process
of planning, for example by exchanging data on how they were going
about the planning, it is possible that the inefficiencies of "theoreti-
cal planning" would not have been perpetuated so long.
Questions
1 ) Can this innovative spirit be successfully institutional-
ized? Caji one institution handle innovation, implementation, evalua-
tion and cessation of programs all at once and also handle the
education and credentialing of graduate and undergraduate students?
2) Can new directions be sustained in the absence of the normal
academic rigor/intellectual honesty evaluative criteria?
Governance/Organization Building (Chapter VII
)
Conclusions
1 ) That although both the Dean and most members of the commu-
nity proclaimed their commitment to the development of a participative
form of organization, the School emerged from its year of planning with
a leader-dominated form of organization
2) That the responsibility for this failure to achieve the
stated goal lies with the Dean, with the Executive Committee, and with
the entire School community, each of whom was responding to different
needs, but all of whom suffered from an ambivalency between the achieve-
ment of academic change and the achievement of participative governance,
not realizing the extensive areas of incompatibility between the two,
and opting for change over participation at all important decision
points
3) That in fact neither the faculty nor the students were as
a group particularly interested in becoming involved in the overall
governance of the School except as it affected their own personal and
professional interests—^which concern seemed to have been fulfilled in
the autonomy granted them by the Dean
4) That the leader-dominated form of decision-making which
emerged was, in fact, highly appropriate for the reform effort at the
School
5) That the time, energy, and focus futilely expended by mem-
bers of the Executive Committee on the conceptualization of a democratic
constitution represented an important lose of leadership for the com-
munity
6) That the conflict within the Dean between change and par-
ticipation precipitated a growing credibility gap between the Dean euid
many members of the community
7) That while the Executive Committee avoided making specific
decisions to theorize about a constitution, the Dean, by making such
decisions, was in fact establishing governing mechanisms in the School.
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Hypotheses
1 ) That the leader-^iominated mode of governance will not be
significantly altered by the adoption of the constitution
2) That the inherent conflict between participation and
leader domination will be a source of serious difficulty until satis-
factorily resolved
3) That as the School moves into its implementation phase
issues of power and authority will become increasingly important
4) That one result of the leader-dominated strategy will be
that upon Deem Allen's departure there will be no organized group at
the School with sufficient status and power to ensure that the ideals
espoused by the Dean are carried on in the School.
Speculations
1) That had the Executive Committee been willing to confront
Dean Allen on the basic issues of power and authority early in the
period, out of that confrontation would have come a compromise more in
the direction of participation, but still satisfactory to the Dean
2) That had Dean Allen moved to really share power with the
Executive Committee, they would, had they accepted it, have come to
operate pretty much as an "Assistant Dean Committee."
Questions
1) What would have happened if, from the beginning, the Dean
had announced his intention to maintain most of the power and authority
over major decisions of the organization?
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On Leader-Dominated Change (Chapter VIII
)
ConcluBions
1 ) That the most important factor in the achievement of radi-
cal change at the School of Education was the change strategies of Dean
Allen, which strategies, to be effective, required that he dominate
the organization
2) That the achievement of domination over the organization
depended on the accTimulation of most of the formal and informal power
in the organization, the latter involving particularly control of the
flexible sources of money in the organization
3) That the successful employment of many of these change
strategies in the organization tended to increase the Dean's domina-
tion over the organization
4) That many of these strategies are replicable by other per-
sons or organizations, even in non-leeuier-dominated modes of organiza-
tions
5) That leadership principles implicit in these strategies are
useful in deriving other strategies for other leaders in other organiza-
tional settings
6) That the principles of organizational susceptibility to
change are also useful to the development of other change strategies
7) That leader domination is an excellent platform for risk-
taking—for operating on the edge of viability.
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Hypotheses
1) That as long as Allen remains Dean the School will remain
fundamentally leader dominated and generally innovative
2) That Dean Allen's domination of the organization has put him
in a highly vulnerable position personally, as all blame as well as all
credit runs to him and it is a characteristic of innovation that criti-
cism arises before credit
3) That during Dean Allen's tenure the School will continually
remain in a highly volatile condition since it lacks the cushion which
bureaucracy and "normal procedures" afford
4) That the Dean must maintain the support of the University
administration and a critical mass of faculty to retain his position.
His style has created a pack of predators howling in the distance, wait-
ing for him to stumble
5) That to successfully lead the implementation stage of the
School's existence Dean Allen will have to alter his style to some extent
to increase the value put on conscientious implementation and evaluation
6) That the glue which holds the School together under the
Dean's domination, control of flexible money, charisma, knowledge of most
of the activities of the School, and personal contact with most members,
will tend to crumble with increasing niimbers, and new forms of control
and governance must be found.
Speculation
1) That considerably less radical and thoroughgoing change would
have taken place had Dean Allen chosen to govern the School in a more
participative mode.
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Summary
The change effort at the School of Education under the strong
and decisive leadership of Dean Allen represented a bold attack on the
most pervasive problem confronting contemporary higher education, its
inability to change in response to rapid change in the social and tech-
nological environment surrounding it—a problem which many have taken on
and few have made significant progress in overcoming. The academic reforms
actually achieved by the School during the period under review are of
considerable significance viewed in this perspective and the nature of
these reforms, in the direction of experimentation, options, student re-
sponsibility, social action, and continuing innovation appears consistent
with directions proposed by the major commissions on higher education of
the past five years.
The means by which reform was achieved are equally significant,
particularly in the perspective of recent evidence that the collegial
decision-making system employed by most institutions of higher education
appears inappropriate to the accomplishment of institution-wide academic
change. The principal components by which change was achieved at the
School of Education included the establishment of a critical mass of
change-oriented people to create an organization committed to reform
rather than to the maintenance of the status quo, the suspension of busi-
ness as usual to focus the energies of the entire group on change for a
year, the uniquely effective leswiership strategies of the Dean who con-
trolled the major sources of power in the orgajiization and used his posi-
tion of dominance to motivate those within the organization toward change
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and to protect the organization as a whole from premature intervention
from without, and the emergence of a decision-making model in which
institution-wide policy decisions were centralized in the Dean and spe-
cific academic program decisions were diffused among the entire instruc-
tional staff. This decision-making model appears to be highly appropriate
for change leadership in that it avoids the tyranny of the collegium,
while permitting substantial input into the change effort by members of
the instructional staff.
As one views the achievement of the School of Education it is
easy to become overenthusiast ic over the School's accomplishments in
conquering age-old problems during the period under review. One must
balance this optimism with the realization that the 26 months are only
a beginning, albeit a remarkably strong one, and that the specific aca-
demic reforms adopted will require successful implementation and evalua-
tion; that at the end of the period described the School had not as yet
resolved the tension between participative and leader-dominated govern-
ance; that the approval of the School's new programs and policies was
still conditional, and that many were waiting in the wings to hasten
its return to "normality"
;
that the leader-dominated mode of decision-
malcing, while proven effective for quick and radical change, had yet to
be proven in the long run for an orgajiization which, to be successful,
would have to include a large number of strong, independent educators
who might not as easily accept the domination of one man once the ini-
tial thrust of radical change had been passed; and finally that during
the period under review the School had not even begun to address the prob-
lems inherent in the course of growth which it appeared to have charted
,1
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for itself, most particularly in the effect of growth on the maintenance
of the Dean's leadership style and of a shared sense of purpose and cora-
mxmity in the School.
Despite the above caveats, however, one must conclude on the
basis of this study that the achievements of the School of Education in
the period under review represent significant progress in overcoming the
chronic problem of inertia which has plagued American higher education
throxxghout its history, and that its efforts are worthy of close study,
analysis, and consideration by those seriously interested in change in
higher education.
APPENDICES
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